Annual Report

1.1 During the year 1999-2000, the Indian economy exhibited a good degree of resilience. Economic growth continued to be in line with the trend in the post 1991 period, notwithstanding deceleration in agricultural output. Industry showed recovery while the services sector surged ahead, led by some of the fast rising segments such as construction and software. Monetary conditions were supportive of growth. Interest rates softened. The combined gross fiscal deficit of both the Central and State governments increased particularly due to a sharp rise in the fiscal deficit position of State governments. The monetary policy efforts in ensuring availability of sufficient credit at reasonable interest rates were facilitated by the general absence of inflationary pressures in the economy, although towards the close of the year, the inflation rate moved up due to revisions in certain administered prices. The external sector gained in strength with the enlargement of the invisible surplus and capital inflows. Foreign exchange reserves increased by about US $ 5.5 billion in 1999-2000.

1.2 A significant aspect of recent economic developments is the increasing influence of economic and financial market conditions in industrial economies on external payment and growth prospects in emerging market economies, including India. During 1999-2000, with the global growth and trade prospects improving significantly, almost all crisis affected South-East Asian economies and economies in other parts of Asia posted higher economic growth and experienced relatively stable financial market conditions.

1.3 In respect of India, however, there were three distinct developments that had a bearing on the domestic economic situation and policy evolution during 1999-2000. First, the border conflict in Kargil, which began in the first week of May 1999 and lasted for about two months, placed considerable pressure on government finances and created uncertainty in the financial markets. The additional defence expenditure had to be absorbed in the government budget, resulting in an adverse impact on the fiscal position. Secondly, the economic sanctions imposed by a number of western countries including the US and Japan on India, following the nuclear tests in May 1998, continued to cast their shadow in 1999-2000, notwithstanding some relaxations in November 1998 and October 1999. The Indian economy, however, could cope with the sanctions without much of adverse consequences, mainly because of heightened investor confidence as reflected in the increase in capital flows. Thirdly, the increase in international oil prices inflated the oil import bill.

1.4 The Reserve Bank proceeded with the policy of cautious liberalisation of the external sector. Several measures were undertaken to facilitate capital flows. First, the cutoff date for forward exchange cover to foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in respect of their equity investments was changed from June 11, 1998 to March 31, 1999 and authorised dealers (ADs) were permitted to provide forward exchange cover to FIIs to the extent of 15.0 per cent of their outstanding equity investments as at the close of business on March 31, 1999 and the entire amount of investments undertaken thereafter. Secondly, Indian companies were permitted to issue rights/bonus shares and non-convertible debentures to non-residents subject to certain conditions. Moreover, Indian mutual funds were allowed to issue units and similar instruments under schemes approved by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to FIIs with repatriation benefits. Foreign corporates and high net worth individuals were permitted to invest in Indian markets through SEBI registered FIIs. Thirdly, policies in respect of external commercial borrowings (ECBs) were substantially liberalised. Fourthly, foreign direct investments in all sectors, except for a small negative list, were placed under the automatic route. Fifthly, Indian companies engaged in knowledge based sectors like information technology, pharmaceuticals, bio-technology and entertainment software were permitted to acquire overseas companies engaged in the same line of activity through stock swap options up to US $ 100 million or 10 times the export earnings during the preceding financial year on an automatic basis. Investments up to US$50 million subject to certain conditions can be made by Indian parties in joint ventures abroad/wholly owned subsidiaries without prior approval of the Reserve Bank/Government of India and those proposals of investment involving amounts in excess of US $ 50 million will be considered for approval by the Special Committee on Overseas Investment. Finally, the minimum maturity of FCNR(B) deposits was raised to one year from six months with a view to elongating the maturity profile of external debt.

1.5 The Export Import (EXIM) Policy for 1997-2002 had attempted to liberalise the trade regime with a view to improving the national export performance. In continuation of this process, modifications announced on March 31, 2000 introduced a number of important fresh initiatives and also significant changes in some of the existing policies/procedures. These include export promotion measures such as extension of the hitherto sector-specific Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) Scheme to all sectors and to all capital goods without any threshold limit, several sector-specific measures, e.g., for gems and jewellery, silk, leather, handicrafts and garments, drugs, pharmaceuticals, agro-chemicals and bio-technology along with a scheme for granting assistance to States for the development of export related infrastructure on the basis of their export performance. Reflecting India’s international commitments, 714 out of 1,429 restricted items have been shifted from the Special Import Licence (SIL) list to the Open General Licence (OGL) list. The remaining items would be moved to the OGL list by March 31, 2001 by which time the SIL list would be abolished. Pharmaceutical and biotech firms would be able to import R&D equipment and goods duty-free up to 1 per cent of free on board (fob) value of their exports. The EXIM policy proposes to set up special economic zones (SEZs) in different parts of the country, which would be able to access capital goods and raw materials duty-free from abroad and from the domestic tariff area (DTA) without payment of terminal excise duty on the condition of achieving positive net foreign exchange earning as a percentage of exports annually and cumulatively for a period of five years from the commencement of commercial production. Sales to DTA would, however, be permitted on payment of full applicable customs duty. The EXIM policy also places emphasis on e-commerce - electronic data interchange including filing, processing and disposal of application forms.

1.6 The gross fiscal deficit (GFD) of the Central Government increased to 5.6 per cent of GDP in the revised estimates from 4.0 per cent in the budget estimates, partly reflecting cyclical, unforeseen and security related factors. The combined state government fiscal deficit also increased sharply. In this context, issues relating to devolution of finances between the Centre and the States and specified aspects of Centre-State fiscal relations have been examined by the Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC), which submitted its final report in July 2000.

1.7 Monetary management has increasingly focussed on multiple indicators in order to influence domestic liquidity conditions. The strategy followed here was one of offsetting autonomous liquidity flows with discretionary flows. Given the thinness of the Indian foreign exchange market, the Reserve Bank had to ensure orderly conditions through pre-emptive and remedial measures. Pressures in the foreign exchange market emerged in May/ June and end-August 1999. During this period, liquidity was appropriately tuned. Once normalcy was restored, the Reserve Bank could ease monetary conditions by reducing reserve requirements and rates consistent with the domestic credit demand.

1.8 One of the important characteristics of 1999-2000 is the softening of the interest rate structure, despite an increase in the fiscal deficit. The key interest rates decided by the Reserve Bank, such as the Bank Rate, the repo rate and the interest rate on savings deposits, have come down substantially. The Reserve Bank has also reduced reserve requirements in order to reduce the implicit tax imposed on banks by such statutory preemptions and cut down banks’ borrowing costs. The other domestic interest rates are left to the banks to decide except in the cases of credit extended under the DRI scheme and of credits of up to Rs.2 lakh. However, a number of structural factors prevent financial entities, especially banks, from quickly responding to changes in the inflation rate while deciding on the nominal interest rates they charge on their lending or offer on deposits. For example, the post-tax return on bank deposits remains lower than those on contractual savings such as the Provident Fund and the National Saving Scheme. The higher fixed rate on long-term deposits raised in the past when interest rates were ruling high as also the high level of non-performing assets (NPAs), besides the high administrative costs of the banking system have limited the flexible use of the interest rate as an instrument of financial intermediation.

1.9 The experience of the past year suggested that flexibility should be the guiding principle in respect of both deposit and lending rates as also in regard to the maturity structures. This was, to an extent, addressed in the Monetary and Credit Policy announcement for the year 2000-01. Nonetheless in 2000-01, there are several challenges to be faced, and dilemmas resolved. Among these, the significant ones are: managing the large Government borrowing programme, meeting the increasing credit needs of the growing economy, maintaining reasonable interest rates and financing the continuing high oil import bill.

1.10 The course of monetary management in 1999-2000 could be categorised into three phases, viz., Phase I (April-May 1999), Phase II (June-October 1999) and Phase III (November 1999-March 2000).

1.11 The Reserve Bank was able to ease monetary conditions following the turnaround of capital flows in March 1999. The Reserve Bank reduced the Bank Rate by one percentage point to 8.0 per cent at the close of business on March 1, 1999 and the fixed repo rate by two percentage points to 6.0 per cent, effective March 2, 1999. The Reserve Bank reduced the cash reserve ratio (CRR) by 0.5 percentage point, effective the fortnight beginning March 13, 1999 releasing, in the process, Rs.3,100 crore in terms of lendable resources to the banking system. In response, major public sector banks reduced their deposit rates and prime lending rates. The Reserve Bank continued to ease monetary conditions by reducing the CRR by a further 0.5 percentage point, effective the fortnight beginning May 8, 1999.

1.12 The situation changed during the second phase as capital flows dried up in end-May 1999. The resultant volatility in the foreign exchange market, was, however, quickly contained as a result of the Reserve Bank’s operations in the foreign exchange market and the money market coupled with the reiteration of its intention to meet demand and supply mismatches. There was a second bout of volatility in the foreign exchange market in end-August 1999. The Reserve Bank was again able to restore orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market with a similar mix of foreign exchange and money market operations and announcement effects. The Reserve Bank continued to align short-term interest rates with the interest rates implied in in the forward market premia in order to pre-empt funds from flowing into the foreign exchange market, in view of the prevailing excess demand conditions. This was achieved by modulating discretionary liquidity through export credit refinance to commercial banks and liquidity support to primary dealers (PDs), which resulted in the firming up of call rates. The Reserve Bank also continued with its policy of accepting private placements/devolvements of government paper when the domestic conditions were tight and offloading them in the market when the situation eased. Thus the Reserve Bank was able to modulate monetary and interest rate conditions using an array of mostly indirect monetary policy instruments such as open market operations and money market support to banks and primary dealers.

1.13 The third phase saw the return of excess supply conditions in the foreign exchange market with the turnaround in capital flows. This, in turn, allowed the Bank to ease monetary conditions further. The cash reserve ratio was reduced by one percentage point in two stages of 50 basis points each, effective the fortnights beginning November 6 and November 20, 1999, respectively. This augmented commercial banks’ lendable resources by about Rs.7,000 crore. Effective the fortnight beginning November 6, 1999, the liabilities under the FCNR(B) scheme were exempted from incremental CRR requirements of 10.0 per cent (over the April 11, 1997 level). The supply of discretionary liquidity through the reduction in reserve requirements allowed banks to retire their borrowings from the Reserve Bank. Call rates thus eased below the Bank Rate. Further, as a result of the return of stability in the foreign exchange market, the Bank withdrew the stipulation of a minimum interest rate of 20.0 per cent per annum on overdue export bills and the interest rate surcharge of 30.0 per cent on import finance imposed in January 1998.

1.14 The Reserve Bank introduced a ';Special Liquidity Support'; facility for the period December 1, 1999 to January 31, 2000 with a view to enabling banks to meet any unanticipated additional demand for liquidity in the context of the century date change. Banks were allowed to avail of liquidity to the extent of their excess holdings of Central Government dated securities/ Treasury Bills over the required statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) at the rate of 2.5 percentage points over and above the Bank Rate. Further, with a view to enabling the banks to meet any unanticipated surge in currency demand on account of the century date change, cash in hand, amounting to about Rs.4,500 crore, with banks was allowed to be included for compliance of CRR requirements during the same period.

1.15 The Reserve Bank continued to ease monetary conditions in April 2000 through a package of measures. The CRR was reduced by one percentage point to 8.0 per cent in two equal stages, effective April 8 and April 22, 2000, augmenting the lendable resources with commercial banks by about Rs.7,200 crore. The Reserve Bank reduced the Bank Rate by one percentage point to 7.0 per cent, effective the close of business on April 1, 2000. The fixed rate repo rate was reduced by one percentage point to 5.0 per cent, effective April 3, 2000. The Reserve Bank cut the savings deposit rate of scheduled commercial banks by 0.5 percentage point to 4.0 per cent, effective April 3, 2000. Comfortable liquidity conditions allowed commercial banks and primary dealers to redeem their borrowings (Rs.11,172 crore) from the Reserve Bank by April 21, 2000, thereby easing call rates below the Bank Rate. There was a general softening of interest rates across the maturity spectrum.

1.16 May 2000 saw a return of excess demand conditions in the foreign exchange market, mainly on account of large oil import payments and a slowdown in capital inflows. The Reserve Bank undertook net sales of US $ 1,948 million during May-June 2000 to meet temporary demand-supply mismatches. The resultant gap put pressure on money market conditions, driving up banks’ and PDs’ recourse to the Reserve Bank by Rs.7,236 crore by June 30, and thereby nudging up call rates above the Bank Rate especially during the second half of May and June 2000. The Reserve Bank accepted private placements/ devolvements amounting to Rs.6,961 crore. The Centre’s ways and means advances (WMA) declined by Rs.6,859 crore.

1.17 In order to reduce the uncertainty in the foreign exchange market, the Reserve Bank undertook the following policy actions on May 25, 2000: (i) an interest rate surcharge of 50 per cent of the lending rate on import finance was imposed with effect from May 26, 2000, as a temporary measure, on all non-essential imports; (ii) it was indicated that the Reserve Bank would meet, partially or fully, the Government debt service payments directly as considered necessary; (iii) arrangements would be made to meet, partially or fully, the foreign exchange requirements for import of crude oil by the Indian Oil Corporation; (iv) the Reserve Bank would continue to sell US dollars through the State Bank of India in order to augment supply in the market or intervene directly as considered necessary to meet any temporary demand-supply imbalances; (v) banks would charge interest at 25 per cent per annum (minimum) from the date the bill falls due for payment in respect of overdue export bills in order to discourage any delay in realisation of export proceeds; (vi) ADs acting on behalf of FIIs could approach the Reserve Bank to procure foreign exchange at the prevailing market rate and the Reserve Bank would, depending on market conditions, either sell the foreign exchange directly or advise the concerned bank to buy it in the market; and (vii) banks were advised to enter into transactions in the foreign exchange market only on the basis of genuine requirements and not for the purpose of building up speculative positions. In response to these measures, the rupee regained stability and traded within a narrow range of Rs.44.57-Rs.44.79 per US dollar during June 2000.

1.18 The introduction of the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) effective June 5, 2000, allowed the Reserve Bank an additional lever for influencing short-term liquidity conditions. With the persistence of pressures in the foreign exchange market, the Reserve Bank conducted reverse repo auctions, averaging about Rs.3,000 crore, at interest rates which increased from 9.05 per cent as on June 9 to 10.85 per cent as on June 14. The Reserve Bank rejected all bids in the June 16, 2000 auction. Reacting to this, inter-bank call rates went up to 28.0 per cent. The Reserve Bank accepted reverse repos (Rs.1,350 crore) at 13.5 per cent as on June 19, 2000 and gradually scaled down the reverse repo rate to 12.25 per cent as on June 28, 2000 with the return of stability in the foreign exchange market.

1.19 The exchange rate of the rupee, which was bound in the range of Rs. 44.68-Rs. 44.74 per US dollar during the first half of July 2000, depreciated to Rs. 45.02 per US dollar on July 21, 2000. On a review of developments in the international and domestic financial markets, including the foreign exchange market, the Reserve Bank took the following measures on July 21, 2000: (i) the Bank Rate was increased by 1 percentage point from 7 per cent to 8 per cent as at the close of business on July 21, 2000; (ii) CRR was increased by 0.5 percentage point from 8 per cent to 8.5 per cent in two stages by 0.25 percentage point each, effective July 29, 2000 and August 12, 2000, respectively; and (iii) the limits available to banks for refinance facilities including the collateralised lending facility (CLF) were reduced temporarily to the extent of 50 per cent of the eligible limits under two equal stages effective from July 29, 2000 and August 12, 2000. In early August, the Reserve Bank also introduced special repo auctions of more than one day maturity to absorb excess liquidity.

1.20 The Reserve Bank continued to play a major role in the development of financial markets and improvement of credit delivery systems. In order to provide greater flexibility, the Reserve Bank has attempted to move gradually towards provision of a daily liquidity adjustment facility in the Indian money markets. The Interim Liquidity Adjustment Facility (ILAF) introduced in April 1999 was replaced in June 2000 by a full fledged liquidity adjustment facility in which liquidity would be injected through reverse repo auctions and liquidity would be sucked out through repo auctions. This is being introduced in stages.

1.21 The Reserve Bank undertook several measures to further facilitate the deregulation and flexibility in interest rates. First, the Reserve Bank allowed banks the freedom to prescribe different prime lending rates (PLRs) for different maturities. Banks were accorded the freedom to charge interest rates without reference to the PLR in case of certain specified loans. Banks may also offer fixed rate term-loans in conformity with the ALM guidelines. Secondly, scheduled commercial banks (excluding regional rural banks), PDs and all-India financial institutions were allowed to undertake forward rate agreements (FRAs)/interest rate swaps (IRS) for hedging and market making. Corporates and mutual funds were allowed to undertake these transactions for hedging balance sheet exposures. The Reserve Bank would also consider requests for hedging commodity price exposures from Indian corporates in specified products, such as over-the-counter (OTC) futures contracts, based on average prices, categories of options contracts, etc. Thirdly, the Reserve Bank allowed the interest rates that are implied in the foreign forward exchange market to be used as an additional benchmark to price rupee interest rate derivatives and facilitate integration between money and foreign exchange markets.

1.22 A Working Group was constituted by the Reserve Bank to explore the possibilities of setting up a Credit Information Bureau in India (Chairman: Shri N.H.Siddiqui). Based on its recommendations and realising the need for development of better institutional mechanisms for sharing of credit related information, the Union Budget 2000-01 announced the establishment of a Credit Information Bureau. The Reserve Bank advised banks and FIs in April 2000 to make necessary in-house arrangements for transmittal of the appropriate information to the Bureau.

1.23 With the passing of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) Act, 1999, banks and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have been permitted to enter the insurance business. The Reserve Bank issued guidelines in this regard. These are felt necessary in view of the fact that the insurance business does not break-even during the initial years of operation and that the banks and NBFCs do not have adequate actuarial and technical expertise in undertaking insurance business.

1.24 The Reserve Bank issued guidelines to banks for operation of gold deposit schemes. The Reserve Bank also granted in-principle approval for an assaying and hallmarking venture to be set up by the State Bank of India (SBI) as its subsidiary, with equity participation from Allahabad Bank, Corporation Bank, Canara Bank and Credit Suisse Financial Products, London.

1.25 In view of the need for promoting and sustaining financial stability and in the light of the international discussions on transparency practices and standards in different financial sector activities, the Reserve Bank appointed a Standing Committee on International Financial Standards and Codes (Chairman: Dr. Y.V. Reddy) in order to identify and monitor developments in global standards and codes being evolved and consider the applicability of these standards and codes to the Indian financial system and chalk out a road map for aligning India’s standards and practices with international best practices. The Reserve Bank has already initiated several measures in order to achieve greater transparency in banking operations by closely complying with the Core Principles for effective banking supervision prescribed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Reserve Bank issued a self-assessment of the Core Principles in operation in Indian banking.

1.26 In line with the recommendations of the second Narasimham Committee, the Mid-Term Review of the Monetary and Credit Policy of October 1999 announced a gamut of measures to strengthen the banking system. Important measures on strengthening the health of banks included: (i) assigning of risk weight of 2.5 per cent to cover market risk in respect of investments in securities outside the SLR by March 31, 2001 (over and above the existing 100 per cent risk weight) in addition to a similar prescription for Government and other approved securities by March 31, 2000, and (ii) lowering of the exposure ceiling in respect of an individual borrower from 25 per cent of the bank’s capital fund to 20 per cent, effective April 1, 2000.

1.27 Out of the 27 public sector banks (PSBs), 26 PSBs achieved the minimum capital to risk assets ratio (CRAR) of 9 per cent by March 2000. Of this, 22 PSBs had CRAR exceeding 10 per cent. To enable the PSBs to operate in a more competitive manner, the Government adopted a policy of providing autonomous status to these banks, subject to certain benchmarks. As at end-March 1999, 17 PSBs became eligible for autonomous status.

1.28 The Reserve Bank persevered with the on-going process of strengthening prudential accounting norms with the objective of improving the financial soundness of banks and to bring them at par with international standards. The Reserve Bank advised PSBs to set up Settlement Advisory Committees (SACs) for timely and speedier settlement of NPAs in the small scale sector, viz., small scale industries, small business including trading and personal segment and the agricultural sector. The guidelines on SACs were aimed at reducing the stock of NPAs by encouraging the banks to go in for compromise settlements in a transparent manner. Since the progress in the recovery of NPAs has not been encouraging, a review of the scheme was undertaken and revised guidelines were issued to PSBs in July 2000 to provide a simplified, non-discriminatory and non-discretionary mechanism for the recovery of the stock of NPAs in all sectors. The guidelines will remain operative till March 2001. Recognising that the high level of NPAs in the PSBs can endanger financial system stability, the Union Budget 2000-01 announced the setting up of seven more Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) for speedy recovery of bad loans. An amendment in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, was effected to expedite the recovery process.

1.29 The Reserve Bank advised banks in February 1999 to put in place an ALM system, effective April 1, 1999 and set up internal asset liability management committees (ALCOs) at the top management level to oversee its implementation. Banks were expected to cover at least 60 per cent of their liabilities and assets in the interim and 100 per cent of their business by April 1, 2000. The Reserve Bank also released ALM system guidelines in January 2000 for all-India term-lending and refinancing institutions, effective April 1, 2000. As per the guidelines, banks and such institutions were required to prepare statements on liquidity gaps and interest rate sensitivity at specified periodic intervals.

1.30 The Reserve Bank issued detailed guidelines for risk management systems in banks in October 1999, encompassing credit, market and operational risks. Banks would put in place loan policies, approved by their boards of directors, covering the methodologies for measurement, monitoring and control of credit risk. The guidelines also require banks to evaluate their portfolios on an on-going basis, rather than at a time close to the balance sheet date. As regards off-balance sheet exposures, the current and potential credit exposures may be measured on a daily basis. Banks were also asked to fix a definite time-frame for moving over to the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and duration approaches for the measurement of interest rate risk. The banks were also advised to evolve detailed policy and operative framework for operational risk management. These guidelines together with ALM guidelines would serve as a benchmark for banks which are yet to establish an integrated risk management system.

1.31 As a move towards greater transparency, banks were directed to disclose the following additional information in the ‘Notes to Accounts’ in the balance sheets from the accounting year ended March 31, 2000: (i) maturity pattern of loans and advances, investment securities, deposits and borrowings, (ii) foreign currency assets and liabilities, (iii) movements in NPAs and (iv) lending to sensitive sectors as defined by the Reserve Bank from time to time.

1.32 In India, banks as well as other financial entities have entered the domain of information technology and computer networking. A satellite-based Wide Area Network (WAN) would provide a reliable communication framework for the financial sector. The Indian Financial Network (INFINET) was inaugurated in June 1999. It is based on satellite communication using VSAT technology and would enable faster connectivity within the financial sector. The INFINET would serve as the communication backbone of the proposed Integrated Payment and Settlement System (IPSS). The Reserve Bank constituted a National Payments Council (Chairman: Shri S. P. Talwar) in 1999-2000 to focus on the policy parameters for developing an IPSS with a real time gross settlement (RTGS) system as the core.

1.33 The Reserve Bank had set up a Working Group (Chairman: Shri M. S. Verma) to suggest measures for the revival of weak PSBs in February 1999. The Working Group, in its report submitted in October 1999, suggested that an analysis of the performance based on a combination of seven parameters covering three major areas of i) solvency (capital adequacy ratio and coverage ratio), ii) earnings capacity (return on assets and net interest margin) and iii) profitability (operating profit to average working funds, cost to income and staff cost to net interest income plus all other income) could serve as the framework for identifying the weakness of banks. PSBs were, accordingly, classified into three categories depending on whether none, all or some of the seven parameters were met. The Group primarily focussed on restructuring of three banks, viz., Indian Bank, UCO Bank and United Bank of India, identified as weak as they did not satisfy any (or most) of the seven parameters. The Group also suggested a two-stage restructuring process, whereby focus would be on restoring competitive efficiency in stage one, with the options of privatisation and/or merger assuming relevance only in stage two.

1.34 Reforming the deposit insurance system, as observed by the Narasimham Committee (1998), is a crucial component of the present phase of financial sector reforms in India. The Reserve Bank constituted a Working Group (Chairman: Shri Jagdish Capoor) to examine the issue of deposit insurance which submitted its report in October 1999. Some of the major recommendations of the Group are : (i) fixing the capital of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) at Rs.500 crore, contributed fully by the Reserve Bank, (ii) withdrawing the function of credit guarantee on loans from DICGC and (iii) risk-based pricing of the deposit insurance premium in lieu of the present flat rate system. A new law, in supercession of the existing enactment, is required to be passed in order to implement the recommendations. The task of preparing the new draft law has been taken up. The relevant proposals in this respect would be forwarded to the Government for consideration.

1.35 The process of registration of NBFCs is a continuous one. The Reserve Bank (Amendment) Act 1997 had allowed a period of three years to NBFCs which did not have the statutory minimum net owned funds (NoF) of Rs.25 lakh at the commencement of the Act to attain the minimum NoF and thus become eligible for registration. The three-year time period expired on January 9, 2000. Out of 26,938 NBFCs whose NoF was less than Rs.25 lakh as on January 9, 2000, as many as 8,070 NBFCs have reported to have stepped up their NoF to Rs.25 lakh or more, thus becoming eligible for registration. In addition, the Reserve Bank received 2,211 applications for extension of time. As per the provisions in the Act and NBFC Acceptance of Public Deposits (Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998, NBFCs with NoF less than Rs.25 lakh are not entitled to accept fresh public deposits. In the case of new NBFCs, which commence the business of a non-bank financial institution as on or after April 21, 1999, and which seek registration with the Reserve Bank, the requirement of minimum NoF was raised to Rs.2 crore. As on June 30, 2000, the Reserve Bank has granted certificates of registration to 679 companies permitting them to accept public deposits and to 8,451 companies without authorisation for acceptance of public deposits.

1.36 The traditional division between banks (as providers of working capital) and FIs (as providers of project finance) is increasingly getting blurred with the deepening of financial reforms and integration of financial markets. There is a need to gradually put in place a regulatory framework which will facilitate eventually the transition to universal banking. The Reserve Bank undertook a number of policy measures during 1999-2000, relating to the prudential regulation and supervision of all India term-lending and refinancing institutions. Effective March 31, 2000, a risk weight of 2.5 per cent was assigned to all securities to cover the market risk over and above the existing 20-100 per cent credit risk weight assigned to different types of securities. The Reserve Bank issued prudential norms relating to the assignment of risk weight, asset classification and provisioning in respect of such take-out financing by FIs. With a view to moving towards the international standards of 15 per cent, the exposure ceiling in respect of all-India term-lending institutions for individual borrowers was reduced from the present level of 25 per cent to 20 per cent of their capital funds, effective April 1, 2000. However, the exposures in excess of 20 per cent existing as on October 31, 1999 are required to be brought down to 20 per cent by end-October 2001. On the resource raising front, all-India financial institutions have also been recently accorded the freedom to determine interest rates on term-deposits. On June 21, 2000, the Reserve Bank also issued a new set of guidelines providing FIs with greater flexibility in resource mobilisation through bond issues.

II The Real Economy

2.1 The overall economic performance during 1999-2000 remained robust. The real GDP growth of 6.4 per cent, although a shade lower than that of 6.8 per cent in 1998-99, was in line with the average rate for the period 1992-93 to 1999-2000. The slowdown in the growth of agriculture and allied activities from 7.2 per cent in 1998-99 to 1.3 per cent in 1999-2000 was compensated by a strong increase in industrial growth from 3.7 per cent to 7.5 per cent and an improvement in the services sector’s growth from 8.0 per cent to 8.7 per cent. A number of manufacturing industries staged a recovery, with growth rates in 1999-2000 higher than those in the preceding two years. The growth of the services sector was driven by the higher rates of expansion of ‘construction’, ‘financing, insurance, real estate and business services’ segment, especially computer software. Both industry and services showed improvement in 1999-2000 over their respective average growth rates of 7.2 per cent and 7.7 per cent during 1992-93 to 1999-2000.

2.2 Quarterly real GDP growth picked up steadily from 5.7 per cent in the second quarter to 7.2 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1999-2000. The growth in industry and services rose from 6.6 per cent and 6.2 per cent in the second quarter, respectively, to 9.2 per cent and 10.5 per cent in the fourth quarter. On the other hand, growth in agriculture and allied activities dropped from 3.5 per cent to -1.3 per cent during the same period. In contrast, in 1998-99, the real GDP growth had peaked at 8.3 per cent in the second quarter before moving down to 7.2 per cent in the fourth quarter. While there had been a slowdown in industry and services in the last two quarters, gross value added in agriculture and allied activities had recorded a steady acceleration from 4.3 per cent in the first quarter to 10.8 per cent in the fourth quarter in 1998-99. The quarterly movements in real GDP growth over the period 1997-98 to 1999-2000 indicate that while agricultural growth has shown sharp fluctuations, industry has experienced a clear upturn since the fourth quarter of 1998-99. The quarterly growth of services sector has remained fairly robust, averaging 8.6 per cent over the past three years.

2.3 The growth experience of the 1990s raises issues relating to the potential output growth, the output gap and implications for monetary policy. Studies on the recent growth dynamics and structural shifts indicate that the estimates of potential output growth vary widely.

2.4 The rate of gross domestic saving, as per the quick estimates of the Central Statistical Organisation, is estimated at 22.3 per cent in 1998-99, down from 24.7 per cent in 1997-98. At the level estimated for 1998-99, the gross domestic saving rate showed a fall of 3.2 percentage points from the peak rate of 25.5 per cent in 1995-96. The decline in the saving rate in 1998-99 was observed across all the three sectors, viz., public, private corporate and household. Fiscal slippages and large deficits in the revenue account of government administration brought down the public sector saving rate from 1.4 per cent in 1997-98 to a very negligible level in 1998-99. The saving rate of the private corporate sector declined from 4.3 per cent in 1997-98 to 3.8 per cent in 1998-99. Household saving rate also recorded a fall from 19.0 per cent in 1997-98 to 18.5 per cent in 1998-99.

2.5 On the basis of the latest tentative information available with the Reserve Bank, the rate of household financial saving is estimated at 10.6 per cent in 1999-2000 as against 10.8 per cent in 1998-99. An interesting characteristic was the sharp increase in holdings of assets in the form of shares and debentures.

2.6 The investment rate moved down in tandem with the saving rate. The rate of nominal Gross Capital Formation (GCF) declined from 23.4 per cent in 1997-98 to 21.8 per cent in 1998-99. All the constituent sectors revealed reduction in the rates of capital formation. The rate of Gross Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF), i.e., GCF adjusted for errors and omissions, was placed at 23.4 per cent in 1998-99 against 26.2 per cent in 1997-98. The average share of net capital inflow from abroad in the investment rate stayed around 5.7 per cent (or 1.5 per cent of GDP) during the 1990s as compared with 8.8 per cent (or 2.0 per cent of GDP) during the 1980s. Given the relatively low dependence on foreign saving, the primary impetus to investment has come from domestic saving.

2.7 After having staged a remarkable turnaround during 1998-99, agricultural production suffered some setback during 1999-2000. The crop production index (with base: triennium ending 1981-82 = 100) recorded a decline of 1.3 per cent in 1999-2000 in sharp contrast to a robust growth of 8.2 per cent during the previous year. However, the output of rice at 88.3 million tonnes and wheat at 74.3 million tonnes registered their record levels. The quantum of foodgrains production increased to 205.9 million tonnes in 1999-2000 from the earlier level of 203.0 million tonnes in 1998-99. There was, on the other hand, a sharp decline in the production of pulses and coarse cereals. In the non-foodgrains segment, major crops such as oilseeds - particularly groundnut -cotton and tea registered declines in output over their respective levels in the previous year, while sugarcane, jute and mesta recorded a rise in production. Sugarcane output, which has been increasing continuously since 1996-97, has scaled a new peak in 1999-2000. Non-foodgrains output, which had been smoothly increasing in the first half of the 1990s, witnessed a certain degree of fluctuation in the second half of the decade.

2.8 During 1999-2000, total procurement of foodgrains reached a new peak, recording an increase of 27.0 per cent over that of 24.2 million tonnes in 1998-99. The total off-take of rice and wheat during 1999-2000 was moderately high at 21.9 million tonnes compared with 20.7 million tonnes in the previous year. The rise may be attributed to higher off-take under the Open Market Sales Scheme (OMSS), even though the off-take under Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) fell by 14.7 per cent. Under the TPDS, introduced in June 1997, a dual pricing system is operative whereby consumers below poverty line (BPL) are supplied with a limited quantity of foodgrains (20 kg. per month per family) at prices which are almost one-half of the central issue price (CIP) fixed for the consumers above poverty line (APL). While off-take by consumers under the BPL category is restricted by quantity stipulation, that for APL consumers is limited by the price. During 1999-2000, the fractional decrease in the off-take under BPL category was accompanied by a substantial fall in the off-take under APL category (20.7 per cent). This decline was compensated through a substantial rise in OMSS and some increase in off-take through Other Welfare Schemes (OWS). The sharp rise in procurement of rice and wheat coupled with a moderate growth in off-take raised the stock of foodgrains to 28.0 million tonnes at the end of March 2000, from 21.7 million tonnes at the end of March 1999. It is important to recognise that foodgrains stock has remained well above the buffer stock norms during 1999-2000, raising the issue of the optimal level of stock.

2.9 Industrial production recovered from a subdued performance in 1998-99 and exhibited a turnaround during 1999-2000, mainly attributable to, inter alia, increased exports, higher credit availability, a low inflation rate, a stable rupee and improved business sentiment. The Index of Industrial Production (IIP) increased by 8.1 per cent during 1999-2000 as compared with the rise of 3.8 per cent during the previous year. The recovery was driven by a strong improvement in the manufacturing sector’s performance which has a weight of 79.36 per cent in the general index. Manufacturing output recorded a significantly higher growth of 9.2 per cent during 1999-2000 than 4.1 per cent in the previous year.

2.10 There has been a broad-based recovery in the manufacturing sector in 1999-2000. Twelve of the seventeen groups at the two-digit level industrial classification showed positive growth during 1999-2000. During 1999-2000, nine major industry groups (55.96 per cent weight in IIP) registered accelerated growth rates, three groups (9.01 per cent weight in IIP) posted decelerated growth and the remaining five groups (14.39 per cent weight in IIP) recorded declines. The pattern of growth also showed some variation. Some of the industry groups which had shown accelerated growth in 1998-99 registered declines/slow down in 1999-2000. Notable among these were metal products and parts and the group rubber, plastic, petroleum and coal products. The industry groups which performed exceedingly well in 1999-2000, were those that had not performed well in the preceding year. Nevertheless, the number of groups which have shown acceleration have not only increased from seven to nine, but their combined weights in IIP have also doubled to 56 per cent in 1999-2000 from 28 per cent in 1998-99.

2.11 The use-based classification of industrial output indicates a pattern of growth wherein intermediate goods led the recovery showing a growth of 15.4 per cent during 1999-2000 as against 5.9 per cent during 1998-99, while capital goods recorded a major slowdown to 5.4 per cent from 11.5 per cent. The latter reflects sluggish investment demand. On the other hand, basic goods and consumer goods sectors registered a moderate though higher growth of 5.1 per cent and 5.4 per cent, respectively, during 1999-2000 as compared with 1.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent during the preceding year. Within the consumer goods sector, the production of consumer durables accelerated sharply to 13.3 per cent from 4.6 per cent in the previous year. The contribution of the two leading sectors, viz., intermediate goods sector (weight being 26.44 per cent in the IIP) and basic goods sector (weight being 35.51 per cent) increased to 53.5 per cent and 20.7 per cent, respectively, during 1999-2000 from 43.6 per cent and 13.0 per cent during 1998-99. The contribution of the consumer goods sector (weight being 28.36 per cent) improved to 18.7 per cent during 1999-2000 from 14.3 per cent in 1998-99.

2.12 The annual trends in industrial growth showed a cyclical pattern with a general upturn during 1992-93 to 1995-96 being followed by a downturn during the first three quarters of 1996-97. Industrial growth picked up over the next ten months; however, this could not be sustained thereafter and it was only in 1999-2000 that the industrial recovery set in. The monthly growth rate of IIP reveals that industrial growth picked up to a range of 4.7 to 11.8 per cent in 1999-2000 from -0.3 to 5 per cent in 1998-99. The financial health of firms also recorded recovery during 1999-2000; sales and gross profits of 916 non-financial public limited companies increased by 15.4 per cent and 20.8 per cent, respectively, during 1999-2000 as against 8.6 per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively, for 1,248 such companies during 1998-99. Foreign investment flows also increased significantly during 1999-2000. The implication of the typical cyclical dynamics of industrial output is related to the issue of sustainability of industrial recovery.

III Money, Credit and Prices

3.1 Monetary policy during 1999-2000 attempted to ensure that all legitimate requirements for bank credit were met while guarding against any emergence of inflationary pressures. During the year as a whole, broad money ^(M3⁾ grew by 13.9 per cent, which was substantially below the long-run average of a little over 17.0 per cent. Scheduled commercial banks’ non-food credit off-take picked up to record 16.5 per cent in support of industrial recovery. At the same time, long-term interest rates eased significantly.

3.2 increased by 13.9 per cent ^M3 (Rs.1,36,182 crore) during 1999-2000 as compared with the growth of 19.4 per cent in 1998-99. Net of Resurgent growth India Bonds (RIBs), the ^M3 rate worked out to 14.1 per cent during 1999-2000 as compared with 17.3 per cent during 1998-99.

3.3 Monetary aggregates as at end-March are compiled on the basis of data pertaining to the Reserve Bank as on March 31 (i.e., the last working day of the fiscal year) and scheduled commercial banks as on the last reporting Friday of the year. However, in 1999-2000, with the lag between the last reporting Friday of March (i.e., March 24, 2000) and March 31, widening to one full week, the year-end balance sheet adjustments, such as interest rate applications and credit disbursals, were large. For instance, scheduled commercial bank deposits increased by Rs.28,623 crore between March 24-31, 2000 as compared with Rs.11,526 crore between March 26-31, 1999. The year-end bulge in deposits usually results in a degree of overestimation of monetary growth, given the fact that a large part of such deposits, especially demand deposits are, in general, drained out of the banking system in April and May. The exclusion of such outliers from monetary statistics would provide a more accurate picture of monetary growth. The aberrations that such point estimates could bring about could be somewhat obviated by averaging the monthly year-on-year growth rates in line with the ^M3 recommendations of the Working Group on Money Supply (1998). The (net monthly average year-on-year ^M3 of RIBs) growth rate worked out to 16.6 per cent during 1999-2000 as compared with 18.2 per cent during 1998-99.

3.4 Currency with the public expanded by 11.7 per cent (Rs.19,761 crore) in 1999-2000 as against 16.1 per cent in 1998-99. However, on monthly average basis, currency grew at a much higher rate of 16.3 per cent during 1999-2000 than that of 11.7 per cent during 1998-99. Aggregate deposits decelerated to 14.5 per cent (Rs.1,17,108 crore) during 1999-2000 from 20.2 per cent (17.6 per cent, net of RIBs) during 1998-99, because of a subdued growth in scheduled commercial banks’ deposits at 13.9 per cent. During 1999-2000, interest rates on bank deposits of various maturities were revised downwards while the return on other financial assets such as equities remained strong. This was partly reflected in the relatively sluggish accretion to bank fixed deposits.

3.5 Monetary policy for 1999-2000 had to be framed in the context of uncertainties. The outlook on growth and inflation at the beginning of 1999-2000 was less than clear. However, the actual outcome in respect of real GDP growth and inflation turned out to be relatively favourable. While the foreign exchange market remained relatively stable during the year, the Reserve Bank had to occasionally undertake money market and foreign exchange market operations to contain speculative pressures. The course of monetary management, however, had to contend with buoyant commercial credit demand, the rise in the fiscal deficit and the inflationary implications arising out of the uncertainties surrounding the performance of agriculture. To face the multiple challenges, the Reserve Bank had to use an array of instruments to influence both the quantity and rate variables. While it is recognised that the rate channel would have to ultimately gain prominence in the conduct of monetary policy, in the absence of adequate integration of financial markets, quantity variables such as monetary and credit aggregates would continue to play an important role in the transition. In this context, the movements in broad money need to be seen along with those in output and prices.

3.6 In the Indian context, both output and price stability should be recognised as vital objectives that should be pursued in both the short term and the medium term. In the absence of complete financial integration and in view of the ongoing financial sector reforms, it would be difficult to have a specified single anchor for monetary policy. However, several central banks, especially in industrialised countries, have adopted inflation targeting, by doing away with the intermediate targeting framework, because of the uncertainties in the links between intermediate and final targets and because financial markets are generally well knit. Although price stability is an important economic policy objective by itself, there are several difficulties in adopting such a single goal of monetary policy in India. Given the need to manage the Government borrowing programme, the Reserve Bank would have to balance, often times, its internal debt management function with the monetary management function in steering interest rates in a manner that should yield allocative efficiency.

3.7 Net domestic credit (NDC), including commercial banks’ investments in commercial paper (CP), public and private sector bonds/ debentures/preference shares and equity shares (termed as non-SLR investments) recorded a lower increase of 16.1 per cent during 1999-2000 as compared with 16.9 per cent during 1998-99. The ratio of scheduled commercial banks’ incremental non-food credit (including incremental non-SLR investments) in incremental NDC increased to 47.1 per cent from 41.8 per cent during 1998-99. This development was in line with the policy objective of ensuring availability of sufficient credit in order to facilitate economic recovery. In the event, the share of the Government sector in incremental NDC declined to 36.7 per cent during 1999-2000 from 41.6 per cent during 1998-99.

3.8 Net bank credit to Government increased by a lower order of 14.2 per cent (Rs.55,077 crore) during 1999-2000 as compared with 17.0 per cent during the previous year. While scheduled commercial banks’ investments in Government securities shot up by 24.7 per cent during 1999-2000, the net Reserve Bank credit to the Government recorded a decline of 2.8 per cent, brought about by a reduction in net Reserve Bank credit to the Centre by 3.8 per cent. For the first time since 1977-78, the Central Government account with the Reserve Bank showed a surplus, the surplus being Rs.5,587 crore in 1999-2000, as against a deficit of Rs.11,800 crore in 1998-99. The ratio of scheduled commercial banks’ incremental investments in Government securities in the incremental net bank credit to the Government soared to 100.3 per cent during 1999-2000 from 64.7 per cent during 1998-99.

3.9 Bank credit to commercial sector accelerated to 16.6 per cent (Rs.82,548 crore) during 1999-2000 from 14.5 per cent during 1998-99. Scheduled commercial banks’ total flow of non-food resources to the commercial sector grew at 17.6 per cent in 1999-2000 as compared with 16.4 per cent during 1998-99. The resource flow from bank and non-bank sources - including capital issues, GDRs/ADRs/FCCBs, CPs (other than those subscribed by banks) and borrowings from as well as bills rediscounted with financial institutions - to the commercial sector increased by Rs.1,51,787 crore in 1999-2000 as against Rs.1,27,952 crore in the previous year.

3.10 Reserve money increased at a slower rate of 8.1 per cent (Rs.20,969 crore) during 1999-2000 as compared with 14.6 per cent during 1998-99, primarily reflecting the reduction in reserve requirements, on the one hand, and the impact of the increasing market orientation of monetary policy operations on the Reserve Bank balance sheet, on the other. Adjusting bank reserves for the first round release of lendable resources, the increase in the monetary base would work out to about 13.0 per cent.

3.11 Aggregate deposits of scheduled commercial banks decelerated to 13.9 per cent (Rs.99,319 crore) in 1999-2000 from 19.3 per cent (16.3 per cent, excluding RIBs) in 1998-99. The fortnightly average year-on-year increase in bank deposits was also lower at 17.0 per cent during 1999-2000 than 19.5 per cent in 1998-99. As indicated earlier, deposit expansion during 1999-2000, measured on March 31 basis increased, but at Rs.1,16,416 crore was nonetheless lower than the projected estimate of Rs.1,18,500 crore in the April 1999 monetary and credit policy statement. Besides this factor, time deposit growth was impacted by the savers’ favourable expectation of returns from mutual funds, particularly as a result of tax concessions extended to these funds in the Union Budget 1999-2000 and the reduction in the interest rates on bank deposits.

3.12 Bank credit recovered with the revival in industrial activity during 1999-2000 growing by 18.2 per cent (Rs.67,121 crore) in 1999-2000 as compared with 13.8 per cent in 1998-99. The increase in bank credit during 1999-2000 was also markedly higher than the average of 15.6 per cent during the 1990s (up to 1998-99). The expansion in food credit by Rs.8,875 crore during 1999-2000 was more than double of Rs.4,331 crore during 1998-99. The conventional non-food bank credit showed a higher order of expansion of 16.5 per cent (Rs.58,246 crore) in 1999-2000 as compared with an increase of 13.0 per cent in the previous year. On an average basis too, the year-on-year month-end non-food credit growth rate was higher at 15.4 per cent than 14.4 per cent during 1998-99.

3.13 Scheduled commercial banks’ non-SLR investments expanded by Rs.12,441 crore in 1999-2000 as compared with Rs.15,921 crore in 1998-99. Consequently, banks’ non-SLR investments decelerated to 25.7 per cent during 1999-2000 from 49.0 per cent during 1998-99. Nonetheless, the total flow of funds from scheduled commercial banks to the commercial sector (i.e., non-food credit and non-SLR investments) grew by 17.7 per cent (Rs.70,687 crore) as compared with 16.4 per cent during 1998-99. The order of growth in resource availability was more or less consistent with the projected increase of about 18 per cent set in the April 1999 monetary and credit policy statement.

3.14 Notwithstanding the pick-up in credit growth, banks sharply increased their investments in government securities by 24.7 per cent (Rs.55,239 crore) in 1999-2000 as against 19.4 per cent in 1998-99. The share of banks’ incremental investments in government paper to incremental deposits jumped to 55.6 per cent in 1999-2000 from 31.4 per cent in 1998-99 and the share of lending to government in the overall deployment of resources by scheduled commercial banks was substantially higher at 42.9 per cent than 35.1 per cent in 1998-99. Currently, the banking system holds government and other approved securities of around 34.5 per cent of its net demand and time liabilities as against the requirement of 25 per cent. The excess SLR holdings by banks amounted to about Rs.85,000 crore as at end-March 2000. Banks’ preference for government securities, despite a reduction in the stipulated SLR to the statutory minimum of 25 per cent was prompted by the higher capital adequacy requirement of 9 per cent and the prospect of reaping capital gains in the context of a decline in the market yields of government securities. This could, however, have implications for the interest rate spread of the banking system given the relative rigidity in the cost structure of funds mobilised by banks.

3.15 According to the new series of Wholesale Price Index (WPI), introduced with effect from April 1, 2000, the annual rate of inflation measured on a point-to-point basis, during 1999-2000, remained consistently below the rates of inflation in 1998-99 for 48 weeks moving in the range of 1.9 per cent to 5.3 per cent in 1999-2000 as compared with the range of 4.2 per cent to 7.3 per cent in 1998-99. The rate of inflation picked up above 5 per cent in the first three weeks of March 2000, before closing the year at 6.5 per cent as against 5.3 per cent in 1998-99². The significant spurt in inflation in the last month of 1999-2000 was accounted for by the revision of prices of electricity (15.1 per cent) and urea N content (14.0 per cent) in the third week of February 2000 and prices of kerosene (100.9 per cent), liquified petroleum gas (30.2 per cent) and aviation turbine fuel (18.2 per cent) on March 22, 2000. Excluding the price increases of the above administered items, the inflation rate works out to 2.6 per cent for 1999-2000. Notwithstanding the year-end spurt, the low order of inflation during the major part of 1999-2000 led to the decline of the average rate of inflation (on a weekly basis) to the low of 3.3 per cent in 1999-2000 as against 5.9 per cent in 1998-99 and the average of 9.0 per cent during 1990-91 to 1997-98.

3.16 The inflation rates at the retail level, as measured by the annual variations in the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPI-IW), on a point-to-point basis, by and large, moved in tandem with the WPI inflation. The CPI recorded an inflation rate of 4.8 per cent in 1999-2000 as against 8.9 per cent in 1998-99 with the month to month annual rate of inflation ranging between zero per cent in November 1999 and 8.4 per cent in March 1999. The steep deceleration in consumer inflation was reflected in the average (monthly) inflation rate for the year, which moved down to 3.4 per cent in 1999-2000 from 13.1 per cent in 1998-99. 3.17 The average increase in the administered prices was 8.9 per cent in 1999-2000 as compared with 3.0 per cent in 1998-99 This was primarily led by a sharp increase in the prices of mineral oils, electricity and urea N content. Excluding the administered items, the annual average inflation rate fell to 2.1 per cent as against the actual of 3.3 per cent. Administered prices of fuel and electricity were revised to a high level in 1997-98 and fell in 1998-99, before returning in 1999-2000 to the average levels witnessed during 1994-95 to 1996-97.

IV Government Finances

4.1 During 1999-2000, fiscal management in the economy continued to be constrained by high fiscal deficits of both the Central and State Governments. Central Government finances came under pressure from both revenue shortfall and expenditure overrun, while State Government finances turned sharply adverse in order to meet the recurrent expenditure requirements mainly on account of recent pay revisions. The large market borrowing by the Central Government, above the budgeted level, on account of the rise in fiscal deficit posed a severe challenge. The Reserve Bank had to face the dilemmas in managing debt and monetary management operations to ensure an appropriate interest rate environment in the economy, keeping in view the incipient industrial recovery. The government bond market remained relatively stable with the yield curve moving down during the year and the maturity profile of government debt was considerably lengthened.

4.2 The stress in the finances of the Central Government during 1999-2000 was partly due to unanticipated expenditures on account of national defence, the unprecedented cyclone in Orissa, the residual impact of the Fifth Pay Commission along with the provision of special fiscal assistance to States in the light of the Eleventh Finance Commission’s recommendations. The overall expenditure (revised estimates), as a result, exceeded the budget estimates by 7.0 per cent. There was also a significant shortfall in tax collections and divestment proceeds. Revenue receipts in 1999-2000 fell short of the budgeted target by 1.8 per cent. Consequently, almost all the major deficit indicators such as the gross fiscal deficit, revenue deficit and primary deficit of the Central Government exceeded the budget estimates by a significant margin. The gross fiscal deficit¹ (GFD) increased to Rs.1,08,898 crore (5.6 per cent of GDP) in the revised estimates, as against the budget estimate of Rs.79,955 crore (4.0 per cent of GDP). The revenue deficit at Rs.73,532 crore (3.8 per cent of GDP) exceeded the budget estimate by Rs.19,385 crore and formed almost two-thirds of the gross fiscal deficit. The primary balance recorded a deficit of 0.9 per cent of GDP in contrast to the projected surplus of 0.4 per cent of GDP in the budget estimates.

4.3 During 1999-2000, the net market borrowing of the Central Government (including 364-day Treasury Bills) at Rs.73,077 crore exceeded the budgetary projections by Rs.15,616 crore (27.2 per cent). The gross market borrowing of the Central Government amounted to Rs.99,630 crore in 1999-2000 as against Rs.93,953 crore in 1998-99. The Reserve Bank’s support to the market borrowing programme by way of private placements/devolvements of dated securities and devolvement of 364-day Treasury bills at Rs.29,267 crore in 1999-2000 was lower than Rs.39,777 crore in 1998-99. The initial subscription was offloaded through net open market sales amounting to Rs.30,861 crore. The Reserve Bank’s initial subscription was high in the first quarter and subsequently declined by the fourth quarter of 1999-2000.

4.4 The budget for 2000-01, formulated against the backdrop of a large slippage in the fiscal position, accorded high priority to curbing expenditure growth and bringing about structural changes in the composition of expenditure. Both the revenue deficit and fiscal deficit are budgeted to be brought down to 3.6 per cent and 5.1 per cent of GDP, respectively, from 3.8 per cent and 5.6 per cent in 1999-2000 (revised estimates). The primary deficit is also budgeted lower at 0.5 per cent of GDP than 0.9 per cent in the previous year. The medium-term strategy underlying the budget is to place the economy on a high growth path of 7 to 8 per cent with a view to reducing poverty significantly within the next decade. Towards these objectives, the budget has adopted a seven-fold strategy: viz., strengthening the foundations of the rural economy, developing knowledge based industries, strengthening and modernising traditional industries, removing infrastructure bottlenecks, according high priority to human resource development with special emphasis on the poorest and weakest sections of the society, strengthening the country’s role in the world economy through rapid growth of exports, higher foreign investment and prudent debt management, and establishment of a credible framework for fiscal discipline.

4.5 The focus of fiscal reform underlying the budget is on further strengthening expenditure management, restructuring public sector enterprises and strengthening tax reforms through restructuring and rationalisation of both direct and indirect taxes. The measures proposed in the budget towards expenditure management include scrutiny of the existing schemes using zero based budgeting technique, limiting the creation of jobs and fresh recruitment in the Government to minimum essential needs, redeployment of surplus staff and introduction of voluntary retirement scheme (VRS), adopting cost-based user charges to reduce subsidies wherever feasible and earmarking a portion of the disinvestment proceeds for debt redemption. For medium-term management of the fiscal deficit, the budget has proposed to introduce an institutional mechanism in the nature of a Fiscal Responsibility Act. The main elements of Government policy towards the public sector would be to restructure and revive potentially viable public sector units (PSUs) and close down the unviable/sick PSUs. The Government has proposed to raise resources from the market against the security of assets of the closed PSUs and use these funds to provide adequate safety net for workers. A fresh impetus to the programme of disinvestment and privatisation of PSUs is also proposed.

4.6 The tax measures proposed in the budget rest on the principles of stability, economic growth, rationalisation and simplification to strengthen the ongoing reform process. On the indirect tax front, the budget proposes to introduce a single rate Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT). The existing three ad-valorem rates of basic excise duty, viz., 8, 16 and 24 per cent would, accordingly, converge into a single rate of 16 per cent CENVAT with MODVAT benefits. In addition to 16 per cent CENVAT, the budget also proposes three rates of special excise duties viz., 8, 16 and 24 per cent, which will not be generally modvatable. The rate structure of custom duties is further rationalised by reducing the number of custom duties rates from 5 to 4, with the tax rate structure consisting of 35 per cent, 25 per cent, 15 per cent and 5 per cent. The peak rate of basic custom duties is reduced from 40 to 35 per cent.

STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES²

4.7 The revised estimates available for twenty-four States for 1999-2000 reveal significant stress in State finances. The consolidated fiscal deficit of States in the revised estimates for 1999-2000 stood at 4.8 per cent of GDP, representing an increase of 0.9 percentage point over the budget estimates and 0.6 percentage point over that of 4.2 per cent in the accounts of 1998-99.

4.8 The slippage of 0.9 percentage point in GFD was on account of mainly expenditure overruns (0.7 percentage point) exacerbated by revenue shortfall (0.2 percentage point). The revenue deficit for 1999-2000 overshot its projected level by 42.0 per cent to Rs.56,815 crore (2.9 per cent of GDP) accounting for almost 92 per cent of the rise in GFD. The primary deficit at Rs.49,110 crore (2.5 per cent of GDP) suffered a serious deterioration from the budgeted level of Rs.31,658 crore (1.6 per cent of GDP) in 1999-2000.

4.9 A major aspect of the fiscal imbalance is the mounting pressure arising out of higher expenditure obligations in relation to the resource raising capabilities. This is reflected in a sharp deviation between the actual expenditure vis-a-vis the budget projections. For instance, during 1999-2000, revenue expenditure overshot the budget estimates by 4.8 per cent while revenue receipts fell short by 2.0 per cent from the budget estimates. The principal components which triggered the expenditure overrun were miscellenous general services (55.8 per cent), interest on market loans (38.9 per cent), additional expenditure on natural calamities (80.3 per cent) and compensation and assignments to local bodies (34.4 per cent). The consolidated revenue expenditure of twenty-four States showed a growth of 23.4 per cent in 1999-2000 over the previous year. The major component which has contributed to the excessive growth in revenue expenditures has been non-Plan expenditure. This segment of expenditure which mainly comprises wages and salaries, pensions and interest payments constitutes around 82.0 per cent of revenue expenditure and absorbs a major portion of revenue receipts causing a persistent rise in the fiscal deficit.

4.10 Notwithstanding the States’ efforts in containing the revenue deficit and fiscal deficit during 2000-01, the budgeted size of the overall resource gap (Rs.85,971 crore against Rs.94,383 crore in 1999-2000) remains high. The revenue deficit is projected to absorb 51.1 per cent of the resource gap in 2000-01. On the financing front, the States depend to a large extent on loans from the Centre. The net loans from the Centre are projected to finance 48.2 per cent of the GFD during 2000-01 as compared with 42.2 per cent in the previous year. Besides the net loans, the States have been taking larger recourse to ‘other liabilities’ in financing the growing expenditures. These liabilities mainly comprising provident funds and small savings, have risen from Rs.6,253 crore in 1990-91 to Rs.44,669 crore in 1999-2000. These are budgeted lower at Rs.34,621 crore in 2000-01. The net receipts from provident fund and small savings have risen from Rs.3,069 crore in 1990-91 to Rs.17,117 crore in 1999-2000, and are budgeted lower at Rs.14,599 crore in 2000-01.

4.11 The combined gross fiscal deficit of Centre and States increased to 9.9 per cent of GDP (Rs.1,93,471 crore) during 1999-2000 as against the budget estimate of 7.4 per cent of GDP (Rs.1,48,581 crore), and 8.9 per cent of GDP (Rs. 1,56,928 crore) in 1998-99. The combined revenue deficit rose sharply to a peak of 6.7 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000, accounting for 67 per cent of GFD. The gross primary deficit of the Government sector deteriorated from 3.7 per cent of GDP in 1998-99 to 4.2 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000.

4.12 The Union Budget for 2000-01 has placed the net market borrowing of the Central Government at Rs.76,383 crore, higher than the amount raised, as per RBI records, at Rs.73,077 crore in 1999-2000. Together with the maturing dated securities and repayment of 364-day Treasury Bills, the gross market borrowing requirement of the Central Government will rise to Rs.1,17,704 crore from Rs.99,630 crore in 1999-2000. During 2000-01 (up to August 10, 2000), gross market borrowings amounted to Rs.63,183 crore as against Rs.56,130 crore in 1999-2000.

4.13 During 1999-2000, the net market borrowings of the State Governments were placed at Rs.12,405 crore as against Rs.10,700 crore in 1998-99. Together with repayments, the gross borrowings amounted to Rs.13,706 crore in 1999-2000 as against Rs.12,114 crore in 1998-99. The State Governments mobilised a gross amount of Rs.13,706 crore through pre-announced issues (Rs.12,906 crore) and auctions (Rs.800 crore). In tandem with the falling coupon rates on medium-term loans of the Central Government, the coupon rate on State Government loans of 10 year maturity also witnessed a steady decline from 12.50 per cent in February 1999 to 12.25 per cent in April 1999 and further to 11.00 per cent by March 2000. Auction-based borrowings were undertaken by a few States (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka) to raise a part of their market borrowings. These States gained by way of lower cut-off yield (11.08-11.77 per cent) than the pre-announced coupon rate (12.25 per cent in April, 1999) on securities of the same maturity. According to the Reserve Bank records, the net allocation of market borrowings to States during 2000-01 is provisionally placed at Rs.11,000 crore (gross Rs.11,420 crore). During fiscal 2000-01, in the first tranche on April 25, 2000, States mobilised Rs.5,838 crore (notified amount Rs.4,369 crore) through the issue of 10-year State Development Loans at a pre-announced coupon of 10.52 per cent, which is 48 basis points lower than the coupon offered on the loan issued in March 2000. Furthermore, as a part of their market borrowing programmes, four States viz. Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal raised Rs.1,220 crore with issuance of 10 year State Development Loan through auction. The cut off yield ranged between 11.70 per cent (Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu) and 11.80 per cent (Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal). The amount devolved on the primary dealers against their underwriting commitments aggregated to Rs.264.63 crore. During the current fiscal so far, i.e., up to August 12, 2000 the State Governments had mobilised Rs.7,058 crore under their gross market borrowings.

4.14 The high level of fiscal deficit of the Central Government has led to steady accumulation of debt, as reflected in the rise in the debt-GDP ratio from 50.6 per cent as at end-March 1999 to 52.9 per cent as at end-March 2000. The debt-GDP ratio of the Central Government is estimated to rise further to 54.1 per cent as at end- March 2001. At this level, the stock of domestic debt is expected to grow at a rate of 15.4 per cent in 2000-01 as against 16.6 per cent in 1999-2000. A high overhang of domestic debt poses significant challenges for debt management from two major considerations. First, it leaves little flexibility for the debt management authority to minimise the borrowing cost in the face of continuous increases in bond supply. This may lead to an increase in the interest rate premium on fresh borrowings and therefore, hardening of yields. Secondly, a high stock of domestic marketable debt can raise future interest rate uncertainty and shift the market preference for short-term paper. As a result, there could emerge a problem of concentration of debt towards the shorter end, leading to bunching of redemptions and roll-over problems. The maturity profile of Central Government loans as on March 31, 2000 indicates large repayment liabilities, ranging between Rs.27,000 crore to Rs.31,000 crore, falling due during the next five years (2001-2002 to 2005-2006). To obviate the difficulties arising from bunching of repayments at the short end, a large part of the Central Government borrowings was placed at the longer end of maturity during 1999-2000. In fact, all borrowings in 1999-2000 were above 5-year maturity, ranging between 5 to 20 years and about 65.0 per cent of the borrowing was through issuance of bonds above 10-year maturity. The weighted average maturity of market loans during 1999-2000 increased to 12.6 years from 7.7 years in 1998-99. Nevertheless, the overall maturity profile of the marketable debt remained skewed towards the shorter and medium end of the market.

4.15 The combined outstanding debt of State Governments as a percentage to GDP rose to 21.4 per cent as at end-March 2000 from 19.4 per cent as at end-March 1999. The debt-GDP ratio of State Governments is projected to increase further to 22.7 per cent by end-March 2001. The consolidated outstanding debt of States remained at an average of 19.3 per cent of GDP during the 1990s. As the nominal stock of debt has recorded a high rate of growth of 16.0 per cent on an average during the 1990s, there are serious concerns about the long-term sustainability of State finances. Given the fact that the States face a hard borrowing constraint, any significant rise in the public debt burden may have adverse implications for resource allocation to some of the critical social sectors. The ratio of States’ marketable debt to GDP increased from 2.4 per cent in the 1980s to 3.2 per cent in the 1990s. The interest rate on market borrowing of State Governments increased from 11.50 per cent in 1990-91 to 12.35 per cent in 1998-99, but declined to 11.89 per cent in 1999-2000.

4.16 The nominal stock of domestic debt of the combined Government sector has been growing at a rate of about 16 per cent during the later part of the 1990s. The higher growth in domestic debt than that in nominal GDP growth has led to steady debt accumulation to 60.7 per cent of GDP by end-March 2000. The debt growth remained below the nominal GDP growth during the first half of the 1990s and the debt growth has generally exceeded the nominal GDP growth since 1997-98 with an exception to 1998-99. As high levels of public debt have deleterious effects on macro-economic stability, the need for reducing the fiscal deficit and debt to sustainable levels through, institution of policy oriented fiscal rules is widely felt. There are some well recognised fiscal policy rules and legislations incorporating specific targets or ceilings or conditionalities. Such legislation, apart from achieving fiscal sustainability, brings about greater fiscal transparency and accountability, provides enhanced flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy and promotes prudent fiscal behaviour. This would be best facilitated if the debt stability condition, which suggests that the output growth rate should exceed the interest rate, is met.

4.17 The guarantees given by the Central Government in nominal terms rose from Rs. 50,575 crore to Rs. 74,606 crore between end-March 1992 and end-March 1999. However, in relation to GDP, the outstanding guarantees declined from 8.2 per cent of GDP to 4.2 per cent during the same period. Recognising the importance of funding guarantees, the Union Budget for 1999-2000 has proposed a Guarantee Redemption Fund aimed at promoting transparency and curbing the growth of contingent liabilities. The outstanding State Government guarantees (17 major States) as ratio to GDP stood at 4.7 per cent, at end-March 1999, lower than the level of 6.5 per cent as at end-March 1992. However, the nominal stock of guarantees has witnessed an annual average growth of 11.1 per cent between end-March 1992 and end-March 1999. The latest provisional data available on guarantees show that outstanding stock of guarantees for 17 major States amounted to Rs.90,391 crore as at end-September 1999.

2. Excludes data for the Governments of Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh, but includes States that have presented Vote-on-Account budgets, viz., Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar and Manipur.

V Financial Markets

5.1 The recovery of South-East Asian economies and the onset of cautious optimism in international financial markets had a somewhat favourable impact on domestic financial market conditions. Financial markets in India remained orderly during 1999-2000. In general, rates tended to move down during the year, particularly at the long end of the market spectrum.

5.2 The movements in inter-bank call money rates during the first half of 1999-2000 were influenced by short-term developments in the foreign exchange market, the marked appetite for government securities and increased credit to the commercial sector. With the large capital inflows in the second half of the year, the pressures on call money market eased and the market, in general, recorded heightened activity.

5.3 The inter-bank call rates ruled steady within a narrow range during 1999-2000 except for bouts of volatility during mid-August 1999, mid-October 1999, mid-February 2000 and end-March 2000, which were primarily attributable to the unanticipated demand for reserves by commercial banks. The daily peak call rates averaged 9.51 per cent, whereas the daily low rates averaged 8.39 per cent. The average daily call rates were higher at 9.09 per cent than 8.13 per cent in the previous year.

5.4 The average call rates moved within the range of 8.27-8.94 per cent during April to June 1999. The rates, thereafter, edged up progressively and peaked at 11.26 per cent in October 1999, 326 basis points above the Bank Rate. Following the measures announced in the mid-term review of monetary and credit policy in October 1999, the liquidity conditions eased markedly with call rates showing a sharp decline of 306 basis points to 8.20 per cent during November 1999 and further to 7.89 per cent during December 1999 - dipping below the Bank Rate for the first time during 1999-2000. The Reserve Bank relaxed the norm for CRR calculation and announced a special liquidity enhancing facility for the period December 1, 1999 to January 31, 2000 to enable the market to tide over the unlikely occurrence of the year 2000 related problems.

5.5 After ruling low at 8.03 per cent in January 2000, call rates again shot up during mid-February 2000, primarily due to large positions taken by a few banks while participating in the Reserve Bank’s open market sales. The liquidity situation eased from February 21, 2000 after some participants liquidated their positions in the market, following the open market purchases of Treasury Bills and dated securities by the Reserve Bank. Despite the pick-up in credit due to the usual seasonal factors and quarterly advance tax payments, call rates softened to 9.68 per cent in March from 10.63 per cent in February 2000.

5.6 In response to the package of monetary policy measures announced by the Reserve Bank on April 1, 2000, comprising cuts in the CRR, the fixed repo rate and the Bank Rate by one percentage point each, which inter alia, injected liquidity to the tune of Rs.7,200 crore, call rates declined sharply to settle around the Bank Rate of 7 per cent. Easy liquidity conditions prevailed till the middle of May 2000 and the call rates moved broadly in a range between the repo rate and the Bank Rate. Issue of Government securities and fluctuations in the currency market brought some hardening in call rates during the second half of the month and the call rates averaged at 7.64 per cent in May 2000. In June 2000, the call money market generally remained tight except in the first week when liquidity conditions eased following the Reserve Bank accepting devolvement of Government securities (on May 30, 2000) to the tune of Rs.4,886 crore. Increased spot sales of foreign currency and the edging up of the inflation rate also contributed to firming up of call rates in June 2000 to an average of 11.51 per cent.

5.7 The foreign exchange market generally exhibited stability during 1999-2000 enabled by a turnaround in export growth, an increase in portfolio investment inflows and the continuing restrictions on rebooking of cancelled forward contracts for imports and splitting of forward and spot legs of a committment. The average monthly turnover in the inter-bank foreign exchange market declined from US $ 88 billion during 1998-99 to US $ 75 billion during 1999-2000. The average monthly total turnover (inter-bank plus merchant) fell from US $ 109 billion in 1998-99 to US $ 95 billion in 1999-2000 although the average monthly merchant turnover at US $ 20 billion was broadly the same as in the previous year. Spot transactions formed the largest chunk (around 55 per cent) of the merchant turnover while the forward segment dominated the inter-bank market accounting for 40 per cent of total inter-bank turnover.

5.8 The average 3-month forward premia ruled sharply lower at around 4.5 per cent than 7.2 per cent during 1998-99. With the spot segment characterised predominantly by excess supply conditions, the forward premia exhibited a decline particularly during the second half of 1999-2000. While call rates oscillated around the mean of 8.7 per cent during June 1998 to March 2000, the forward premia exhibited a downward drift from 10.2 per cent in June 1998 to 7.0 per cent in March 1999 and further to 3.8 per cent in March 2000.

5.9 All segments of the capital market witnessed renewed activity during 1999-2000. There were a large number of successful new capital issues in the primary market although the private placement market continued to dominate in terms of resource mobilisation. Responding to the fiscal concessions announced in the Union Budget for 1999-2000, resource mobilisation by mutual funds, particularly by private sector funds, exhibited a turnaround. Activity in the secondary market remained bullish for most part of the year with the BSE Sensex crossing the 6000 mark for the first time in February 2000 and market capitalisation surging to a historical peak.

5.10 During 1999-2000, the primary market showed signs of improvement with a significant increase in the number of new capital issues. While aggregate resource mobilisation through prospectus and right issues at Rs.7,704 crore was lower than Rs.9,365 crore mobilised during the previous year, this was mainly due to a lower order of primary issues by banks and financial institutions in the public sector. There was a substantial fall in the amount mobilised through ‘mega issues’ (Rs.100 crore or above) to Rs.5,994 crore through 16 issues during 1999-2000 from Rs.8,546 crore through 12 issues during 1998-99. For the second consecutive year, non-financial PSUs and Government companies remained absent from the public issues market.

5.11 The growth of the private placement market further strengthened during 1999-2000 with PSUs relying entirely on this market. The State level undertakings as a group emerged as the largest mobiliser of funds through this route, ahead of all-India development financial institutions. During 1999-2000, resources mobilised by banks, financial institutions and public and private sector companies through private placements increased by 23.3 per cent to Rs.61,259 crore (as against an increase of 65.1 per cent during 1998-99), with the public and the private sectors accounting for 68.3 per cent (Rs.41,856 crore) and 31.7 per cent (Rs.19,404 crore), respectively. Financial intermediaries (both in the public and private sector) accounted for 47.1 per cent (Rs.28,857 crore) of the total resources mobilised through private placement, while non-financial corporate entities accounted for 52.9 per cent (Rs.32,402 crore). The public sector companies raised resources at interest rates varying between 8.5 per cent (for issues of one-year maturity) and 14.75 per cent (for issues of seven year maturity), while the interest rate for the private sector debt ruled between 9.5 per cent (for issues of nine-month maturity) and 15.25 per cent (for issues of five to seven years maturity).

5.12 During 1999-2000, stock markets witnessed generally buoyant conditions. The year began on a somewhat subdued note mainly due to domestic uncertainties. However, in the first week of May 1999 an uptrend set in and share prices ruled firm until September 1999, driven mainly by large FII inflows. Signs of industrial recovery, improved corporate sector performance and sound macro economic fundamentals also strengthened the market sentiment. After a brief spell of downtrend in September 1999, the stock markets started looking up again in the first week of October 1999 following the formation of a new Government at the Centre and upgrading of India’s international credit ratings from ‘stable’ to ‘positive’ by the international credit-rating agencies. The BSE Sensex breached the 5000-mark on October 8, 1999.

5.13 The stock markets remained range bound till December 3, 1999 but showed a distinct rise thereafter to close the calendar year above the 5000-mark mainly due to fresh FII buying. The uptrend continued during January-February 2000 with the BSE Sensex crossing the 6000-mark for the first time during intra-day trading on February 11, 2000, enabled, inter alia, by the smooth changeover to the year 2000, increased buying by FIIs and passage of important economic reform bills like the Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) Bill, the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) and the Securities Laws (Amendment) Bill 1999. The rally in share prices was broad-based and was particularly driven by a sharp rise in the prices of infotech stocks. The CNX IT Index (Base: January 1, 1996=1,000) consisting of 20 major information technology scrips registered a phenomenal growth of 363.3 per cent during the year 1999-2000 on top of the sharp rise of 311.5 per cent in the preceding year, thereby driving up the P/E multiple of this sector. Although in the recent period (since April 1, 2000) there has been some decline in the P/E multiple of infotech stocks, it still continues to be high. The high P/E multiples in respect of technology stocks are attributed to their large earnings and/ or high growth potential.

5.14 The steep decline in the prices of some major infotech scrips in the recent period (the CNX IT Index declined sharply by 47.0 per cent between end-March 2000 and end-July 2000) has raised questions regarding the sustainability of their P/E multiples at high levels in the future. The market remained generally subdued since March 2000 on account of several factors, such as, the slowdown of FII investment, volatility in the foreign exchange market, uncertainty about international oil prices and the bearishness in the international stock markets (especially the NASDAQ) following the hike in interest rate by the US Fed. The BSE Sensex touched an 11-month low of 3831.86 on May 23, 2000 during intra-day trading. However, it recovered since then and closed at 4279.86 on July 31, 2000.

5.15 The NSE was the first exchange to grant permission to brokers to commence internet based trading services and as on March 31, 2000, 4 members were granted permission to commence internet trading. The NSE incorporated a separate company i.e. NSE.IT Ltd. in October 1999 which would service the securities industry in addition to management of IT requirements of NSE. It developed a system of managing the primary issues through a screen based automated trading system.

5.16 During 1999-2000, banks’ direct investment in the capital market instruments declined sharply. Accommodation provided by the scheduled commercial banks to the commercial sector through investments in bonds/debentures/ preference shares and equity shares (including loans to corporates against shares to meet promoters’ contribution) declined to Rs.11,513 crore during 1999-2000 from Rs.14,378 crore during the previous year. Banks’ investments in bonds/ debentures and preference shares at Rs.11,071 crore, formed the major portion of investment in capital market instruments.

5.17 During the year 1999-2000, the number of securities listed on wholesale debt market (WDM) segment increased to 843 from 679 in 1998-99, while the number of active securities listed and available for trading in the segment increased to 1412 from 1147 during the same period. The volume of trading nearly trebled to Rs.3,04,216 crore in 1999-2000 from Rs.1,05,469 crore in 1998-99, with the highest volume recorded in February 2000 at Rs.43,186 crore, mainly reflecting the keen interest by market participants in the Government securities market. The average daily traded value increased sharply to Rs.1,035 crore in 1999-2000 from Rs.365 crore in 1998-99. The trend in the trading pattern during 1999-2000 remained almost the same as in the previous year with Government securities and Treasury Bills accounting for the bulk of the trading volume at over 96 per cent of the total trade. The declining trend in the traded volume of corporate debentures continued in 1999-2000, with amounts traded falling to Rs.498 crore from Rs.971 crore in 1998-99. Banks, brokers and PDs accounted for 95 per cent of the total volume. Indian banks accounted for 42 per cent of the trade in 1999-2000.

5.18 Dated securities aggregating Rs.86,630 crore were issued during fiscal 1999-2000 as against Rs.83,753 crore in 1998-99. The Central Government entered the market on 21 occasions (including private placements with the Reserve Bank on 8 occasions) in 1999-2000 as against 24 occasions (with private placements on 8 occasions) in the previous year. The shift from an yield-based to the price-based auction resulted in finer bidding. Out of the 30 loans floated by the Government, only four were fresh issues whereas others were re-issues. The Reserve Bank’s subscription to total primary issues (including private placement) amounted to Rs.27,000 crore (31 per cent) as against Rs.38,205 crore (46 per cent) during 1998-99. During 1999-2000, there was no direct devolvement on the Reserve Bank in view of the overwhelming response to auctions, particularly during the second half, when bids received exceeded 200 per cent of the notified amount. About 65 per cent (Rs.56,630 crore) of the total primary issues was raised through securities of above 10-year maturity as against 14 per cent (Rs.11,324 crore) in 1998-99 resulting in the lengthening of the weighted average maturities of outstanding marketable debt to 7.75 years from 7.30 years in 1998-99.

5.19 During 1999-2000, the long-term rates declined notwithstanding a moderate firming up of the interest rates in short-term Government papers such as Treasury Bills. Banks generally exhausted their short-term resources to fund investment in long-term Government securities, which drove down the long-term interest rates. Given the underlying low inflationary expectations and stable call money market conditions and the improvements in liquidity due to consolidation of issues through reissuance, the market participants found the long-term paper to be attractive. As a consequence, the yield curve flattened considerably with the term spread between the 1-year and 10-year security falling from nearly 200 basis points in March 1999 to 92 basis points in March 2000.

5.20 The aggregate volume of transactions in Central Government dated securities and Treasury Bills (outright as well as repos) more than doubled to Rs.5,35,602 crore in 1999-2000, from Rs.2,25,674 crore in 1998-99 reflecting the substantial improvement in demand conditions in the Government securities market. As much as 85 per cent (Rs.4,52,861 crore) of the transactions were on outright basis with the balance by way of repos. Most of the secondary market transactions took place in Central Government securities. Transactions in State Government securities amounted to only Rs.3,632 crore. The turnover in Central Government securities during 1999-2000 amounted to Rs.12,36,678 crore as against Rs.5,30,742 crore in 1998-99 (counting twice the volume of transactions in the case of outright transactions and four times in the case of repos). The outright turnover aggregated Rs.9,05,722 crore as compared with Rs.3,71,954 crore in 1998-99. Thus, the average monthly turnover in Central Government securities aggregated Rs.1,03,056 crore in 1999-2000 as compared with Rs.44,228 crore in 1998-99. The average monthly turnover of outright transactions amounted to Rs.75,477 crore during 1999-2000 as against Rs.30,996 crore in 1998-99. The average daily turnover increased to Rs.3,388 crore from Rs.1,454 crore in 1998-99. The turnover ratio in dated securities (defined as the ratio of total turnover to total outstanding securities) thus increased to 3.2 as on March 31, 2000 from 1.7 as on March 31, 1999.

5.21 The Reserve Bank used OMO as a part of liquidity management. Open market sales were activated to drain excess liquidity in conjunction with private placement / devolvement operations. The Reserve Bank also resorted to open market purchases of Treasury Bills of varying maturities from PDs to inject liquidity into the market with a view to fine-tuning temporary asset-liability mismatches and stabilising money market rates at the desired level.

5.22 At the shortest end, the average cut-off yield on 14-day Treasury Bills rose to 8.23 per cent in 1999-2000 from 7.79 per cent in 1998-99, representing an increase of 44 basis points over the previous year. Similar trends were also observed in respect of the 91-day and 364-day Treasury Bill rates as the average cut-off yields rose by 47 basis points to 9.03 per cent and by 58 basis points to 10.09 per cent, respectively, in 1999-2000. However, the implicit cut-off yields of 14-day, 91-day and 364-day Treasury Bills up to end-June 2000, declined on an average basis to 7.54, 8.46 and 9.21 per cent, respectively.

5.23 The yield in the secondary market for 10-year paper which was 12.05 per cent as on March 31, 1999, declined through the year to 10.42 per cent at end-February 2000. The yield hardened somewhat in March 2000 and settled at 10.85 per cent on March 31, 2000. On a point-to-point basis, the yield for 10-year security declined by 120 basis points between end-March 1999 and end-March 2000. Similarly, at the longest end, the yield on 18-year security (residual maturity) declined to 10.72 per cent at end-February 2000 from 12.44 per cent at end-March 1999 before edging up to 11.12 per cent at end-March 2000. At the short to medium end, 1-year, 3-year and 5-year security rates declined from 10.07 per cent, 11.00 per cent and 11.17 per cent respectively at end-March 1999 to 9.93 per cent, 10.27 per cent and 10.35 per cent at end-March 2000.

5.24 The yield curve moved successively downwards during the year up to mid-February 2000 with the slope rising gently on the maturity axis. After moving up in March 2000, the yield curve once again moved down following the monetary policy changes announced effective April 1, 2000. The yield in the secondary market for 10-year paper declined from 10.85 per cent as at end-March 2000 to 10.27 per cent as on April 11, 2000. Similarly, the yield on 18-year maturity declined from 11.12 per cent as at end-March 2000 to 10.68 per cent as on April 11, 2000. At the short to medium-end 1-year and 5-year security rates declined from 9.93 per cent and 10.51 per cent as at end-March 2000 to 9.29 per cent and 9.90 per cent, respectively, as on April 11, 2000.

VI External Sector

6.1 The external sector continued to be comfortable in 1999-2000, notwithstanding a sharp rise in the oil import bill on account of the hardening of international crude oil prices. During the year, India’s merchandise exports showed a turnaround partly reflecting the economic recovery the world over. With private transfers and software exports exhibiting continued buoyancy, the current account deficit (CAD) was restricted to 0.9 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000. Strong capital flows led by a renewal in portfolio inflows resulted in an overall balance of payments (BoP) surplus for the fourth successive year. This enabled an increase in foreign exchange reserves by US $ 5,546 million during the year to US $38,036 million by end-March 2000.

6.2 The two major characteristics of the BoP position during 1999-2000, on the positive side, were the turnaround in exports of goods and a pick up in capital inflows. These developments could alleviate the pressures posed by the sharp increase in oil imports and a rise, albeit moderate in the non-oil non-gold imports. Thus, although the recovery in exports was sharp, the trade deficit in 1999-2000 turned out to be higher than in the preceding year. With net invisibles posting a higher surplus, the CAD remained broadly at the preceding year’s level. Capital inflows, augmented mainly by portfolio investment and non-resident Indian (NRI) deposits, were much above the CAD. Consequently, the BoP recorded an overall surplus of US $ 6,402 million in 1999-2000.

6.3 The trade deficit, according to the provisional data released by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S), worked out higher at US $ 9.6 billion during 1999-2000 than that of US $ 9.2 billion during 1998-99. This was essentially fuelled by a sharp increase in the oil import bill despite the strong recovery in exports after three years. India’s total exports, at US $ 37.6 billion, recorded an increase of 13.2 per cent during 1999-2000 (over the final export figures of 1998-99), in contrast to the decline of 5.1 per cent during 1998-99. Imports, at US $ 47.2 billion, accelerated to 11.4 per cent during 1999-2000 from 2.2 per cent during 1998-99. Non-oil imports increased by 2.1 per cent in 1999-2000 as against the increase of 8.0 per cent in the preceding year.

6.4 Invisible transactions remained buoyant with the surplus at US $ 12,935 million in 1999-2000 as compared with US $ 9,208 million during 1998-99. Private transfers from non-resident Indians continued to be an important source of invisible receipts. Remittances from Indians working in the US, UK, South-East Asia and continental Europe have expanded in comparison with the traditional base of the Middle-East.

6.5 Software exports kept up their momentum and rose by 53 per cent to US $ 4,015 million in 1999-2000 on top of an increase of 49 per cent during the preceding year. Indian software companies draw their comparative advantage in the software business mainly on the basis of their cost-effectiveness, international quality and reliability. In tandem with the liberalisation of current account and technology imports, payments on account of financial services, management services, office maintenance, advertising, royalties, licence fees etc. have increased. Consequently, miscellaneous payments increased from US $ 6,161 million in 1998-99 to US $ 6,924 million in 1999-2000. Despite subdued tourism earnings, net earnings in non-factor services increased substantially during 1999-2000 to US $ 3,856 million from US $ 2,165 million in 1998-99. Net income payments increased marginally to US $ 3,559 million during 1999-2000 due to higher interest payments on external liabilities.

6.6 Despite a sharp rise in import payments, a marked recovery in exports and a buoyant surplus under invisibles helped to contain the current account deficit to US $ 4,163 million (0.9 per cent of GDP) during 1999-2000 as compared with US $ 4,038 million (1.0 per cent of GDP) in 1998-99. Current receipts financed 93.8 per cent of current payments in 1999-2000 as against 93.2 per cent in the previous year. The current receipts in relation to GDP, one of the indicators of external sector sustainability, improved to 15.2 per cent during 1999-2000 from 14.3 per cent in 1998-99. The debt-service ratio declined to 16.0 per cent in 1999-2000 from 18.0 per cent during 1998-99.

6.7 The restoration of orderly conditions in the international financial markets coupled with pro-active policy initiatives on macroeconomic management prompted a marked shift in the volume and composition of capital flows during 1999-2000. While net external commercial borrowings remained subdued, there was a significant recovery in the flow of foreign investment and non-resident deposits. As a result, capital flows rose from US $ 8.6 billion during 1998-99 to US $ 10.2 billion in 1999-2000 with an increase in the share of non-debt flows to 50.7 per cent from 28.2 per cent.

6.8 The overall balance of payments recorded a surplus for the fourth year in succession with US $ 6,402 million (1.4 per cent of GDP) during 1999-2000 on top of US $ 4,222 million (1.0 per cent of GDP) in 1998-99, as net capital flows at US $ 10,242 million more than offset the current account deficit during the year. The overall surplus during the year, net of repurchases of US $ 260 million from the IMF, resulted in an accretion of US $ 6,142 million (excluding valuation) to foreign exchange reserves.

6.9 India’s foreign exchange reserves comprising foreign currency assets and gold held by the Reserve Bank and Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) held by the government increased by US $ 5,546 million (Rs. 27,908 crore) during 1999-2000 to US $ 38,036 million (Rs 1,65,913 crore) by end-March 2000 on top of an increase of US $ 3,123 million during 1998-99. Concurrently, the Reserve Bank’s forward liabilities were limited to a narrow range of US $ 675-997 million during the year, declining from US $ 802 million at end-March 1999 to US $ 675 million (less than two per cent of total reserves) by end-March 2000. Net of outstanding forward liabilities and use of the IMF credit, India’s foreign exchange reserves stood at US $ 37,335 million as compared with US $ 31,401 million as at end-March 1999, thereby showing an even higher accretion of US $ 5,934 million during 1999-2000.

6.10 India’s external debt increased by 0.8 per cent from US $ 97,666 million as at end-March 1999 to US $98,435 million as at end-March 2000. Component-wise, long-term non-resident deposits, multilateral (excepting IMF) and bilateral debt increased while debt owed to the IMF, external commercial borrowings and rupee debt owed to the erstwhile USSR fell in absolute terms. While the proportion of multilateral (excepting IMF) and bilateral debt in the total debt inched up from 49.2 per cent as at end-March 1999 to 50.2 per cent as at end-March 2000 and that of debt under long-term nonresident deposits increased from 12.6 per cent to 14.8 per cent, the share of commercial borrowings (including long-term trade credits) fell from 28.6 per cent to 26.4 per cent and that of rupee debt fell from 4.8 per cent to 4.5 per cent over the same period.

6.11 The developments in the exchange rate during 1999-2000 continued to be guided by the policy objective of ensuring that the external value of the Rupee is realistic and credible as evidenced by a sustainable CAD and manageable reserve situation. At the same time, in order to even out lumpy demand and supply in the relatively thin forex market and to smoothen sharp movements, the Reserve Bank makes sales and purchases of foreign currency as considered necessary. With a view to promoting orderly development of foreign exchange markets and facilitating external payments in a liberalised regime, the Government passed a new legislation viz., Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), which came into effect from June 1, 2000.

6.12 The exchange rate of the Indian rupee vis-a-vis the US dollar traded within a range of Rs.42.44-Rs.43.61 during 1999-2000.

6.13 The global economy registered a V-shaped recovery in 1999 with the actual growth rate projected at 3.3 per cent in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), exceeding the earlier estimates of 2.9 per cent. The world economic growth is projected to strengthen to about 4.2 per cent in 2000. While uncertainties about the sustainability of the current order of global economic growth remain, advanced economies are expected to record stronger growth, as per the latest WEO forecasts, driven partly by a stable macroeconomic environment and the rally in equity prices and partly reflecting the success achieved in entrenching effective macro policy adjustment and in greater adherence to international standards as a part of the development of international financial architecture.

6.14 Certain global developments could pose serious risks to sustainable global growth. These include: (i) the possibility of a sustained increase in oil prices, which has doubled since early 1999, (ii) the perceived overvaluation of developed country stock markets and the associated risk emanating from sudden corrections and (iii) the asynchronous growth among the advanced economies, with the corresponding downside risks of large payment imbalances and realignment of the major currencies.

VII Assessment and Prospects

7.1 During 1999-2000, despite a number of difficult domestic and international developments, such as the Kargil conflict and the sharp increase in oil prices, the Indian economy posted a reasonably high rate of growth with relative price stability. Real GDP growth was 6.4 per cent, the annual rate of inflation, on a point-to-point basis, was 6.5 per cent (or 3.8 per cent excluding the impact of rise in administered oil prices) and the accretion to foreign exchange reserves was about US $ 5,546 million. The external current account deficit was below 1 per cent of GDP.

7.2 It is useful at the threshold of the twenty-first century to take stock of the macro-economic developments since the 1991 crisis. The average real growth rate of the economy at 6.4 per cent during 1992-93 to 1999-2000 was higher than 5.9 per cent during the 1980s and 6.0 per cent during the second half of the 1980s. On a point-to-point basis, the rise in the wholesale price index averaged 7.6 per cent, remaining at the level recorded in the 1980s. However, in the second half of the 1990s (i.e., since 1995-96), the average headline inflation rate came down significantly to 5.2 per cent. The ratio of the gross fiscal deficit (GFD) of the Centre to GDP averaged about 5.8 per cent in the post-1991 period as against 8.2 per cent in the second half of the 1980s on a comparable basis. The external current account deficit averaged 1 per cent of GDP on almost a sustained basis in the recent period. The key indicators of external debt sustainability improved continuously throughout the post-1991 period. Reserve accretions occurred in every successive year, except in 1995-96, to take the level of foreign exchange reserves to over 8 months of import cover by 1999-2000. The new impulses of growth have emerged from the private (including household) sector with private capital formation moving up, financed primarily by private saving.

7.3 There are, however, many concerns. The fiscal position has not been strong enough to share the burden of macro-economic adjustment. The variability in both output growth and the inflation rate continues to exist. Moreover, the task of sustaining ‘quality’ growth over the medium to long term is not complete; it requires that challenges associated with social sector improvement and productivity growth are addressed with appropriate structural reforms in a wide range of areas of activity including the labour markets. The first quarter of fiscal 2000-01 has also been characterised by several unfavourable developments including pressures in the foreign exchange market and an increase in the overall rate of inflation largely due to an increase in administered oil prices.

7.4 The sectoral growth profile in the two periods, viz., the post-1991 period and the second half of the 1980s, throws up some interesting insights for future policy direction. In the recent period, the services sector recorded an annual average growth of 7.7 per cent as against 7.2 per cent in the earlier period. Agriculture and allied activities which registered an annual average growth of 3.4 per cent in the second half of the 1980s improved their performance to a rate of 3.8 per cent in the post-1991 period. The average growth of the industrial sector, on the other hand, was lower at 7.3 per cent during the 1990s as compared with 8.0 per cent during the 1980s. However, manufacturing growth was more or less even during the two periods. The average growth rates of mining and quarrying and electricity, gas and water supply, on the other hand, were sharply lower in the years since 1992-93. Among the services, the main impetus has emerged from trade, transport and communication and financing, insurance, real estate and business services (which includes software). Besides, the growth rates of construction and community, social and personal services have moved up during the recent period compared to the position in the second half of the 1980s.

7.5 The real GDP growth of the Indian economy is widely believed to be hovering around its ‘filtered’ trend rate¹, but the economy has still to ‘catch up’ to achieve an average growth of 7-8 per cent per annum or the potential growth as determined by the production possibility frontier. Such an outcome would be rendered possible if the requisite real investment growth occurs along with technology improvements and efficiency gains.

7.6 According to available data on Net State Domestic Product (NSDP), which is subject to some limitations, there was a decline in the coefficient of variation of the growth rates of NSDP at constant prices of the various States from 293.2 per cent in 1991-92 to 77.5 per cent in 1995-96. This does not fully reflect the continuing deterioration in the economic position of several States in relation to others. Looking at growth in individual States, there is some evidence of widening of the gap between the better-off States and other States. To reduce these disparities, the economies of the backward regions need to grow faster, by adopting pro-active policies including those that help to promote literacy and develop infrastructure. In this context, the role of the rural infrastructure development fund (RIDF) is important. The RIDF, which was set up from the contributions by the scheduled commercial banks to the extent of the shortfall in their priority sector lending targets, has provided funds in five tranches to State Governments to enable them to complete various types of infrastructure projects pertaining to irrigation, flood protection, rural roads, bridges, etc. As against a total corpus of Rs.18,000 crore for the RIDF, the cumulative sanctions and disbursements amounted to Rs.14,386 crore and Rs.6,269 crore, respectively, till end-June 2000. The state-wise performance in respect of disbursements has, however, been uneven. The low level of disbursements was due to the difficulties faced in identifying projects by some State governments, the lack of budgetary support and delays in finalisation of projects, especially those involving land acquisition and tendering procedures.

7.7 Growth of all crops has decelerated to 2.6 per cent in the 1990s (1992-2000) from 4.3 per cent in the second half of the 1980s, notwithstanding normal monsoons and improvements in private capital formation in agriculture, in net irrigated area and in fertiliser consumption. The variability in the inflation rates in recent years is found to originate mainly from the variability of supplies of some farm-related products such as fruits and vegetables, milk and milk products and eggs, fish and meat, which have significant weights in the WPI. A simulated exercise shows that if prices of these commodities increase at an annual rate of 2.5 percentage points (i.e., 100 basis points above the trend growth in population) and assuming the increases in the prices of mineral oils and fertilisers to be in line with the international prices, the headline inflation rate would be about 4.0 per cent a year. This would imply that barring calamities such as the severe cyclones in Orissa, supplies relating to food articles would need to be maintained on a sustained basis through measures that help to reduce vulnerability to the vagaries of weather, ensure efficient land-use with reference to the cropping pattern, diversify agricultural activities with emphasis on value-added farm products, promote the development of irrigation and water resources, and make appropriate use of water and other inputs such as fertilisers, seeds, power, pesticides, including new farm technologies. Such measures are in the area of policy implementation at the state level where administrative arrangements would need to be backed up by well-tuned intelligence gathering and exercises about behavioural responses of farmers and other participants to policy initiatives.

7.8 One of the current developments of concern relates to the mounting stock levels of foodgrains. This problem has emerged from the high procurement in response to the regular hikes in Minimum Support Prices (MSP) of foodgrains unaccompanied by a commensurate rise in the off-take. The rice and wheat procurement-production ratio increased, as a result, from 16.3 per cent in 1989-90 to 18.9 per cent in 1999-2000. The off-take of foodgrains has been low in most years of the 1990s, partly due to limited open market absorption, and partly due to low quantities utilised by the public distribution agencies. In the case of the former, while market prices as well as factors such as quality are important considerations, low public distribution has much to do with the issue price levels, the quantity of the products offered and the inadequate institutional arrangements for quick delivery at areas of need and for linking delivery with work-oriented tasks (like the Food for Work programme). The buffer stocks have generally ruled above the norms in recent years resulting in a high burden of food subsidy on public finances. Better targeting of subsidies through such schemes as food stamp issuance, and a freeze on MSP with appropriate issue prices could help reduce stocks over time. At this juncture, it appears that enhanced exports of foodgrains to reduce the stock levels are also difficult, given the relatively low international prices of grains. It may become necessary to explore such methods of indirect interventions such as options and futures in the realm of agricultural marketing by first establishing a nation-wide multi-commodity exchange. Further, the problems pertaining to skewed availment/ distribution of foodgrains under the public distribution scheme would need to be resolved quickly with elimination of inter-State restrictions in the movements of agricultural products.

7.9 The industrial performance has been generally uneven in the post-1992 period. Industrial output growth, as per the national accounts statistics, after showing an upward movement for three consecutive years (1993-94 to 1995-96), exhibited a moderate growth of over 6 per cent in 1996-97 and slackened in 1997-98 and 1998-99. There was some industrial recovery in 1999-2000, made possible by a combination of factors. Improved demand was propelled to an extent by increased exports, easy credit availability, low inflationary expectations and improved business confidence. The recovery was reflected largely in the increase in the output of the consumer goods sector, followed by that in basic goods and intermediate goods. The capital goods sector has suffered a significant slowdown, due to an inadequate pick up in domestic investment demand partly because of the past build up of excess capacities. The slowdown in capital goods production is also due to sharp cutbacks in project investments and the increase in cost overruns (from 51.6 per cent during March 1999 to 56.8 per cent in March 2000) on account of delays in the completion of projects in the public sector. It is important to recognise that consumption-led recovery would not help to sustain high industrial growth since infrastructure bottlenecks are substantial, with the demand for infrastructure services outpacing their supply.

7.10 In recent years, there has been considerable amount of industrial restructuring, led to a large extent by mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Most of the M&As were in consumer goods industries, where exploitation of both economies of scale and scope is likely to give material gains in a relatively short period of time. However, M&As by themselves may not necessarily lead to improvement in competitiveness. A competitive industrial structure is particularly important in ‘new’ economy industries where concentration of economic power or restrictive practices could jeopardise innovativeness, flexibility and cost minimisation. Once barriers to entry and exit are removed, the possibility of cost competitiveness and improving resource allocation will enhance. However, future policy initiatives for promoting fair competition need to be carefully designed since infromation technology (IT) makes it possible for information flows to be large and quick and helps market participants to devise business strategies that give them advantage over others in the industry.

7.11 The fiscal imbalance of the Central Government and State Governments, as reflected in the combined GFD touched a high level of 9.9 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000. The slippage between the revised and the budget estimates was high at 2.5 percentage points of GDP. While the high level of government sector deficit is attributable to some unavoidable expenditure commitments as well as unanticipated shocks, any further erosion of the fiscal position could turn out to be unsustainable, since the financial saving rate of the household sector is only moderately higher than the ratio of overall fiscal deficit to GDP.

7.12 The need for a turnaround in the fiscal position is well recognised, but it requires a multi-pronged effort at improving revenue buoyancy in particular tax collections, effecting necessary expenditure reductions and raising proceeds from divestment of selected public enterprises. Expenditure management also holds the key to achieving overall fiscal prudence. The combined Government sector expenditure/GDP ratio at 28.7 per cent in 1999-2000, though lower than 30.6 per cent in 1990-91, reflects nonetheless the large size of the Government. About 52 per cent of the aggregate expenditure of the Central Government is committed towards interest payments, defence and statutory grants to States while non-obligatory expenditures such as subsidies and wages and salaries have been high and have tended to move up. Defence expenditures and statutory grants are exogenously given but in respect of others, strong policy actions would need to be put in place. The interest burden could over time be reduced by containing fiscal deficits and by plugging leakages and misappropriations while subsidies could be oriented to operate as ‘social safety nets’. The expenditures of Government on wages and salaries and pensions seem to be the most important area where reforms have to be focussed. For instance, the expenditure of the Central Government towards wages and salaries has grown at an annual average rate of 14.8 per cent to Rs.32,433 crore in 1999-2000 from Rs.11,069 crore in 1991-92, which is higher than the 12.5 per cent growth in the overall expenditure of the Central Government. Unless the size of the government is pruned, the wage bill would pose a significant burden on fiscal management. Moreover, there is an urgent need to ensure that solvency of public finances in respect of pensions and other unfunded liabilities is attained.

7.13 The slow-down in revenue collections is reflected in the deterioration in the tax-GDP ratio of the government sector (Centre and States) from 16.4 per cent in 1985-86 to 14.1 per cent in 1999-2000. The structural shift in the composition of GDP seems to have constrained growth in tax receipts. While the agricultural sector has remained out of the tax net, the fast growing services sector has not been adequately taxed. With the manufacturing sector being subjected increasingly to business cycles in recent years, the problem of maintaining the tax-GDP ratio at a reasonable level has become difficult. The wide ranging tax exemptions and concessions extended to various sectors of the economy need to be rationalised after a thorough examination of the effectiveness of such concessions in promoting intended aims or in augmenting the growth of the particular sectors for which they have been extended. Moreover, there is a need for further reform and reorientation of levies such as stamp duties, registration fees, etc. These fees and duties need to be made ‘tax payer-friendly’. It should be ensured that they do not impede the volume of transactions and reduce, in the process, the total revenue from these sources.

7.14 While the Government has taken initiatives to strengthen tax administration and reforms including the harmonisation of sales tax rates across States as a prelude to the introduction of VAT, there are some emerging problems arising from the technological development in domestic and international trade that need to be addressed. The rapid pace of globalisation and fast moving e-commerce the world over has increased the ‘mobility’ of the tax base. It is by now well recognised that in the near future the scope of e-commerce would widen, and the absence of a proper mechanism to tax the trade based on e-commerce may prove to be a potential source of leakage of the tax revenue of the Government. The Government would have to work in concert with other countries, which are also wrestling with this problem, to find a feasible solution. Simultaneously, the Government needs to upgrade its technological infrastructure and systems and procedures so that action in this area could be undertaken expeditiously.

7.15 In the absence of enough corrective actions, the elbow room available for public spending for creation of capital assets and social capital has become limited. In the event of a fall in public capital formation, there would be constraints on the creation of new or additional capacities. Besides, the private sector investments which depend on public sector project demands may not fructify or lose momentum.

7.16 The restructuring of public sector enterprises is yet another area of critical importance from the point of view of moving towards fiscal consolidation. In the last two budgets, the Government has announced several policy initiatives relating to closing down of non-viable public sector undertakings (PSUs), restructuring of potentially viable PSUs and marking down government equity in non-strategic PSUs. The actual realisation of disinvestment proceeds has so far fallen short of the budget targets. The disinvestment process necessarily has to take into account the prevailing or the likely capital market conditions and investor preferences. It would be useful to build different scenarios assuming different degrees of success of the disinvestment process and propose corrective strategies under each scenario for realising the determined final fiscal outcome.

7.17 The fiscal position with regard to State finances, characterised as it is by expenditure overruns due to committed expenses like wages and salaries, pensions and growing debt service obligations cannot be easily corrected in the medium term without the support of a well designed strategy. The State level PSUs, like the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and the State Road Transport Corporations (SRTCs), have been reporting net losses and have been absorbing scarce funds through budgetary support. Restructuring the PSUs, increasing the user charges and providing greater managerial autonomy are some of the measures that are often advocated as the requisite solutions to the problem on hand. In this context, a fiscal issue of relevance is the growth in the implicit or contingent liabilities in the form of guarantees for accessing finances to meet the needs of PSUs, especially those in the area of infrastructure, besides the explicit liabilities. These off-balance sheet exposures are often costly, and could pose risks of default if the institutions supported by funds do not improve their performance. It is vital that limits are placed on the quantum and value of guarantees that could be given by State Governments and adhered to in the framework of a law.

7.18 With the fiscal deficits persisting, the debt/GDP ratio of the combined Government sector increased from 59.6 per cent as at end-March 1991 to 60.7 per cent as at end-March 2000. The relatively high interest rates on borrowings owing to persistence of fiscal deficits has led to growth in the interest burden (interest payments-revenue receipts ratio) of the combined Governments from 23.6 per cent in 1990-91 to 32.2 per cent in 1999-2000. However, the interest burden has risen more sharply for the Central Government from 39.1 per cent to 50.9 per cent of revenue receipts during the same period. The high stock of debt fuels expectations about the uncertainties of future budgetary policies and adds higher risk premium, thereby leading to volatility in the financial markets and constraining downward movement in long-term interest rates. With the Central and State governments meeting their repayment obligations through fresh borrowings, the bunching of repayments has also brought pressure on the market by increasing gross borrowings with adverse implications for interest rate evolution. While the debt management operations during 1999-2000 attempted to extend the maturity profile without having adverse effects on interest cost, the high overhang of debt acts as a severe constraint for continuance of such a policy stance in the coming years. Moreover, the adverse effect of a high debt ratio has been the reduced allocation of funds for social and other productive expenditures of the Government in order to accommodate the ballooning interest commitments. It is imperative, therefore, to limit public debt accretion together with contingent liabilities over the medium-term and thereby to lend credibility to the fiscal stance.

7.19 It is in the context of sustainability and the need for fiscal adjustment in the medium term that a strong institutional mechanism embodied in the form of Fiscal Responsibility Legislation (FRL), as announced in the last Budget, would be necessary at the level of the Central Government. The FRL at the Central Government will help in attaining sustainability, but for it to be credible it should include stringent requirements for fiscal transparency, backed by strong enforcement mechanisms. The legislation should explicitly focus on the elimination of dissavings of the public sector, placing statutory limits on borrowings and stabilisation of the debt/GDP ratio at a sustainable level. State Governments too should also be encouraged to balance their revenue accounts by introducing FRL on the lines envisaged in respect of the Central Government.

7.20 The current account deficit has averaged about 1 per cent of GDP over the years since 1992-93. While commodity exports have generally grown over the years, there has been variability in export performance. On the other hand, competitiveness in services has strengthened during this period. Invisible earnings in the form of remittances from expatriate Indians and software exports have emerged as a major source of support to the balance of payments. As a result, current receipts have gone up, and formed over 90 per cent of current payments in 1999-2000.

7.21 Capital flows have been fairly strong since 1993-94 with brief interruptions, particularly in 1995- 96. In the absence of a significant expansion in the external financing requirement, larger capital flows have helped to build foreign exchange reserves from a level of 2.5 months of imports as at end-March 1991 to 8.2 months as at end-March 2000. There has also been a progressive reorganisation and consolidation of external debt. The debt-GDP ratio has declined from over 41 per cent in 1991-92 to around 22 per cent in 1999-2000. Over the same period, the debt service ratio has fallen from 35 per cent to 16 per cent. The strategy for management of external debt to contain short-term and volatile elements within prudent limits was pursued.

7.22 While the external position has remained fairly comfortable over the last eight years, the growing openness of the economy and the need for accelerating growth in the medium term bring to the fore some areas of concern which require particular attention.

7.23 It is generally accepted that earnings on account of exports of goods and services are the mainstay of the balance of payments. In the 1990s, the ratio of current receipts to GDP has moved up to around 15 per cent, mainly on account of buoyant invisible earnings. The ratio of merchandise exports to GDP has, however, stagnated at 8-9 per cent with a downward drift in the two years of 1997-98 and 1998-99. A sharp decline in global inflation visa-vis inflation in India has had unfavourable effects on India’s export competitiveness. Sluggishness in external demand was also precipitated by the recent financial crises in some parts of the world. Besides, vigorous export strategies by competitor countries, low-to-intermediate technological content of Indian exports and specific product level deficiencies are the other factors that constrained the improvement in the exports to GDP ratio.

7.24 Stepping up exports on a sustained basis holds the key to a healthy balance of payments position, in the context of India’s growing global financial integration with accompanying uncertainties in capital movements. It is, therefore, necessary to create a conducive export environment by effecting enduring improvements in productivity at the specific export industry level. Such an action is particularly required in knowledge intensive and sunrise export categories. Besides, it is useful to utilise the medium of e-commerce for providing trade as also foreign investment, with sufficient monitoring and regulatory safeguards. The creation of a scheme for granting assistance to States for development of export related infrastructure is also a step in the right direction. Policies for foreign direct investment (FDI) need to emphasise the intrinsic link between FDI and exports by allowing for a greater role for foreign enterprise in infrastructure development. India’s exports are reported to be suffering from a technological lag and are concentrated in lower segments of the product life cycle. As a consequence, India has not been able to exploit the shifting patterns of external demand in comparison with the export-led economies of Asia. Here again, FDI could play a major role in transferring closely held technologies and in diffusing innovations, both horizontally and vertically. In market-based exchange and payments systems, aggressive marketing strategies, brand promotion and improvement in the quality perception of goods overseas would provide the cutting edge of non-price competitiveness. This is where attention needs to be paid in full measure. There is an urgent need to diversify the external market structure of India’s exports through appropriate marketing plans. The geographical pattern of exports has remained virtually unchanged since the 1970s. The South-East Asian economies and China have shown the vigour and resilience that exports can acquire when they are widely diversified in their destination patterns. In addition, exim policies should carry forward the efforts to reduce the anti-export bias in the trade regime, particularly in scaling down tariffs to international levels and in improving the access of domestic producers to imported inputs.

7.25 Structural changes underway in the economy would impact upon patterns of import demand and alter the responsiveness of imports to the domestic activity and relative prices. In so far as POL imports are concerned, the international price shocks in 1999-2000 were weathered mainly because of low non-oil import demand coinciding with the pick up in exports and net invisible receipts. The share of POL imports in total imports, however, has to be closely watched since India is vulnerable to oil price shocks. From the experience of the past oil shocks, it is necessary to contain this share at no more than one-fifth of total imports, so as to insulate the economy from cost push inflationary pressures emanating from oil price hikes. Nevertheless, with domestic consumption growing in line with the real growth rate of the economy, there is a widening gap between demand and supply. Intensive efforts for oil exploration together with augmentation of indigenous refinery capacity would save foreign exchange payments for relatively costlier imports of petroleum products. In these areas of policy, foreign direct investment by large oil companies could have a potentially critical role of providing benefits from exploitation of worldwide economies of scale and leading domain technologies.

7.26 The category of non-oil non-gold imports has remained subdued through the later half of the 1990s, essentially reflecting the structural shifts in the production pattern. The burgeoning growth of the services sector, with the consequential fall in the comparative share of commodity producing sectors in the national output, and the ongoing industrial restructuring to exploit economies of scale are some of the factors which have been at work in recent years, significantly altering the pattern of import demand. These factors also imply that there will be a shift in the composition of industrial output towards consumer goods and to an extent, basic and intermediate goods. Over the medium term, sustaining a growth rate in the range of 7 to 8 per cent would, however, require substantial increase in capital deepening and this may lead to higher imports of capital goods. Current receipts, therefore, will have to go up to meet the anticipated growth in import payments, if the reserves position has to be maintained.

7.27 The capital account of the balance of payments has been undergoing a progressive liberalisation. In respect of some components of the capital flows such as FDI, portfolio flows, banking flows and overseas investment by Indian corporate entities, liberalisation has preceded current account convertibility. Proactive changes in the policy regime have facilitated the sequential opening up of the capital account. The FEMA, which replaced the FERA in June 2000, reflects a shift in policy emphasis: from conservation to management of foreign exchange consistent with the orderly evolution of trade and payments and the foreign exchange markets; from a ‘citizenship’ basis to a ‘residency’ basis in the conduct of foreign exchange transactions; and from criminal procedures of enforcement to civil procedures - all under a transparent framework that promotes accountability. The FEMA contains various provisions in regard to capital account transactions which will facilitate better management of capital flows.

7.28 The capital account has undergone substantial, largely policy induced, changes in size and composition, with equity flows occupying an equiproportional share with debt flows over the 1990s. This has had beneficial effects in terms of transfer of technology, financial market reforms and consolidation of the country’s exposure to external debt. The FDI has, over the 1990s, been viewed as the ‘preferred’ source in the hierarchy of capital flows to developing countries. The policies for FDI have, therefore, been progressively simplified. The emphasis is on dismantling of regulatory entry barriers. Investment proposals are being shifted to the automatic route. Further action is required for infrastructure upgradation with support from FDI itself, better exit policies, legal reforms which bring about consistency in laws within the country and in line with international standards, and decentralisation of the implementation process with accompanying State level reforms for quick and easy access to land, public utilities, raw materials and power through changes in legislation. The special economic zones being set up in the Exim policy measures for 2000-01 represent a transitional stage which allows FDI to freely come into the country even as changes in extant laws and procedures are being addressed. It is, however, important to broad base these reforms including labour market flexibility and not allow these zones to become enclaves.

7.29 Policy towards external commercial borrowings (ECBs) has been operated flexibly within the parameters of prudent debt management. While ceilings on approvals have excluded longer maturity ECBs, the approval process keeps in view the consideration about the minimum average maturity of debt. In such a process, priority is accorded to infrastructure and export sectors. The end-use stipulations have been progressively eased except with regard to capital markets and real estate. Prudent management of ECBs should continue with careful monitoring of the exposure to short-term and contingent liabilities. Given the growing exposure to international financial markets in the debt portfolio, appropriate risk and asset liability management strategies assume critical importance in the handling of market and maturity mismatches. Liquidity risks need to be assessed through dynamic liquidity-at-risk models and buttressed with built-in liquidity options and contingent support lines. The policy for ECB also encourages the use of derivatives for hedging interest and exchange rate risks on underlying foreign currency exposures. Over time, the approach to external debt management should expand into overall liability management encompassing the economy’s international investment position.

7.30 External debt management policies have yielded positive results in the 1990s. The nominal stock of debt has remained at the March 1995 level, indicative of the consolidation that has occurred. India is presently at the lower bound of the group of moderately indebted countries with almost 40 per cent of the debt stock on concessional terms. Efforts are underway to develop a more comprehensive framework of debt management by setting up benchmarks that lead to optimal currency, interest and maturity mix. In order to consolidate the gains achieved so far, continuing emphasis on reporting, transparency and MIS inputs for debt management decisions assumes importance.

7.31 During the 1990s, the Indian economy began to receive portfolio flows through foreign investment in domestic stock exchanges as well as the Indian issues in foreign stock exchanges. In 1999-2000, the strength and resilience of the macroeconomic fundamentals and the on-going reforms in the capital markets helped to evoke optimistic investor response. Portfolio flows have outstripped FDI in terms of share in net capital flows. Portfolio flows are important in that they often occur alongside FDI and provide an impetus for integration of financial markets. Within this growing integration, Indian financial markets have become increasingly sensitive to asset price movements abroad. Portfolio flows are sensitive to these movements and, therefore, it is necessary to build cushions to guard against sudden movement of portfolio capital in response to international asset prices. One way to protect the economy from the effect of volatility in portfolio flows is to build international reserves, which India has been doing in the past few years.

7.32 An important insight that emerges from the developments in the financial sector during the 1990s is the need to treat financial stability as a dominant objective of macroeconomic management and as a necessary, if not the sufficient, condition for accelerating economic growth. Towards this end, it has become necessary to not only regulate and supervise the financial sector but also to encourage market participants to improve information flows, adopt transparency practices, manage a wide array of risks associated with growth of business and eliminate asset-liability mismatches. Financial stability without efficiency is not a workable proposition from the point of view of growth and development. Competition for funds and introduction of modern technologies based on IT and networking have been the distinct hallmarks of the 1990s enabling freer competition. But profitability and cost minimisation which enable freer competition and financial innovations have remained areas of concern.

7.33 The banking sector is still dominant in the overall financial system in India. Since the adoption of prudential standards in 1993-94 there has been a reduction in non-performing assets (NPAs) in relation to the total assets, especially over the last five years. However, the level of NPAs still remains unduly high, partly because of the carry-over of NPAs in certain sunset industries and the continued existence of weak internal control systems in banks, and partly because of relatively weak legal support to the recovery mechanisms. The large quantum of NPAs, however, poses a major problem for a few banks, identified as weak banks, where the possibility of a return to profitability, without substantial restructuring, is doubtful. The Verma Committee, which looked into the problems of weak banks, made certain recommendations which are under consideration of the Government and the Reserve Bank.

7.34 Any delay in the resolution of the NPA problem could act as a ‘drag’ on the reforms process itself. It should be recognised that mere compliance to the internationally accepted Core Principles of Banking Supervision will not eliminate the problem. There is a need for not only banks and supervisory authorities to adopt best practices, but also for corporate entities to adopt greater accountability through adoption of disclosures and transparency practices and corporate governance principles. The legal machinery, as reflected in the establishment of a larger number of Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) and Settlement Advisory Committees (SACs) in banks, will need to be activised strongly to enable expeditious recovery of dues of banks and financial institutions. Simultaneously, the on-going initiatives such as the setting up of internal asset-liability management committees (ALCOs) in banks, the pursuit of risk based supervision and the preparation for setting up of a Credit Information Bureau should be vigorously followed, together with upgradations in technology and payment and settlement systems.

7.35 Monetary policy has continued to place emphasis on the twin objectives of pursuing price stability and ensuring adequate availability of credit for productive activities in the economy. These objectives are fundamental not only because they are in line with the provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act but also because they reflect the economic priorities of the country.

7.36 This does not, however, imply that the monetary policy environment and conduct of monetary policy have remained unchanged. In fact, they have changed in the 1990s all over the world and in India as well. The instruments and operating procedures of monetary policy are, analytically speaking, determined largely by the nature and depth of the institutional infrastructure and arrangements, and the levels of technology and systems in the banking sector, besides the degree of deregulation and globalisation faced by the economy. These factors have played a major role in transforming the Indian financial scene in the last 8 years.

7.37 The flexibility to conduct monetary management in India was recognised and strengthened by the analytical work of the Reserve Bank’s Working Group on Money Supply (1998). The Group reported that monetary policy exclusively based on monetary targets set by estimates of money demand could lack precision because while the money demand function exhibited parametric stability, predictive stability was less certain. The gradual emergence of rate variables such as interest rates with their growing sensitivity to financial developments and economic activity has contributed to the information content of quantity variables. Rate variables together with quantity variables would thus need to be used in the framework of multiple indicators to optimise management goals. In other words, the rate variables cannot be regarded as substituting for monetary targeting so long as the rate channel of transmission of policy has not evolved into a robust and reliable one. Such an outcome requires that certain conditions are satisfied, viz., the elimination of fiscal dominance in macroeconomic processes and of the connect between monetary and internal debt management, and the full integration of financial markets.

7.38 It should be understood that efficient functioning of the rate channel is not always a blessing. For instance, monetary policy making in most industrialised countries has become complex in the 1990s mainly because of financial market integration and market sensitivity to rates, generating in the process expectations that may eventually be inconsistent with the final information about the economies. In the short run, the authorities face policy dilemmas as market conditions change and as ‘new information’ flows. Monetary authorities may announce a nominal anchor such as an inflation target or an exchange rate target, but they would still need to have an operational ‘implementation aid’ that could be frequently adjusted. In a strict sense, therefore, monetary policy cannot be pre-determined and has to react to evolving conditions and new information flows (Box VII.1). This explains why the interest rate, which was utilised as the operational aid to policy implementation in the US and in the Euro-zone, has been changed several times in the last 18-20 months (Table VII.1).

7.39 In the US for example, the interest rates which ruled at relatively low levels in 1998 have been moved up gradually, in small magnitudes, in 1999 and 2000 so far in order to address the issues of rising external current account deficit and overheating of the economy. The gradual upward hikes in interest rates help to avoid sudden changes in expectations and to ensure that economic confidence is not undermined by uncertainty in policy conduct. The Euro-zone countries, on the other hand, coordinated an interest rate cut in December 1998, going against the policy strategy of the respective countries, essentially to address the unknowns associated with the introduction of the Euro on January 1, 1999 and the subsequent exchange rate evolution. Since February 2000, these countries adopted a restrictive policy in the light of the many uncertainties in outlook such as the oil price movements, the changes in Euro’s exchange rates and the growth rates of the Euro-zone countries themselves.

7.40 In the Indian context, the movements in market rates of interest in recent years suggest that (a) the markets have grown with the increase in interest rate flexibility; and (b) markets would get interlinked with financial sector reforms and overall economic liberalisation. Market interest rates in nominal terms were lower in 1999-2000, notwithstanding the increase in the size of Government’s borrowing from the market, as compared with the rates prevalent in 1998-99. For most part of 1999-2000, the headline inflation rate was lower than the overall trend of the last five years. This situation raised the real interest rates and enabled capital flows into the economy. The consequential improvement in the liquidity position could meet the revival in loan demand as well as the financing needs of the Government sector and of the corporate sector.

7.41 However, by the end of the first quarter of 2000-01, it was clear that successive interest rate increases in industrialised countries, the continued oil price uncertainties, the rise in the domestic inflation rate mainly on account of administered price hikes and the general bearishness in the capital market would pose serious challenges to monetary management in India. The narrowing of the differential in the interest rates obtaining in the Indian and the overseas markets in the face of the growing demand to meet the payment obligations mainly on account of the oil import bill, has put pressure on the foreign exchange market. In order to curb arbitrage opportunities for investors to borrow from the fairly liquid money market and operate in the foreign exchange market as well as to reduce the impact of ';leads and lags'; on inflows, the Reserve Bank had to tighten liquidity conditions in July 2000. The Reserve Bank will continue to monitor closely the developments in the markets at home and abroad and take such measures as necessary from time to time.

7.42 Against this background, the unveiling of the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) with repo auctions in June 2000, as an important operating aid to manage liquidity and influence the rate variables, gains importance. It is too early to comment on its effectiveness, but with further enhancement of market integration and with gradual phasing out of refinancing facility, the impact of LAF will become more certain and transparent. From most indications, it is already apparent that the introduction of LAF has helped the market participants to assess liquidity conditions better and has facilitated the gradual adjustment in the interest rates to the realities of the market.

7.43 The year 1999-2000 brought to a close an eventful decade for the Indian economy and its external environment. The international financial system was affected by a number of financial crises which severely undermined its functioning. Towards the end of the decade there emerged a global consensus on the need to strengthen and appropriately regulate domestic financial systems, to pursue consistent and credible macroeconomic policies in an environment of greater accountability and improved governance and to evolve an appropriate international architecture which prevents the occurrence of crises and/or mitigates the burden of adjustment. The work in this area is progressing and India has actively participated in the international financial reform efforts, giving particular emphasis on implementation of core standards and codes that are consistent with the country’s circumstances.

7.44 At home, the performance in 1999-2000 proved to be satisfactory but challenges to both fiscal and monetary management emerged early in 2000-01. Notwithstanding recent developments, the prospects of posting yet another year of good real output growth seem to be realistic. Monsoon conditions, in general, have been fairly satisfactory and as per present indications, the agricultural outturn in 2000-01 is likely to be better than in 1999-2000. If industrial recovery is ensured and assuming continued buoyancy in the services sector, real GDP growth during 2000-01 could be about 6.5 per cent. Such an order of growth should have favourable effects on inflation expectations particularly if the fiscal deficit and monetary expansion are kept at reasonable levels. Recent developments in respect of growth of India’s exports and invisible receipts are also highly promising which along with a high level of reserves and reasonable capital flows should contribute to external viability.

VIII Payment and Settlement Systems

8.1 The Reserve Bank of India has, in recent years, assigned high priority to reform of payment systems in order to enhance the reliability, speed and timeliness of payment transactions, the finality of settlement and operational efficiency of markets. In the process the risks of default are sought to be reduced.

8.2 The reforms included consolidation of the existing payment systems, development and upgradation of technologies relating to modes of payment and funds transfer, designing of multiple deferred/discrete net settlement system and a real time gross settlement (RTGS) system. The RTGS system would ultimately, link various payment and settlement arrangements into an integrated system which will function in an online real time environment. Issues relating to the appropriate legal framework, regulation and oversight of the payment and settlement system and the implications for the future conduct of monetary policy are now on the agenda of payment system reforms.

8.3 The acceleration in the pace of computerisation in the banking industry in recent years has facilitated the orderly development of modern payment and settlement systems in a secure manner. The thrust was placed on commercially important centres which account for 65 per cent of banking business in terms of value. At present, there are about 6,103 fully computerised branches among public sector banks across the country. The switchover from cash based transactions to paper based transactions is gathering momentum with the banking business on the rise. The value of transactions put through cheque clearances as a proportion to GDP is estimated to have reached over 402 per cent in 1999-2000 as against 352 per cent in 1998-99. The rise in cheque clearances was partly reflective of the operation of MICR clearing of cheques at more centres than the traditional four metropolitan centres. MICR clearing has been operational in 12 cities in 1999-2000 as against 10 cities in the previous year. The daily average value of cheques processed in clearing operations in the four metropolitan cities has gone up to Rs.19,679 crore reflecting in part the installation of modern S/390 systems, and the rising trend in daily turnovers in the principal segments of the financial markets, namely the call money market, the gilt market and the equity market. The electronic clearing services (ECS) (credit) are offered at 15 of the offices of the Reserve Bank across the country with debit services available at the six major centres. At the end of 1999-2000, there were 26 ECS debit users and 171 ECS credit users. The number of ECS transactions has gone up from 4.3 million valued at Rs.67.37 crore for credits and from 5.2 lakh transactions valued at Rs.181.77 crore for debits in 1998-99 to 6.9 million valued at Rs.934.45 crore for credits and to 8.4 lakh transactions valued at Rs.301.87 crore for debits in 1999-2000. Retail electronic funds transfer (EFT) on a T+1 basis has been in operation in all the metropolitan cities. The Reserve Bank EFT scheme was extended in 1999-2000 to encompass 12 other scheduled commercial banks besides the 27 public sector banks. Average monthly transactions under EFT has increased from 100 valued at Rs.5 lakh in 1998-99 to 600 valued at Rs.9 crore in 1999-2000.

8.4 The setting up of the INdian FInancial NETwork (INFINET), a Wide Area based satellite communication and terrestrial lines network using VSAT technology in June 1999, was a landmark in the area of communication technology in so far as the Indian financial system is concerned. The INFINET is the fore runner of an efficient telecommunication backbone for the banking and financial sector. It is a Closed User Group network for the banking sector. At present it covers public sector banks. It is intended to extend the membership in phases to other banks and other eligible entities. The hub and the network management system are located at the Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology (IDRBT), Hyderabad, which is fully funded by the Reserve Bank. The INFINET was operationalised with one-eighth transponder capacity initially. The transponder capacity was raised to one in July 2000. Currently, the INFINET connects 439 VSATs but plans are underway to extend network connectivity to 5000 VSATs in the long-run, now that transponder capacity has been augmented.

8.5 Setting up an RTGS environment has become the focal point of payment system reforms in India as in the rest of the world. Access to major financial centres and cross border payment system hinges on the availability of a full-fledged domestic RTGS. Apart from providing real time fund settlement environment, RTGS is critical to an effective risk control strategy for preventing domino effects of individual defaults.

IX Banking, Internal Debt and Exchange Management Developments

9.1 A number of policy measures were undertaken in the banking sector during 1999-2000 as a part of the ongoing financial sector reforms. These measures had the objectives of improving information flows, strengthening financial stability, enhancing the efficiency of systems and procedures in the use of financial instruments, and laying down guidelines for management of risks. The underlying medium-term objective of the reforms is to move towards internationally accepted best practices in prudential norms, accounting standards, disclosure norms, and the supervisory framework.

9.2 Banks have been given the freedom to operate different PLRs for different maturities. Some banks are declaring a stand alone PLR in addition to tenor linked PLRs. Banks which have moved over to declaration of tenor-linked PLRs should always indicate the specific tenor for which the declared PLRs is applicable.

9.3 Till October 1999, loans up to Rs.2 lakh attracted interest rates not exceeding the PLR and on the loans above Rs.2 lakh, PLR was the minimum lending rate. In the light of the suggestions received from the banks and other market participants, effective October 29, 1999, banks were given freedom to charge interest rates without reference to their own PLR in certain categories viz., loans covered by refinance scheme of term lending institutions, interest rates on bank lending to intermediary agencies including housing finance intermediary agencies, bill discounting by banks and advances/ overdrafts against domestic/NRE/ FCNR (B) deposits.

9.4 The progressive liberalisation of the financial sector and the establishment of international standards, codes and best practices by international agencies to promote financial stability have been two areas where supervisors of financial systems have focussed attention. A self-assessment of the Indian banking system vis-a-vis the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision as enunciated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, was conducted by an internal group in 1998 and was followed up by a second detailed self-assessment using the revised methodology set out by the BCBS in October 1999. It concluded that systems in India are largely in compliance with the core principles notwithstanding the need to close gaps in respect of risk management, consolidated supervision and inter-agency cooperation. In order to rectify these gaps, ALM and Risk Management guidelines were issued to banks. A system of consolidated supervision of banking groups (i.e. banks and their subsidiaries) is gradually being introduced. In keeping with the commitment to increased transparency, the Reserve Bank placed its self-assessment in the public domain in October 1999. An external assessment of the compliance position in India was conducted in November 1999 by the International Monetary Fund. It stated that, ';with the exception of a few areas viz., consolidated supervision, country risk, market risk and other risks, there already exist adequately detailed and comprehensive regulations on all significant aspects of banking. These regulations generally comply with international best practices, with minor exceptions.'; In recognition of the role played by the Reserve Bank in the implementation of the Basel Core Principles, the BCBS invited the Reserve Bank in August 1999 to be a member of the Core Principles Liaison Group (CPLG), which has been set up by the BCBS to promote and monitor the implementation of these principles worldwide. The Reserve Bank participates actively in the deliberations of the Group and is also represented on the Working Group on Capital, which is currently discussing the proposals of the revised capital adequacy framework. In April 2000, the Reserve Bank released its view on the proposals under the new capital adequacy framework with a view to generating a debate at the national and international levels.

9.5 The existing licensing policy in respect of new primary cooperative banks is based on the need and potential for mobilisation of deposits and absorption of credit at a centre. During 1999-2000, 172 proposals were cleared for registration, and 58 proposals were rejected. During 1999-2000, licences were issued to 89 new primary (urban) co-operative banks for commencement of banking business. The number of unlicensed primary co-operative banks issued licences during the year were 12.

X Organisational Matters

10.1 Notes in circulation increased by 11.6 per cent to Rs.1,92,483 crore at the end of March 2000 from Rs.1,72,541 crore in March 1999. The number of currency chests operated by commercial banks and treasuries increased to 4,223 from 4,163 in 1998-99. A currency chest was established in the Jammu office of the Reserve Bank. In all, the number of currency chests functioning as at the end of March 2000 stood at 4,242.

10.2 With a view to enhancing the motivation of officers and staff the heads of regional offices, central office departments and the Reserve Bank’s training colleges were advised to initiate certain measures to making the administration positive, to create an atmosphere of openness and trust, to encourage collaboration and team spirit, proactiveness and innovativeness, to improve work ethics, to conduct employee-oriented surveys and studies, to develop appropriate leadership skills and to refine the performance appraisal system so as to enhance organisational effectiveness.

10.3 The Reserve Bank continued its efforts for promotion of the use of Hindi consistent with the Official Language Policy. Hindi workshops and training programmes were arranged for imparting training to officers and other staff for doing work in Hindi. A special workshop on Hindi translation was conducted in the Reserve Bank Staff College, Chennai.

10.4 During the year, several bilingual publications including the Reserve Bank of India monthly bulletin, a quarterly magazine viz., ';Chintan Anuchintan';, the Annual Report, the Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, the Report on Currency and Finance, the Annual Report of the Services Board of the Reserve Bank, the Reserve Bank of India News Letter and the Credit Information Review were published. Besides, ';Computer Paribhasha Kosh'; an explanatory English-Hindi dictionary on computer terms was also published. In the field of computer bilingualisation some data processing applications were developed in bilingual form. Training in bilingual software packages was intensified. Rajbhasha shields, cups were awarded to the winner public sector banks for their outstanding performance in implementation of Hindi in different regions.

10.5 Industrial relations between the Bank and all the four recognised unions/associations of workmen and officers have continued to be peaceful and cordial during the year 1999-2000.

10.6 During 1999, the Reserve Bank recruited 620 employees, of which 175 were from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes categories constituting 28.2 of total recruitment.

10.7 The total staff strength as on December 31, 1999 was 31,737 as compared with 31,626 during the previous year. Of the total staff, 7,926 belonged to Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes.

10.8 The Bank’s Liaison Officer for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe employees conducted inspection of reservation rosters maintained at the Bank’s Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Bhopal, Calcutta, Chennai, Guwahati, Jaipur, Jammu, Patna and Thiruvananthapuram Offices during the year. Meetings between the Management and the representatives of the All India Reserve Bank Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Buddhist Employees’ Federation were held on three occasions during the year to discuss issues relating to implementation of the reservation policy in the Reserve Bank.

10.9 The total strength of ex-servicemen in the Bank at the end of 1999, stood at 95 in class I, 648 in Class III and 1,138 in Class IV. The number of physically handicapped employees in Class I, Class III and Class IV stood at 51, 324 and 149, respectively.

XI The Bank’s Accounts for 1999-2000

11.1 The key financial results of the Bank’s operations during the year are presented in this chapter.

11.2 The total income of the Bank for the year 1999-2000, after various provisions, showed an increase of Rs.2,740.64 crore (14.3 per cent) from Rs.19,220.33 crore to Rs.21,960.97 crore. The increase in income was mainly due to increase in earnings from domestic and foreign sources. However, the share of earnings from foreign sources has declined from 32.8 per cent in 1998-99 to 29.7 per cent in 1999-2000.

11.3 During the accounting year ended June 30, 2000, the Bank’s net earnings from deployment of foreign currency assets including gold increased by Rs.208.14 crore (3.3 per cent) from Rs.6,306.59 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.6,514.73 crore in 1999-2000 mainly due to higher average level of foreign currency assets at Rs.1,40,275 crore in 1999-2000 as against Rs.1,16,445 crore in 1998-99. However, in percentage terms the net earnings on foreign currency assets and gold declined from 5.4 per cent in 1998-99 to 4.6 per cent in 1999-2000. Excluding gains/losses on account of securities transactions, the net earnings on foreign currency assets and gold worked out to 5.0 per cent for 1999-2000 as against 5.1 per cent for 1998-99. There was capital loss (net) on sale of securities at Rs.464.68 crore (depreciation of Rs.496.53 crore as against realised capital gain of Rs.31.85 crore) during the year 1999-2000 as compared to capital loss (net) of Rs.20.67 crore (depreciation of Rs.189.62 crore, as against realised capital gain of Rs.168.95 crore) in 1998-99. The foreign securities held in Bank’s portfolio are valued at the end of every month at the lower of book value or market rate. If the market rate is lower than the book value, depreciation to the same extent is provided for. Appreciation is neither taken to profit and loss account nor to the reserves. Such unrealised appreciation in the value of foreign securities held in the Bank’s portfolio as at the end of June 2000 was Rs.216.97 crore as against Rs.93.93 crore as at the end of June 1999.

11.4 Domestic income rose by Rs.2,532.50 crore (19.6 per cent) from Rs.12,913.74 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.15,446.24 crore in 1999-2000 reflecting increase in income earnings from sale of rupee securities, interest earnings on Ways and Means advances to Central and State Governments and loans and advances to banks and financial institutions and discount on Government Treasury bills. The profit booked on sale of Rupee Securities increased by Rs.2,125.09 crore from Rs.1,155.45 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.3,280.54 crore in 1999-2000 on account of larger volume of open market operations (sales) coupled with higher security prices.

11.5 The decrease of Rs.479.50 crore in interest from Government securities from Rs.9,441.82 crore during 1998-99 to Rs.8,962.32 crore during 1999-2000 was mainly because of lower interest rates. The interest earnings on Ways and Means advances increased by Rs.101.63 crore from Rs.614.20 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.715.83 crore in 1999-2000 due to increased recourse to this facility by the Central and State Governments. Interest on loans and advances to banks/financial institutions also increased by Rs.200.66 crore from Rs.1,137.18 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.1,337.84 crore in 1999-2000. The increase in discount earned is attributable to devolvement of Government Treasury bills on the Bank in auctions and net purchases made in the open market.

11.6 Total expenditure of the Bank increased by Rs.795.83 crore (17.5 per cent) from Rs.4,545.09 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.5,340.92 crore in 1999-2000. The increase is due to rise both in establishment and non-establishment expenses.

11.7 The net disposable income for the year 1999-2000 amounted to Rs.9,354 crore as against Rs.4,483 crore in 1998-99. Since 1991-92 significant transfers to statutory funds have been discontinued. However, pending amendment to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 for vesting in the Bank the discretion in the matter of transfer to statutory funds from the profits of the Bank, a token contribution of Rupees one crore each, has been made to the four funds.

11.8 A sum of Rs.9,350 crore is transferable to the Government for the year 1999-2000 as against Rs.4,479 crore transferred during the year 1998-99 inclusive of Rs.1,479 crore each for both the years towards interest differential on special securities converted into marketable securities. In the year 1997-98, Special Securities of the order of Rs.20,000 crore carrying interest at 4.6 per cent per annum held by the Bank were converted into marketable securities at market related rates to augment the stock of eligible securities in the Bank’s investment portfolio for open market operations. The above transfer is intended to compensate the Government for the difference in interest expenditure, which the Government had to bear consequent on the conversion. Transfer of higher amount of surplus to the Government for the year under reference has been considered after ensuring that indicative target to take Contingency Reserve balance to 12 per cent of the size of the Bank’s assets by the year 2005, could be achieved.

11.9 The National Industrial Credit (Long Term Operations) Fund was established by the Bank in July 1964 with an initial corpus of Rs.10 crore and annual contributions from the Bank’s disposable surplus in terms of Section 46C(1) of Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. The Fund was applied for the purpose of making loans and advances to eligible financial institutions. Consequent on the announcement in the Union Budget for 1992-93, the Bank decided to discontinue the practice of crediting large sums to the said Fund. Simultaneously, no further disbursements from the Fund have been made. It was decided in 1997-98 to transfer the unutilised balance in the Fund built up through repayments to Contingency Reserve (CR) on a year to year basis. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.350 crore has been transferred to CR in 1999-2000 as against Rs.300 crore transferred in the preceding year.

11.10 ‘Deposits - Banks’ represent balances maintained by the banks in current account with Reserve Bank mainly for maintaining Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and working funds for clearing adjustments. The aggregate deposits of scheduled commercial banks with the Reserve Bank decreased by Rs.9,151.75 crore (13.1 per cent) from Rs.70,006.22 crore as on June 30, 1999 to Rs.60,854.47 crore as on June 30, 2000 mainly due to reduction in CRR requirement from 10 per cent of total Net Demand and Time Liabilities (NDTL) to 8 per cent during the year 1999-2000. The aggregate deposits of the scheduled state co-operative banks, other scheduled co-operative banks, non-scheduled state co-operative banks and other banks, increased by Rs.603.30 crore (23.4 per cent) from Rs.2,577.48 crore as on June 30, 1999 to Rs.3,180.78 crore as on June 30, 2000.

11.11 ‘Other Liabilities’ include the internal reserves and provisions of the Bank and net credit balance in RBI General Account. These liabilities have increased by Rs.10,513.09 crore (19.3 per cent) from Rs.54,556.21 crore as on June 30, 1999 to Rs.65,069.30 crore as on June 30, 2000 mainly on account of increase in the levels of internal reserves.

11.12 The reserves viz., Contingency Reserve, Asset Development Reserve, Exchange Fluctuation Reserve and Exchange Equalisation Account etc., reflected in ‘Other Liabilities’ are in addition to the ‘Reserve Fund’ of Rs.6,500 crore held by the Bank as a distinct balance sheet head.

11.13 The foreign currency assets comprise foreign securities held in Issue Department, balances held abroad and investments in foreign securities held in Banking Department. Such assets which stood at Rs.1,32,505.09 crore as on June 30, 1999 rose to Rs.1,50,901.13 crore as on June 30,2000. In US dollar terms, these assets rose from US dollar 30.56 billion as on June 30,1999 to US dollar 33.77 billion as on June 30, 2000.

11.14 Investment in Government of India rupee securities which stood at Rs.1,47,965.95 crore as on June 30, 1999 marginally increased by Rs.942.41 crore (0.6 per cent) to Rs.1,48,908.36 crore as on June 30, 2000.