9.1 Structural reforms initiated in the Indian economy since
the early 1990s have encompassed all spheres of economic activity. Reforms included
industrial deregulation, liberalisation of the foreign trade and investment
regime, public enterprises reform and financial sector liberalisation. These
reforms, aimed at reorientation of the Indian economy from a centrally directed
command and control economy to a market oriented economy so as to foster
greater efficiency and growth, have contributed to a sustained pick-up in growth.
9.2 These wide-ranging reforms have inevitably impacted
upon the conduct of macroeconomic policy in India. Monetary policy framework,
in particular, had to contend with a number of changes in its operating environment.
These changes have been brought about primarily by financial and external sector
liberalisation. First, the process of financial liberalisation now necessitates
a greater market orientation of the process of monetary policy formulation than
ever before in view of the shift to a market-oriented economy from a control-oriented
regime. Second, financial liberalisation has led to emergence of financial conglomerates
with implications for financial stability. Third, the globalisation of economies,
while essential for greater competition and hence for efficiency, has
posed several challenges for monetary management emanating, inter alia,
from swings in international commodity prices, and, more importantly, from large
and sudden movements in capital flows and exchange rates. Finally, advances
in information technology are not only revolutionising payment and settlement
practices but also speeding up the spread of information. For all these reasons,
during the 1990s, monetary policy in India, like other countries, revisited
issues related to objectives, intermediate targets, instruments and operating
procedures of monetary policy.
9.3 In the monetary policy arena, a significant success
has been in respect of reigning in inflation since the second half of
the 1990s until recently. This has also enabled lower inflationary expectations.
Efforts to improve the credit delivery mechanism have also begun to indicate
some success recently. Real interest rates for borrowers have also softened.
A noteworthy achievement, despite progressive opening up of the Indian economy,
has been the maintenance of financial stability in the country. In contrast
to the Indian experience, financial crises were endemic in many developing and
emerging market economies during the 1990s. These issues have been addressed
in detail in earlier Chapters. This concluding Chapter provides an overall assessment
of the dynamics and challenges for monetary policy in India.
Key Issues in Monetary Policy
9.4 It is now widely agreed that monetary policy can contribute
to growth and employment by maintaining price stability. Price stability does
not mean a zero rate of inflation. For a number of reasons - quality biases
in the measurement of prices, downward wage and price rigidities and the zero
bound on nominal interest rates - price stability is defined as a low and stable
rate of inflation conducive to economic growth. That price stability should
be a key objective of monetary policy is reflected in a growing number of central
banks, starting with New Zealand in the late 1980s, adopting inflation targeting
frameworks. At present, there are more than 20 such central banks in the world
who have price stability as the overriding objective of monetary policy. At
the same time, a majority of central banks still operate under dual or even
multiple mandates – for instance, the legislated objectives of the US Federal
Reserve are maximum employment, price stability and moderate long-term interest
rates. However, even in such cases, it is agreed that central banks can contribute
to growth and employment objectives through maintenance of low and stable inflation.
Price stability is considered to be a pre-requisite for the efficient allocation
of resources in the economy and, hence this contributes to growth. There is
a near unanimity now that there is no long-run trade-off between growth and
inflation, i.e., monetary policy cannot permanently raise output above
its potential through inflationary policies. Any attempts to raise output above
the economy’s potential will be eventually reflected in higher inflation. One
reason as to why inflation surged during the 1970s in many economies was the
misplaced belief that there existed a long-run trade off between inflation and
output. High inflation has an adverse effect on growth due to a number of factors:
distortion of relative prices which lowers economic efficiency; redistribution
of wealth between debtors and creditors; aversion to long-term contracts; and,
devotion of excessive resources to hedging inflation risks. In developing economies,
in particular, an additional cost of high inflation emanates from its adverse
effects on the poor population in the form of an implicit tax.
9.5 Notwithstanding the absence of a long-run trade-off,
central banks have a key role in macroeconomic stabilisation. Due to a number
of exogenous shocks hitting the economy, business cycles are a regular feature
of market economies and central banks can stabilise economic activity by pursuing
a countercyclical monetary policy. Illustratively, in the recent episode of
global downturn, a number of central banks eased their monetary policies during
2002 and 2003 to provide a boost to aggregate demand in the economy. With incipient
signs of inflation, the central banks have, however, since late 2003, star ted
to withdraw their accommodative stance by raising policy rates in a measured
manner. This holds true, both for inflation targeting as well as non-inflation
targeting central banks.
9.6 Against this brief overview of the key objective, an
analysis of actual inflationary movements throws some interesting results. The
period since World War II has witnessed episodes of high inflation. In developing
countries, high inflation has been mainly on account of expansionary fiscal
policies and the subsequent accommodation of these fiscal imbalances by monetary
authorities. Greater openness, large devaluations and a high degree of exchange
rate pass-through have also added to inflationary pressures in these economies,
apart from a greater degree of susceptibility to supply shocks. Developed economies
also witnessed inflationary pressures during 1970s reflecting expansionary fiscal
and accommodative monetary policies, oil shocks, and, overestimation of potential
output and productivity growth. High inflation was also on account of the received
wisdom regarding growth-inflation trade-off. By late 1970s, it came to be increasingly
recognised that persistent high inflation was ultimately the outcome of lax
monetary policies. With inflation in double digits, central banks in advanced
economies adopted deliberate disinflation strategies in the late 1970s. Monetary
policies were tightened and industrial economies could reduce inflation significantly
by the second half of the 1980s, albeit at the cost of large output and
employment losses.
Inflation fell further in these economies during the 1990s
to a range of 2-3 per cent per annum, a level more or less consistent with price
stability. More importantly, in these economies, inflation expectations have
been broadly stabilised at low levels. Developing countries have also been able
to reduce inflation during the 1990s as fiscal consolidation and structural
reforms provided flexibility to the conduct of monetary policy in meeting its
price stability objective. In fact, the decline in inflation in developing economies
has been quite dramatic - from 38 per cent per annum during the 1980s to around
six per cent during 2000-03. Concomitantly, exchange rate pass-through to domestic
prices has declined during the 1990s for advanced as well as developing economies,
inter alia, due to success of monetary policy in maintaining a low and
stable inflation environment. This low pass-through is one of the reasons as
to why consumer prices in many developed economies have been relatively stable
even in the context of sharp swings in exchange rates.
9.7 A number of factors explain the success of central banks
in reducing inflation. These include: improvements in the institutional set-up
- greater autonomy accorded to central banks, better communication strategies,
increased transparency, improved techniques in terms of availability of market
oriented instruments; prudent fiscal policies suppor ted by fiscal rules; structural
reforms; productivity growth; deregulation, globalisation and competition. It
needs to be stressed that the actual inflation outturn depends critically upon
inflation expectations. Successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of
effective control of overnight interest rates as it is of shaping market expectations
of the way in which inflation and other critical variables are likely to evolve
(Woodford, 2003). Increased central bank autonomy, accountability of central
banks through clear-cut targets, transparency and stress on communications backed
by fiscal rules are believed to increase the credibility of the central banks
and thus help stabilising inflation expectations. Monetary reforms such as an
independent central bank per se have only limited power to fix real problems
arising from a fiscal regime inconsistent with the goal of price stability.
Looking ahead, a reversal in the trend of any of the above factors can be a
threat to the present low inflation environment (Rogoff, 2003). A noteworthy
development is that this reduction in inflation has not come, at least in the
case of major developed economies, at the cost of increased output volatility.
While there is greater unanimity that reduction in inflation and its volatility
is mainly due to improved monetary policy, the role of monetary policy in reducing
output volatility remains a matter of debate.
9.8 Finally, in the recent years, an issue of debate is
the usefulness of inflation targeting (IT) frameworks. Looking at the experience
of the 1990s, both inflation targeting (IT) and non-IT central banks have been
successful in reducing inflation. Therefore, it is not obvious that IT regimes
have outperformed the non-IT regimes. Amongst IT central banks in emerging market
economies (EMEs), while their performance is actually quite impressive when
judged in terms of the reduction in inflation, they have not been always able
to meet their inflation targets. Moreover, compared with many advanced economies,
their performance is relatively weak, reflecting additional constraints prevailing
in these economies. The jury is still out on the extent to which inflation targeting
policies have actually contributed to the reduction in inflation that has occurred
(Mohan, 2004a).
9.9 Developments during the 1990s, however, suggest that
price stability by itself does not necessarily ensure overall macroeconomic
and financial stability. Even in an environment of price stability, the 1990s
witnessed episodes of financial instability. The traditional presumption is
that price stability contributes to financial stability. This is true in the
long-run, and the two objectives reinforce each other. However, the same may
not be true in the short-run. An environment of price stability can generate
excessive optimism and irrational exuberance on future growth prospects of the
economy. Illustratively, during the late 1990s, technology-driven increases
in productivity growth imparted upward momentum to expectations of earnings
growth while macroeconomic stability reduced perceptions of risk. In an environment
of (low and) stable inflation expectations, the incipient imbalances in the
economy are not reflected in the headline inflation. Rather, these may get reflected
in a sharp rise in asset prices - stock or real estate prices - and in excessive
increases in financial aggregates such as credit and monetary aggregates. In
the upswing of the business cycle, these imbalances get accentuated as self-reinforcing
processes develop, characterised by rising asset prices and loosening external
financial constraints. These forces operate in reverse in the contraction phase,
as brought out strikingly by the recent global slowdown of 2000 which reflected
the interplay of unwinding of financial imbalances in contrast to earlier episodes
of slowdowns which were induced by monetary tightening. In brief, liberalisation
of financial markets, together with advances in technology, increases the likelihood
of 'justified optimism' turning into 'unjustified optimism'
which breeds boom-bust cycles (White, 2004).
9.10 Financial stability concerns mainly arise from the growing
globalisation and integration of economies. Swings in trade flows and especially
capital flows are quite common and these impart a high degree of volatility
to exchange rates. Large devaluations can wreck havoc on balance sheets of financial
as well as non-financial entities due to currency mismatches. Such currency
mismatches are quite severe in emerging market economies, given the fact that
their external borrowings are typically serviced in foreign currencies while
most of their revenues are largely earned in domestic currency. Furthermore,
financial markets are often characterised by herd behaviour. In view of increased
financial integration across countries, contagion can spread from one country
to other, as it did during the Asian and the subsequent financial crises of
the late 1990s. Financial crises during the 1990s were, in fact, a reflection
of shortcomings of the reform agendas pursued by many developing economies.
Issues such as institutional and governance reforms, and macroeconomic fragilities
arising from the financial system and capital account of the balance of payments
were not fully addressed (Montiel and Serven, 2004).
9.11 Concerns with future financial instability have also shaped
the response of monetary authorities to the recent wave of capital flows. Following
Mundell-Fleming, it is well-known that the triumvirate of the objectives - a
fixed (or, managed) exchange rate, an open capital account and an independent
monetary policy - cannot be achieved simultaneously. Large capital flows are
often intermediated to speculative activities such as real estate and stock
markets. Permitting unbridled appreciation of the exchange rate during periods
of heavy capital inflows can be a harbinger of a future financial crisis. Sharp
real appreciation of the domestic currency can hurt external competitiveness
of the economy and could over time lead to large and unsustainable current account
deficits. Given the volatile nature of capital flows, such flows can reverse
easily and impose severe adjustment costs on the economy. Illustratively, in
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, some economies in the region witnessed
a turnaround as large as more than 10 per cent of GDP in their current account
balances.
9.12 More recently, since 2000, emerging market economies are
facing large persistent capital inflows. They have also been recording surpluses
on their current accounts. Accordingly, their overall balance of payments have
posted large surpluses. Central banks in these economies are facing the constraints
imposed by the ‘impossible trinity’ or the ‘macroeconomic policy trilemma’ by
absorbing these capital flows into their reserves. The expansionary effect of
these reserves on domestic money supply is subsequently sterilised through offsetting
open market operations. The build-up of substantial reserves reflects a precautionary
demand and self-insurance necessitated by volatility of capital flows. This
response of EMEs may be all the more appropriate since capital flows in the
past 3-4 years are widely believed, in a large part, to be due to 'push'
factors.
9.13 Given the boom-bust pattern of capital flows, volatile
exchange rates and the emergence of financial conglomerates, ensuring orderly
conditions in financial markets and maintaining financial stability has emerged
as an important objective of central banks. This is true even for central banks
not involved directly with banking regulation and supervision. Historically,
central banks have focussed on only one of the two objectives at any given time,
but not together. A distinguishing feature of the 1990s is the simultaneous
pursuit of monetary and financial stability gradually subsuming issues relating
to financial stability in the design of monetary policy.
9.14 Notwithstanding the agreement that financial stability
should be an objective of central banks, the role of monetary policy per
se in maintaining financial stability remains a matter of debate. Monetary
policy is considered to be too blunt an instrument to achieve financial stability,
especially to counter threats from asset price misalignments. First, it is argued
that it is difficult to adjudge ex ante as to whether asset price misalignments
are bubbles or not. Second, even if the central bank can identify a bubble in
real time, the typical monetary tightening measures - such as moderate increases
in interest rates - might be ineffective in containing or deflating asset price
bubbles. In view of these limitations on direct monetary policy actions as also
the fact that inflationary pressures take more than the usual time to surface
in conditions of low inflation, central banks are advised to take cognisance
of emerging financial imbalances by lengthening their monetary policy horizons
beyond the usual two-year framework. In addition, central banks can contribute
to financial stability through effective regulation and supervision to ensure
that banks are well-capitalised and well-diversified.
Encouraging more transparency in accounting and disclosure
practices, ensuring integrity of payment and settlement systems and provision
of the lender-of-last-resort facility are also needed to maintain financial
stability.
9.15 Apart from price stability and financial stability, availability
of credit for productive purposes remains an important objective of monetary
policy, at least in developing and emerging economies. At the same time, in
consonance with reforms in many of these economies, there is a shift away from
credit controls and directed credit programmes often at concessional prices
towards a regime of credit allocation based on the market-oriented price of
credit. A key challenge in this regard is to channel credit to the relatively
disadvantaged sections of society.
9.16 Bank credit is important not only because it finances
growth, but also is an important channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The ‘credit channel’ of transmission holds even for central banks that rely
on interest rates to convey their policy stance and it also augments the effects
of the traditional interest rate channel. For this channel to be effective,
however, it is critical that banks price various risks appropriately onto their
lending rates. While such risk assessment techniques are in place in advanced
economies, these remain underdeveloped in emerging market economies due to the
lack of adequate and timely information and large transaction costs. Availability
of improved information base will enable banks to make informed choice of their
risk profiles and lead to efficient pricing of risk. While leading to an efficient
allocation of resources, the credit channel also enhances the efficacy of monetary
policy signals. Thus, improvements in the credit delivery mechanism are necessary
for monetary policy signals to have the expected effect on output and prices.
9.17 Financial innovations have impacted not only upon the
objectives of monetary policy but also on the strategies and tactics to conduct
monetary policy. With financial innovations imparting a degree of instability
to money demand and velocity of money, central banks in many countries have
eschewed setting unique intermediate targets or following some fixed rule of
monetary policy. There is a growing realisation that given the increasing uncertainties
and latent risks in financial markets in recent times, a single model or a limited
set of indicators is not a sufficient guide for monetary policy. Instead, an
encompassing and integrated set of data is required (Trichet, 2004). Many central
banks now follow a ‘multiple indicator approach’ and monitor a large range of
macroeconomic indictors, which carry information about the ultimate objectives.
At the same time, as noted above, large movements in monetary and credit aggregates
are believed to provide lead information on future financial imbalances. Moreover,
in the long-run, inflation is still believed to be a monetary phenomenon. Accordingly,
many prominent central banks such as the European Central Bank continue to monitor
monetary aggregates even as others have de-emphasised these aggregates.
9.18 With shifts away from monetary targeting regime, short-term
interest rates have emerged as operative target/instrument of monetary policy
in many economies, both developed and developing. Such central banks manage
liquidity to steer monetary conditions in consonance with the overall policy
objectives of price stability and growth. Central banks usually forecast market
liquidity and then conduct open market operations to impact the interest rate
structure to affect the real economy. Furthermore, reflecting the market orientation
of monetary policy, direct instruments of monetary management have given way
to market-based instruments. Even within the set of indirect instruments, instruments
such as cash reserve ratios have been de-emphasised and, in many countries,
their use is restricted to stabilise money markets. In order to allow the interplay
of market forces, most central banks prefer to prescribe reserve requirements
on an average basis and encase interest rates in a corridor, rather than target
a particular point. Given the market-orientation of monetary policies, central
banks have recognised the need to strengthen their balance sheets in order to
be able to meet unforeseen contingencies that may arise from their market operations.
If balance sheet of a central bank is not strong enough, it could be constrained
from taking the necessary market operations. Strong balance sheets, therefore,
increase the credibility of the central banks and hence, stabilise market expectations.
9.19 For monetary policy to remain effective, its operating
procedures and instruments will necessitate continuous refinements. Monetary
policy actions affect output and prices with long and variable lags. Despite
substantial progress, the precise channels of monetary transmission remain a
'black-box'. Prices are typically quite sluggish - almost unchanged
for one year and it can take almost two years for monetary policy to have a
noticeable effect on prices, although some evidence suggests that, in the case
of emerging economies, the lags may be somewhat shorter. The effectiveness of
monetary policy signals depends upon the speed with which the policy rates are
transmitted to market rates of interest. Cross-country evidence suggests that
this pass-through to interest rates is only partial in the short-term. Although
it increases over time, it is still usually less than complete. Finally, monetary
authorities in future will have to contend with implications of electronic money
on the transmission process. The dominant view is that monetary policy is likely
to remain a key instrument of macroeconomic stabilisation albeit its
effectiveness could be weakened to some extent by the growing use of electronic
money.
Monetary Policy in India: The Framework
9.20 Structural reforms in the Indian economy since early 1990s
impacted upon the various aspects of monetary policy - its objectives, strategies
and tactics. As regards objectives, price stability and ensuring adequate credit
to productive sectors of the economy have been the twin objectives of monetary
policy since Independence. The relative emphasis between these two objectives
depends on the underlying economic conditions and is spelt out from time to
time (Reddy, 2002). Although with the introduction of the structural reforms,
there has been a shift in the policy from a planned and administered interest
rate system to a market-oriented financial system, credit availability remains
an important objective of monetary policy in India. In the pre-1990s period,
credit allocation and administered pricing certainly ensured a reasonable level
of credit flow in the desired direction at the desired price, but at a cost
along with inefficiencies as well as distortions (Reddy, 2004a). In such a situation,
the cost had to be borne in different ways, including statutory pre-emptions
- as high as 63.5 per cent of the incremental deposits of banks in 1992. Policies
of liberalisation, deregulation and enabling environment of comfortable liquidity
at a reasonable price, however, did not automatically translate into credit
flow at reasonable interest rates as banks continued to charge interest rates
to various categories of borrowers by their category per se -whether
agriculture or small scale industry - rather than based on actual assessment
of risks for each borrower. The Reserve Bank’s endeavour in the past few years
has, therefore, been to reduce transaction and information costs so that credit
availability to such sectors is available at reasonable interest rates.
9.21 At the same time, with the opening up of the economy since
the early 1990s, financial stability has now emerged as a key consideration
in the conduct of monetary policy. Monetary management has now to contend with
vicissitudes of capital flows and volatility in exchange rates. Due to large
capital flows and, in recent years, surpluses in the current account, the overall
balance of payments have recorded persistent growing surpluses since 1993-94
(excepting one year, 1995-96). Such large surpluses have been absorbed by the
Reserve Bank in its foreign exchange reserves. Whereas the distinction between
short term and long term flows is conceptually clear, in practice, however,
it is not always easy to distinguish between the two for operational purposes.
Moreover, at any given time, some flows could be of an enduring nature whereas
others could be temporary and, hence, reversible. More importantly, what appears
to be short-term, could tend to last longer and vice versa, imparting
a dynamic dimension to judgment about their relative composition (RBI, 2003).
In a scenario of uncertainty facing the authorities in determining temporary
or permanent nature of inflows, it is prudent to presume that such flows are
temporary till such time that they are firmly established to be of a permanent
nature.
9.22 Large purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank
from the market have an expansionary effect on domestic money supply and, therefore,
pose challenges for monetary management. Monetary policy had to manage not only
these persistent surpluses but also episodes of volatility in the foreign exchange
market. Although capital flows have been largely stable, reflecting a cautious
approach to capital account liberalisation, there have been nonetheless a few
episodes of volatility in capital flows and exchange rates. As maintaining orderly
conditions in the foreign exchange market is an important objective of monetary
policy, monetary authorities have to face potential conflicts between the interest
rate and exchange rate objectives. The bouts of volatility in exchange rate
may necessitate that market conditions are rendered less liquid and interest
rates are kept high. This policy has implications for promoting domestic growth
but the larger objective of evading the likely potential disruption of domestic
activities arising out of exchange rate crisis also needs to be kept in view.
Given the imperfections in the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate objective
may predominate due to emphasis on avoidance of undue volatility (Reddy, 1999).
9.23 Financial stability concerns arise also due to the move
from a Government-dominated financial system to a market oriented one. In the
past, the Government domination was imparting too much stability through rigidity
and too little efficiency. In this context, enhancing efficiency while at the
same time, avoiding instability in the system, has been the challenge for the
regulators in India (Reddy, 2004b). Financial stability entails: (a) ensuring
uninterrupted financial transactions; (b) maintenance of a level of confidence
in the financial system amongst all the participants and stakeholders; and (c)
absence of excess volatility that unduly and adversely affects real economic
activity. Such financial stability has to be particularly ensured when the financial
system is undergoing structural changes to promote efficiency.
9.24 In India, the vulnerability to real sector shocks has
the potential to significantly affect financial stability. The major sources
of shocks in India are very sharp increases in oil prices and extraordinary
monsoon failures with consequent impact on the agricultural sector. Therefore,
the weight to financial stability in India is higher than in many other countries
(RBI, 2004b).
9.25 Financial integration and innovations have also necessitated
refinements in the strategies and tactics of monetary policy in India. In order
to meet challenges thrown by financial liberalisation and the growing complexities
of monetary management, it was felt that monetary policy based exclusively on
a money demand function could lack precision. Accordingly, the Reserve Bank
switched from a monetary targeting framework to a multiple indicator approach.
Short-term interest rates have emerged as signals of monetary policy stance.
A significant shift is the move towards market-based instruments away from direct
instruments of monetar y management. A key step has been the introduction of
a liquidity management framework in which market liquidity is now modulated
through a mix of open market (including repo) operations and changes in reserve
requirements and standing facilities, reinforced by changes in the policy rates.
These arrangements have been quite effective in the recent years in managing
liquidity in the system, especially in the context of persistent capital flows.
The introduction of the Market Stabilisation Scheme has provided further flexibility
to the Reserve Bank in its market operations. With the market orientation of
monetary policy, the Reserve Bank, like most other central banks, has initiated
several measures to strengthen the integrity of its balance sheet.