DBOD. No. BP.1762/21.04.132/2004-05
May 6, 2005
All Commercial Banks
(excluding RRBs & LABs)
Dear Sir,
Draft Guidelines on Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR)
Please refer to our circular DBOD
No. BP.BC. 68/21.04.114/2002-03 dated February 5, 2003
on the captioned subject wherein detailed guidelines on Corporate Debt Restructuring
System were issued incorporating the recommendations of the High Level Group
under the chairmanship of Shri Vepa Kamesam, then Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank
of India, for facilitating timely and transparent mechanism for restructuring
debts of viable corporate entities affected by internal or external factors,
outside the purview of BIFR, DRT and other legal proceedings, for the benefit
of all concerned.
2. A Special Group under the Chairmanship of Smt.S.Gopinath,
Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India has undertaken a review of the Scheme
recently and suggested certain changes / improvements in the existing Scheme
for enhancing its scope and to make it more efficient. Based on the recommendations
made by the Special Group amendments proposed to the guidelines on Corporate
Debt Restructuring are furnished in the Annexure
3. The major modifications proposed in the existing CDR Scheme relate to
- extension of scheme to corporate entities on whom banks and institutions have an outstanding exposure of Rs.10 crore or more
- requirement of support of 60% of creditors by number in addition to the support of 75% of creditors by value with a view to make the decision making process more equitable
- linking the restoration of asset classification prevailing on the date of reference to CDR Cell to implementation of package within three months from the date of approval of the package
- restricting the regulatory concession in asset classification and provisioning requirement to the first restructuring where the package also has to meet certain norms relating to turnaround period and minimum sacrifice and funds infusion by promoters.
- convergence in the methodology for computation of economic sacrifice among banks and FIs
- regulatory treatment of non-SLR instruments acquired while funding interest or in lieu of outstanding principal and valuation of such instruments
- limiting RBI’s role to providing broad guidelines for the CDR System
- enhancing balance sheet disclosures
- pro-rata sharing of additional finance requirement
- including OTS as a part of the CDR Scheme to make the exit option more flexible and
- discretion to the core group in dealing with wilful defaulters in certain cases.
4. The proposed amendments to the guidelines are being issued as a draft for feedback from all concerned. The draft will be open for comments for a period of one month from the date of this letter. Comments on the proposed draft may be addressed to the undersigned at the address given below. Comments can also be sent by e-mail to Shri A.R. Appathurai, Asst.General Manager arappathurai@rbi.org.in and Shri Rajinder Kumar, Dy.General Manager r-kumar@rbi.org.in.
Yours faithfully,
(Anand Sinha)
Chief General Manager-In-Charge
Annex
Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) Mechanism
1 Background
The Reserve Bank of India had undertaken a review of the working of the CDR mechanism in the month of August 2004 and a Special Group was constituted in September 2004 with Smt.S.Gopinath, Deputy Governor, RBI as Chairperson to review and suggest changes / improvements, if any, in the CDR mechanism. Based on the recommendations of the Special Group, CDR guidelines have been further revised. The changes to the existing guidelines are as under:
|
2 |
CDR Standing Forum |
|
2.1 |
The RBI would not be a member of the CDR Standing Forum and Core Group. Its role will be confined to providing broad guidelines. |
|
2.2 |
The Forum, while laying down the policies and guidelines, should also set out the critical parameters for restructuring (i.e. maximum period for a unit to become viable under a restructuring package, minimum level of promoters’ sacrifice, etc.) to be followed by the CDR Empowered Group and CDR Cell for debt restructuring. |
|
3
|
Eligibility criteria
|
|
|
|
|
3.1.1
|
The CDR mechanism will cover only multiple banking
accounts / syndication / consortium accounts with outstanding exposure
of Rs.10 crore and above by banks and institutions.
|
|
3.1.2
|
In terms of the extant instructions, in no case, requests
of any corporate indulging in wilful default, fraud or misfeasance even
in a single bank will be considered for restructuring under the CDR
mechanism. Modifications introduced recently in the system laid down
for the identification of the wilful defaulters has made it more transparent
and has provided an opportunity to the borrower before final classification
is made. As a general principle therefore, wilful defaulters should
not be entertained under the CDR mechanism. However, in deserving cases,
the Core Group may review the reasons for classification of the borrower
as wilful defaulter and satisfy itself that the borrower is in a position
to rectify the wilful default provided he is granted an opportunity
under the CDR mechanism. Such exceptional cases may be admitted for
restructuring only with the approval of the Core Group. The Core Group
may evolve policies and safeguards for dealing with cases of wilful
default.
|
|
|
|
|
3.1.3
|
The accounts where recovery suits have been filed by
the lenders against the company, may be eligible for consideration under
the CDR mechanism provided, the initiative to resolve the case under
the CDR mechanism is taken by at least 75% of the lenders (by value)
and 60% of lenders in number.
|
|
3.2
|
Legal Basis
|
|
|
|
|
3.2.1
|
In order to ensure discipline in the CDR mechanism,
members of CDR may jointly or severally decide that those banks that
have not joined the mechanism as members would not be eligible for future
consortium / syndication arrangements for lending. For this purpose,
a collective action clause may be incorporated in the loan agreements
involving multiple lenders whereby all lenders agree to abide by the
majority decision for restructuring of the account in case of need.
|
|
|
|
|
3.2.2
|
If 75 per cent of creditors by value and 60% of the
creditors in number, approve a restructuring package of an existing
debt (i.e., debt outstanding) under CDR mechanism, it shall be binding
on the remaining creditors.
|
|
|
|
|
3.3
|
Stand-Still Clause
|
| |
|
|
3.3.1
|
During pendency of the case with the CDR mechanism,
the usual asset classification norms continue to apply and the process
of reclassification of an asset does not stop merely because the case
is referred to the CDR Cell. If restructuring under the CDR mechanism
is approved and the approved package is implemented within three
months from the date of approval by the Empowered Group, the asset classification
status would be restored to the position, which existed when the reference
to the Cell was made. Consequently, any additional provisions made by
banks towards deterioration in the asset classification status during
the pendency of the case with the CDR mechanism may be reversed.
|
|
3.3.2
|
If an approved package remains unimplemented even three
months after the date of approval by the Empowered Group, it would indicate
that the success of the package is uncertain. Therefore, the asset classification
status of the account should not be restored to the position as on the
date of reference to the CDR Cell. This will ensure that banks which
delay implementation of the package will not be allowed to enjoy the
regulatory concessions
|
| |
|
|
3.4
|
Additional finance
|
| |
|
|
3.4.1
|
Additional finance, if any, is to be provided by all
lenders irrespective of whether they are working capital or term lenders
on a pro-rata basis. The additional finance may be treated as standard
asset up to a period of one year after the first interest/ principal
payment whichever is earlier falls due under the approved restructuring
package. The income in this period may be recognized only on cash basis.
If restructured asset does not qualify for up gradation at the end of
the above period, additional finance shall be placed in the same asset
classification category as the restructured debt.
|
|
3.4.2
|
In case for any internal reason, any creditor (outside
the minimum 75 and 60 per cent) does not wish to commit additional
financing, that creditor will have the option to either (a) arrange
for his share of additional financing to be provided by a new or existing
creditor, or (b) agree to deferment of the first year’s interest
due to him after the CDR package becomes effective. The first year’s
deferred interest as mentioned above, without compounding, will be payable
along with the last instalment of the principal due to the creditor
|
| |
|
|
3.5
|
Exit Option
|
| |
|
|
3.5.1
|
As mentioned in paragraph 3.4.2 above, the proposals
for restructuring package should provide for option to a particular
lender or lenders (outside the minimum 75 and 60 per cent who have agreed
for restructuring) who for any internal reason, does/do not fully abide
by the CDR Empowered Group's decision on restructuring. The lenders
who wish to exit from the package would have the option to sell their
existing share to either the existing lenders or fresh lenders, at an
appropriate price, which would be decided mutually between the exiting
lender and the taking over lender. The new lenders shall rank on par
with the existing lenders for repayment and servicing of the dues since
they have taken over the existing dues to the exiting lender. In addition,
the 'exit option' will also be available to all other lenders within
the minimum 75 and 60 per cent, provided the purchaser agrees to abide
by the restructuring package approved by the Empowered Group.
|
|
3.5.2
|
In order to bring more flexibility in the exit option,
One Time Settlement can also be considered, wherever necessary, as a
part of the restructuring package.
|
| |
|
|
3.6
|
Conversion option
|
| |
|
|
3.6.1
|
Equity acquired by way of conversion of debt / overdue
interest under the CDR mechanism is allowed to be taken up without seeking
prior approval from RBI even if the capital market ceiling is breached,
subject to reporting such holdings to RBI every month along with the
regular statement. However, banks will have to comply with the provisions
of Section 19(2) of the BR Act.
|
|
3.6.2
|
Acquisition of non-SLR securities by way of conversion
of debt are exempted from the guidelines on non-SLR securities subject
to periodical reporting to RBI
|
|
3.6.3
|
The relaxation from ceilings mentioned in paras 3.6.1and
3.6.2 would be reviewed after a year.
|
| |
|
|
3.7
|
Category 2 CDR System
|
|
|
|
| |
For the second category of CDR where the accounts
have been classified as ‘doubtful’ in the books of lenders, a minimum
of 75% (by value) and 60% of the lenders in number should satisfy themselves
of the viability of the account and consent for such restructuring.
|
|
|
|
|
4
|
Lenders Rights
|
| |
All CDR approved packages must incorporate lenders’ right to accelerate repayment and borrowers’ right to pre-pay. The right of recompense should be based on certain performance criteria to be decided by the CDR Standing Forum. |
| |
|
|
5 |
Prudential and Accounting Issues |
| |
|
|
5.1 |
Accounts restructured under CDR system, including accounts classified as 'doubtful' under Category 2 CDR, would be eligible for regulatory concession in asset classification and provisioning on writing off/providing for economic sacrifice in terms of the circular DBOD.BP.BC.98/21.04.048/2000-01 dated March 30, 2001 only if
i. he restructuring under CDR is done for the first time,
ii. The unit becomes viable in 7 years and the repayment period
for the restructured debts does not exceed 10 years,
iii. promoters’ sacrifice and additional funds brought by them
should be a minimum of 15% of lenders’ sacrifice, and
iv. personal guarantee is offered by the promoter except when
the unit is affected by external factors pertaining to the economy and
industry.
|
|
5.2.
|
Treatment of ‘standard’ accounts restructured under
CDR
|
| |
|
|
5.2.1
|
A rescheduling of interest element either before commencement
of commercial production or after commencement of commercial production
but before the asset has been classified as substandard provided conditions
(i) to (iv) of Para 5.1 are complied with would not cause an asset to
be downgraded to sub-standard category on writing off/providing for
the amount of sacrifice, if any, in the element of interest measured
in present value terms. For this purpose, the sacrifice should be computed
as the difference between the present value of future interest income
reckoned based on the current BPLR as on the date of restructuring plus
the appropriate term premium and credit risk premium for the borrower
category on the date of restructuring and the interest charged as per
the restructuring package discounted by the current BPLR as on the date
of restructuring plus appropriate term premium and credit risk premium
as on the date of restructuring
|
|
|
|
|
5.3.
|
Treatment of ‘sub-standard’ / ‘doubtful’ accounts restructured
under CDR
|
|
5.3.1
|
A rescheduling of interest element would render a sub-standard
/ ‘doubtful’ asset eligible to be continued to be classified in sub-standard
/ ‘doubtful’ category for the specified period provided the conditions
(i) to (iv) of Para 5.1 are complied with and the amount of sacrifice,
if any, in the element of interest, measured in present value terms
computed as per the methodology described in Para 5.2.1 is either written
off or provision is made to the extent of the sacrifice involved.
|
|
5.3.2
|
Banks/ FIs may recalculate the amount of sacrifice
at each balance sheet date so as to capture the changes in the fair
value on account of changes in BPLR, term premium and the credit category
of the borrower and the amount of excess provision, if any may be reversed.
|
|
5.3.3
|
Economic sacrifice must necessarily be provided for
by debit to the Profit & Loss account. In the event a zero coupon
bond is taken against the sacrifice, it should be valued at Re1/- till
the maturity of the bond. This will ensure that the effect of charging
off the economic sacrifice to the Profit & Loss account is not negated.
|
|
|
|
|
5.3.4
|
In case a restructured asset is subjected to
restructuring on a subsequent occasion when the restructured asset is
a standard asset, it should be classified as sub-standard. The restructured
(including restructured sub-standard and doubtful assets) may be allowed
to be upgraded to standard asset category after one year from the date
of first payment of interest or repayment of principal, whichever falls
due first in terms of the restructuring package, subject to satisfactory
performance during this period.
|
|
5.3.5
|
If a standard asset is taken up for restructuring before
commencement of production and the restructuring package provides a
longer period of moratorium on interest payments beyond the expected
date of commercial production / date of commercial production vis-à-vis
the original moratorium period, the asset can no more be treated as
standard asset. It may, therefore, be classified as sub-standard. The
same regulatory treatment will apply if a standard asset is taken up
for restructuring after commencement of production and the restructuring
package provides for a longer period of moratorium on
interest payments than the original moratorium period.
In case of sub-standard / doubtful assets, if there
is moratorium on interest/principal repayments, up gradation of the
asset category should only be considered after one year from the time
when the first interest/principal payment, whichever is earlier, falls
due and subject to satisfactory payment performance during this period
in the usual manner.
|
|
5.3.6
|
Where overdue interest is funded or outstanding principal
and interest components are converted into equity, debentures, zero
coupon bonds or other instruments and income is recognized in consequence,
full provision should be made for the amount of income so recognized.
Equity, debentures and other financial instruments acquired by way of
conversion of outstanding principal and interest should be classified
and valued in accordance with the extant instructions except to the
extent that (a) equity may be valued as per market value, if quoted
(b) in cases where equity is not quoted, valuation may be at break-up
value in respect of standard assets and (c) in respect of sub-standard
/ doubtful assets, equity may be initially valued at Re1 and at break-up
value after restoration / up gradation to standard category.
|
|
5.3.7
|
If the conversion of interest is into equity, which
is quoted, interest income can be recognized after the account is upgraded
to the standard category at market value of equity, on the date of such
up gradation, not exceeding the amount of interest converted into equity.
Such equity, if held under HTM category must thereafter be classified
in the "available for sale" category and valued at lower of
cost or market value. If the conversion of interest is into equity,
which is not quoted, interest income should not be recognized.
|
|
5.3.8
|
In case of conversion of principal and / or interest
into debentures, zero coupon bonds, etc., such instruments should be
treated as NPA ab-initio in the same asset classification category as
the loan if the loan’s classification is sub-standard or doubtful on
implementation of the restructuring package and provision should be
made as per the norms. Consequently, income should be recognized on
these instruments only on realization basis. The income in respect of
unrealised interest which is converted into debentures or any fixed
maturity instruments, would be recognized only on redemption of such
instruments.
|
|
6
|
Disclosure
|
|
|
|
|
6.1
|
Banks / FIs should also disclose in their published
annual Balance Sheets, under 'Notes on Accounts', the following information
in respect of corporate debt restructuring undertaken during the year:
|
|
|
- Total number of accounts total amount of loan assets and the
amount of sacrifice in the restructuring cases under CDR.
[(a) = (b)+(c)+(d)]
- The number, amount and sacrifice in standard assets subjected to
CDR.
- The number, amount and sacrifice in sub-standard assets subjected
to CDR.
The number, amount and sacrifice in doubtful assets
subjected to CDR
|
|