RBI 105 / 2004
DBS.FRMC.No. BC. 1 /23.04.01D/2004-05
August 7, 2004
The Chief Executives
All Commercial Banks
Dear Sir,
Deficiencies found in sanctioning of loans and monitoring of
borrowal accounts by banks / Financial Institutions
As you are aware, the incidence of frauds in major borrowal
accounts is a cause of concern for the banks’ management as also for Reserve
Bank of India. Apart from acts of willful default, diversion of funds, clandestine
removal of goods, fraudulent practices adopted in documentation of securities
pledged with banks, submission of fake / bogus / forged bills / LCs / export
documents etc., it has been observed that in many reported frauds, there were
inherent weaknesses at the stages of sanction and post disbursement follow up
of advances which ultimately culminated in perpetration of frauds in the accounts.
2. In this connection, the Advisory Board on Bank, Commercial
and Financial Frauds (ABBCFF) has observed that in a large number of cases reported
as frauds, there were administrative lapses in the processing of applications
and in monitoring of accounts. The Board is also of the opinion that where such
lapses had occurred, the action taken by the senior management to investigate
the matter and take disciplinary action was often tardy and inadequate.
3. An illustrative list of deficiencies at the stages of sanction
and monitoring of advances, observed by the ABBCFF and suggestions to improve
the system, offered by it is given in the Annex for guidance of banks.
4. Please let us know the additional steps taken by you on
the basis of the suggestions given in the Annex for minimizing
the incidence of frauds in the advances portfolio.
5. We also advise you to apprise the Special Committee of the
Board for monitoring and follow up of cases of frauds of Rs.1crore and above,
of the contents of this letter.
Yours faithfully
(K V Subba Rao)
Chief General Manager
ANNEX
I. Deficiencies at the stage of sanction
- There were deficiencies in the appraisal of credit proposals. High projections
of the borrowing company were not critically analysed by the sanctioning authorities.
With the result, the borrowers’ credit requirements were not properly assessed.
In some cases, the credit limits were sanctioned on the basis of appraisal
made by the Merchant Banking Division for the purpose of public issue. In
such cases, the existence of a conflict of interest was not always appreciated,
as the arranging of finance was one of the services, which the Merchant Banker
was rendering to the borrower. The bank relied on such appraisal and no separate
assessment for credit risk was done. There were instances where term loans
were sanctioned without insisting on the project report, cost of project and
means of finance.
- At the time of mid-term review of the projects, additional loans were sanctioned
without proper appreciation of the market conditions and the factors which
led to time and cost overruns in the projects by the sanctioning authorities.
- The sanctioning authorities had overlooked the irregularities pointed out
by the lower level functionaries in the borrowal accounts or in the accounts
of the group companies based on stock verification reports, audit reports,
etc. and sanctioned the facilities. They had not taken into account the fact
that the existing accounts of the borrower were irregular, audit objections
not cleared, estimates inordinately inflated and the vital issues either not
commented upon or wrongly commented in the inspection / audit report itself.
- The sanctioning authorities were not given full facts about the borrowers
and the projects by the officials in controlling office / branch. This was
mainly because the branch did not make proper scrutiny of the borrowing company’s
antecedents and verify the claims of achievements by them.
- Contrary to the above, the sanctioning authorities had adequate facts about
the unsatisfactory position of the borrowal accounts and yet facilities were
sanctioned overlooking the deficiencies.
- There were instances where the sanction itself was not justified on the
basis of projections made by the borrowers and valuation of securities offered
by them.
- Sanctions were made deviating from the laid down policy on extending finance
for capital expenditure / long term working capital. In one case, facilities
were sanctioned by the bank’s board in violation of its own internal norms.
- Sanctioning authorities overlooked the fact at the time of take over of
accounts that the borrowing company had irregular accounts with the previous
bank/s.
- Adhoc limits were sanctioned frequently even if the company had regular
limits and its accounts were running irregularly. At times, such limits were
sanctioned by branch / Zonal Office / Central Office level functionaries in
excess of their delegated powers. Revival packages were also sanctioned by
the Regional authorities in respect of credit limits originally sanctioned
by the bank’s Head Office Committee.
- The terms and conditions prescribed at the time of sanction of loan facilities
were subsequently relaxed by the sanctioning authorities themselves while
disbursing funds without any justification for such relaxation.
- In some cases, it appears that the sanctioning authorities had acted on
extraneous influences, rather than deciding on the merits of the case. The
borrowal account finally turned into a non-performing asset.
II. Deficiencies at the monitoring stage
- Loans / advances were released by the branch officials in blatant violation of the terms and conditions of the sanction laid down by the Central Office.
- No proper monitoring of the end-use of the funds by the borrowers was noticed in a few cases. Cases of such diversion of funds in larger accounts were not reported to the bank’s Board for their information and providing required direction in the matter.
- Monitoring of the company’s financial standing especially with reference to the financial indicators was not carried out effectively.
- Undue reliance on the certificates given by the Chartered Accountants / Valuers without co-relating them with other relevant procedures was noticed. For example, in the case of projects under implementation, reliance was placed on the certificates without adequate monitoring of the progress of construction through site visits. Similarly, in respect of certificates for verification of inventories, there was inadequate correlation of the figures with audited financial statements and also inadequate follow-up on deficiencies reported. In one case, it came to light subsequently that the borrower company had produced forged expenditure certificates from the Chartered Accountants.
- There was also lack of proper monitoring even with regard to very important terms and conditions of the term loan sanction such as, tie up of funds, stipulation of promoter’s contribution, etc leading to disproportionate lending by the banks / FIs.
- As regards working capital limits, failure to detect disappearance of stocks given as security had resulted in misappropriation of funds / sale of stock and realization of receivables without the knowledge of banks/FIs.
- Failure to ensure adequacy of the security offered by the borrowers, especially failure to verify whether the same asset was mortgaged to another bank / FI was also noticed.
- Periodical reviews of accounts were not undertaken after the funds were lent by the banks / FIs.
- Proper assessment of the financial standing of the projects was not carried out when the bank / FI took over an account from another bank.
- Excess drawings permitted by the branch / Regional Office level functionaries, in the borrowal accounts were ratified by the Head Office in a routine manner without examining the need for such permissions, at times, frequently.
- Limits sanctioned were allowed to be interchanged indiscriminately by the branch officials without proper authority.
- In cases pertaining to term loans for financing projects, important terms and conditions of the sanction stipulated by the Board of Directors such as induction of technical directors, constitution of Audit Committees and independent project monitoring committees are not taken seriously. Many a times, non-compliance even at the stage of the release of the final instalment of the loan sanctioned is not taken seriously. This is a very serious lacuna which cuts at the root of the principles of project management and project financing.
III. Suggestions to improve the system
The following suggestions are made with a view to improving
the system.
- In many cases diversion of funds is facilitated by opening of accounts
with other banks wherein the sale proceeds / proceeds of realized book debts
are credited, without the knowledge of the lending bank. With a view to
prevent such malpractices, the lending bank should obtain a certificate
from the borrowers on a quarterly basis furnishing details of accounts opened
with other banks.
- It is noticed that the banks rely on the certificates of valuation given
by the external valuers which in some cases were subsequently found to have
shown grossly inflated values. It is, therefore, suggested that the setting
up of independent cells for valuation within banks themselves, which are
manned by technical personnel with the right expertise is considered seriously.
- Immediate action should be taken where the malafides / gross negligence
on the part of dealing officials are noticed. The Advisory Board finds that
in the large majority of cases, administrative action is either not initiated
well in time or not initiated at all.
- Wherever there is a prima-facie case against the dealing officials, appropriate
action in terms of CVC guidelines for their inclusion in the list of officers
with doubtful integrity should be initiated by banks / FIs in consultation
with the CBI.
- While processing loan applications, there is no scientific application
of mind by the bank officials in observance of compliance with the stipulated
terms and conditions by the borrowers and as a result, certain serious defaults
had occurred causing systemic failure of the financial sector. It is, therefore,
suggested that banks/FIs should evolve a process of check listing which
would enable them to take note of any deficiencies while releasing the funds
to the borrowers or monitoring the end use of funds.
- There is a need for building up a cadre of officials with proper educational
background and training to take care of at least larger projects being financed
by the banks / FIs.
- Perhaps the single largest cause of financial loss to the lending institutions
is the fact that in respect of project finance, disbursements are not made
by the lending institution in proportion to the funds disbursed by the promoter
/ borrower. In several cases, the promoter / borrower is unable to bring
in or raise the funds which he is required to provide in terms of the sanction
and consequently, in order to protect the investment already made, the lending
institution has to provide additional funds not envisaged in the original
proposal. The same situation persists when there are cost over-runs, whereby
the exposure of the lending institution gets increased.
This problem can be avoided if the promoter / borrower
is required to bring in up-front his contribution (other than funds
to be provided through internal generation) and the lending institution
commences its disbursement only after the stipulated funds are brought
in by the promoter / borrower.
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