The
turmoil in the international financial markets of advanced economies, that started
around mid-2007, has exacerbated substantially since August 2008. The financial
market crisis has led to the collapse of major financial institutions and is now
beginning to impact the real economy in the advanced economies. As this crisis
is unfolding, credit markets appear to be drying up in the developed world. With
the substantive increase in financial globalisation, how much will these developments
affect India and other Asian emerging market economies (EMEs)?
India,
like most other emerging market economies, has so far, not been seriously affected
by the recent financial turmoil in developed economies. In my remarks today, I
will, first, briefly set out reasons for the relative resilience shown by the
Indian economy to the ongoing international financial markets’ crisis. This will
be followed by some discussion of the impact till date on the Indian economy and
the likely implications in the near future. I then outline our approach to the
management of the exposures of the Indian financial sector entities to the collapse
of major financial institutions in the US. Orderly conditions have been maintained
in the domestic financial markets, which is attributable to a range of instruments
available with the monetary authority to manage a variety of situations. Finally,
I would briefly set out my thinking on the extent of vulnerability of the Asian
economies, in general, to the global financial market crisis. Financial
Globalisation: The Indian Approach The
Indian economy is now a relatively open economy, despite the capital account not
being fully open. The current account, as measured by the sum of current receipts
and current payments, amounted to about 53 per cent of GDP in 2007-08, up from
about 19 per cent of GDP in 1991. Similarly, on the capital account, the sum of
gross capital inflows and outflows increased from 12 per cent of GDP in 1990-91
to around 64 per cent in 2007-08. With this degree of openness, developments in
international markets are bound to affect the Indian economy and policy makers
have to be vigilant in order to minimize the impact of adverse international developments
on the domestic economy. The
relatively limited impact of the ongoing turmoil in financial markets of the advanced
economies in the Indian financial markets, and more generally the Indian economy,
needs to be assessed in this context. Whereas the Indian current account has been
opened fully, though gradually, over the 1990s, a more calibrated approach has
been followed to the opening of the capital account and to opening up of the financial
sector. This approach is consistent with the weight of the available empirical
evidence with regard to the benefits that may be gained from capital account liberalisation
for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging market economies.
The evidence suggests that the greatest gains are obtained from the opening to
foreign direct investment, followed by portfolio equity investment. The benefits
emanating from external debt flows have been found to be more questionable until
greater domestic financial market development has taken place (Henry, 2007; Prasad,
Rajan and Subramanian, 2007). Accordingly,
in India, while encouraging foreign investment flows, especially direct investment
inflows, a more cautious, nuanced approach has been adopted in regard to debt
flows. Debt flows in the form of external commercial borrowings are subject to
ceilings and some end-use restrictions, which are modulated from time to time
taking into account evolving macroeconomic and monetary conditions. Similarly,
portfolio investment in government securities and corporate bonds are also subject
to macro ceilings, which are also modulated from time to time. Thus, prudential
policies have attempted to prevent excessive recourse to foreign borrowings and
dollarisation of the economy. In regard to capital outflows, the policy framework
has been progressively liberalised to enable the non-financial corporate sector
to invest abroad and to acquire companies in the overseas market. Resident individuals
are also permitted outflows subject to reasonable limits.
The financial sector, especially banks, is subject to prudential
regulations, both in regard to capital and liquidity (Mohan, 2007b). As
the current global financial crisis has shown, liquidity risks can rise manifold
during a crisis and can pose serious downside risks to macroeconomic and financial
stability. The Reserve Bank had already put in place steps
to mitigate liquidity risks at the very short-end, risks at the systemic level
and at the institution level as well. Some of the important measures by the Reserve
Bank in this regard include, first, restricting the overnight unsecured market
for funds to banks and primary dealers (PD) as well as limits on the borrowing
and lending operations of these entities in the overnight inter-bank call money
market. Second, large reliance by banks on borrowed funds can exacerbate vulnerability
to external shocks. This has been brought out quite strikingly in the ongoing
financial crisis in the global financial markets. Accordingly, in order to encourage
greater reliance on stable sources of funding, the Reserve Bank has imposed prudential
limits on banks on their purchased inter-bank liabilities and these limits are
linked to their net worth. Furthermore, the incremental credit deposit ratio of
banks is also monitored by the Reserve Bank since this ratio indicates the extent
to which banks are funding credit with borrowings from wholesale markets (now
known as purchased funds). Third, asset liability management guidelines for dealing
with overall asset-liability mismatches take into account both on and off balance
sheet items. Finally, guidelines on securitization of standard assets have laid
down a detailed policy on provision of liquidity support to Special Purpose Vehicles
(SPVs). In order to further
strengthen capital requirements, the credit conversion factors, risk weights and
provisioning requirements for specific off-balance sheet items including derivatives
have been reviewed. Furthermore, in India, complex structures like synthetic securitisation
have not been permitted so far. Introduction of such products, when found appropriate,
would be guided by the risk management capabilities of the system. The
Reserve Bank has also issued detailed guidelines on implementation of the Basel
II framework covering all the three pillars with the guidelines on Pillar II being
issued as recently as on March 27, 2008. In tune with RBI’s objective to have
consistency and harmony with international standards, the Standardised Approach
for credit risk and Basic Indicator Approach for operational risk have been prescribed.
Minimum capital-to-risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR) would be 9 per cent, but higher
levels under Pillar II could be prescribed on the basis of risk profile and risk
management systems. The banks have been asked to bring Tier I CRAR to at least
6 per cent before March 31, 2010. After analyzing the global schedule for implementation,
it was decided that all foreign banks operating in India and Indian banks having
a presence outside India should migrate to Basel II by March 31, 2008 and all
other scheduled commercial banks encouraged to migrate to Basel II in alignment
with them but not later than March 31, 2009. In addition
to the exercise of normal prudential requirements on banks, the Reserve Bank has
also successively imposed additional prudential measures in respect of exposures
to particular sectors, akin to a policy of dynamic provisioning. For example,
in view of the accelerated exposure observed to the real estate sector, banks
were advised to put in place a proper risk management system to contain the risks
involved. Banks were advised to formulate specific policies covering exposure
limits, collaterals to be considered, margins to be kept, sanctioning authority/level
and sector to be financed. In view of the rapid increase in loans to the real
estate sector raising concerns about asset quality and the potential systemic
risks posed by such exposure, the risk weight on banks' exposure to commercial
real estate was increased from 100 per cent to 125 per cent in July 2005 and further
to 150 per cent in April 2006. The risk weight on housing loans extended by banks
to individuals against mortgage of housing properties and investments in mortgage
backed securities (MBS) of housing finance companies (HFCs) was increased from
50 per cent to 75 per cent in December 2004, though this was later reduced to
50 per cent for lower value loans. Similarly, in light of the strong growth of
consumer credit and the volatility in the capital markets, it was felt that the
quality of lending could suffer during the phase of rapid expansion. Hence, as
a counter cyclical measure, the Reserve Bank increased the risk weight for consumer
credit and capital market exposures from 100 per cent to 125 per cent. An
additional feature of recent prudential actions by the Reserve Bank relate to
the tightening of regulation and supervision of Non-banking Financial Companies
(NBFCs), so that regulatory arbitrage between these companies and the banking
system is minimized. The overarching principle is that banks should not use an
NBFC as a delivery vehicle for seeking regulatory arbitrage opportunities or to
circumvent bank regulation(s) and that the activities of NBFCs do not undermine
banking regulations. Thus, capital adequacy ratios and prudential limits to single/group
exposures in the case of NBFCs have been progressively brought nearer to those
applicable to banks. The regulatory interventions are graded: higher in deposit-taking
NBFCs and lower in non-deposit-taking NBFCs. Thus, excessive leverage in this
sector has been contained. Various
segments of the domestic financial market have been developed over a period of
time to facilitate efficient channelling of resources form savers to investors
and enable the continuation of domestic growth momentum (Mohan, 2007a). Investment
has been predominantly financed domestically in India – the current account deficit
has averaged between one and two per cent of GDP since the early 1990s. The Government’s
fiscal deficit has been high by international standards but is also largely internally
financed through a vibrant and well developed government securities market,
and thus, despite large fiscal deficits, macroeconomic and financial stability
has been maintained. Derivative instruments have been introduced cautiously in
a phased manner, both for product diversity and, more importantly, as a risk management
tool. All these developments have facilitated the process of price discovery in
various financial market segments. The
rate of increase in foreign exchange market turnover in India between April 2004
and April 2007 was the highest amongst the 54 countries covered in the latest
Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity
conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). According to the survey,
daily average turnover in India jumped almost 5-fold from US $ 7 billion in April
2004 to US $ 34 billion in April 2007; the share of India in global foreign exchange
market turnover trebled from 0.3 per cent in April 2004 to 0.9 per cent in April
2007. There has been consistent development of well-functioning, relatively deep
and liquid markets for government securities, currency and derivatives in India,
though much further development needs to be done. However, as large segments of
economic agents in India may not have adequate resilience to withstand volatility
in currency and money markets, our approach has been to be increasingly vigilant
and proactive to any incipient signs of volatility in financial markets. In
brief, the Indian approach has focused on gradual, phased and calibrated opening
of the domestic financial and external sectors, taking into cognizance reforms
in the other sectors of the economy. Financial markets are contributing to efficient
channelling of domestic savings into productive uses and, by financing the overwhelming
part of domestic investment, are supporting domestic growth. These characteristics
of India's external and financial sector management coupled with ample forex reserves
coverage and the growing underlying strength of the Indian economy reduce the
susceptibility of the Indian economy to global turbulence. Impact
of the Crisis on India While the overall policy approach
has been able to mitigate the potential impact of the turmoil on domestic financial
markets and the economy, with the increasing integration of the Indian economy
and its financial markets with rest of the world, there is recognition that the
country does face some downside risks from these international developments. The
risks arise mainly from the potential reversal of capital flows on a sustained
medium-term basis from the projected slow down of the global economy, particularly
in advanced economies, and from some elements of potential financial contagion.
In India, the adverse effects have so far been mainly in the equity markets because
of reversal of portfolio equity flows, and the concomitant effects on the domestic
forex market and liquidity conditions. The macro effects have so far been muted
due to the overall strength of domestic demand, the healthy balance sheets of
the Indian corporate sector, and the predominant domestic financing of investment.
As might be expected, the main impact of the global financial
turmoil in India has emanated from the significant change experienced in the capital
account in 2008-09 so far, relative to the previous year (Table 1).
Total net capital flows fell from US$17.3 billion in April-June 2007 to US$13.2
billion in April-June 2008. Nonetheless, capital flows are expected to be more
than sufficient to cover the current account deficit this year as well. While
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows have continued to exhibit accelerated
growth (US$ 16.7 billion during April-August 2008 as compared with US$ 8.5 billion
in the corresponding period of 2007), portfolio investments by foreign institutional
investors (FIIs) witnessed a net outflow of about US$ 6.4 billion in April-September
2008 as compared with a net inflow of US$ 15.5 billion in the corresponding period
last year. Similarly, external commercial borrowings of
the corporate sector declined from US$ 7.0 billion in April-June 2007 to US$ 1.6
billion in April-June 2008, partially in response to policy measures in the face
of excess flows in 2007-08, but also due to the current turmoil in advanced economies.
With the existence of a merchandise trade deficit of 7.7 per cent of GDP in 2007-08,
and a current account deficit of 1.5 per cent, and change in perceptions with
respect to capital flows, there has been significant pressure on the Indian exchange
rate in recent months. Whereas the real exchange rate appreciated from an index
of 104.9 (base 1993-94=100) (US$1 = Rs. 46.12) in September 2006 to 115.0 (US$
1 = Rs. 40.34) in September 2007, it has now depreciated to a level of 101.5 (US
$ 1 = Rs. 48.74) as on October 8, 2008.
| Table
: Trends in Capital Flows | |
(US $ million) | |
Component |
Period |
2007-08 |
2008-09 | |
Foreign Direct Investment to India |
April-August |
8,536 |
16,733 | |
FIIs (net)@ |
April – Sept 26 |
15,508 |
-6,421 | |
External Commercial Borrowings (net) |
April- June |
6,990 |
1,559 | |
Short-term Trade Credits (net) |
April- June |
1,804 |
2,173 | |
Memo: | | | |
| ECB Approvals
| April-August |
13,375 |
8,127 | |
Foreign Exchange Reserves (variation) |
April-September 26 |
48,583 |
-17,904 | |
Foreign Exchange Reserves (end-period) |
September 26, 2008 |
247,762 |
291,819 | |
Note:
Data on FIIs presented in this table represent inflows into the country and, thus,
may differ from data relating to net investment in stock exchanges by FIIs. |
With the volatility in portfolio flows having been
large during 2007 and 2008, the impact of global financial turmoil has been felt
particularly in the equity market. The BSE Sensex (1978-79=100) increased significantly
from a level of 13,072 as at end-March 2007 to its peak of 20,873 on January 8,
2008 in the presence of heavy portfolio flows responding to the high growth performance
of the Indian corporate sector. With portfolio flows reversing in 2008, partly
because of the international market turmoil, the Sensex has now dropped to a level
of 11,328 on October 8, 2008, in line with similar large declines in other major
stock markets. As noted earlier,
domestic investment is largely financed by domestic savings. However, the corporate
sector has, in recent years, mobilized significant resources from global financial
markets for funding, both debt and non-debt, their ambitious investment plans.
The current risk aversion in the international financial markets to EMEs could,
therefore, have some impact on the Indian corporate sector’s ability to raise
funds from international sources and thereby impede some investment growth. Such
corporates would, therefore, have to rely relatively more on domestic sources
of financing, including bank credit. This could, in turn, put some upward pressure
on domestic interest rates. Moreover, domestic primary capital market issuances
have suffered in the current fiscal year so far in view of the sluggish stock
market conditions. Thus, one can expect more demand for bank credit, and non-food
credit growth has indeed accelerated in the current year (26.2 per cent on a year-on-year
basis as on September 12, 2008 as compared with 23.3 per cent a year ago).
The financial crisis in the advanced economies and the
likely slowdown in these economies could have some impact on the IT sector. According
to the latest assessment by the NASSCOM, the software trade association, the current
developments with respect to the US financial markets are very eventful, and may
have a direct impact on the IT industry and likely to create a downstream impact
on other sectors of the US economy and worldwide markets. About 15 per cent to
18 per cent of the business coming to Indian outsourcers includes projects from
banking, insurance, and the financial services sector which is now uncertain.
In summary, the combined impact of the reversal
of portfolio equity flows, the reduced availability of international capital both
debt and equity, the perceived increase in the price of equity with lower equity
valuations, and pressure on the exchange rate, growth in the Indian corporate
sector is likely to feel some impact of the global financial turmoil. On the other
hand, on a macro basis, with external savings utilisation having been low traditionally,
between one to two percent of GDP, and the sustained high domestic savings rate,
this impact can be expected to be at the margin. Moreover, the continued buoyancy
of foreign direct investment suggests that confidence in Indian growth prospects
remains healthy. Impact on the Indian Banking System One
of the key features of the current financial turmoil has been the lack of perceived
contagion being felt by banking systems in EMEs, particularly in Asia. The Indian
banking system also has not experienced any contagion, similar to its peers in
the rest of Asia. A detailed
study undertaken by the RBI in September 2007 on the impact of the sub-prime episode
on the Indian banks had revealed that none of the Indian banks or the foreign
banks, with whom the discussions had been held, had any direct exposure to the
sub-prime markets in the USA or other markets. However, a few Indian banks had
invested in the collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) / bonds which had a few
underlying entities with sub-prime exposures. Thus, no direct impact on account
of direct exposure to the sub-prime market was in evidence. However, a
few of these banks did suffer some losses on account of the mark-to-market losses
caused by the widening of the credit spreads arising from the sub-prime episode
on term liquidity in the market, even though the overnight markets remained stable.
Consequent upon filling of bankruptcy under Chapter 11
by Lehman Brothers, all banks were advised to report the details of their exposures
to Lehman Brothers and related entities both in India and abroad. Out of 77 reporting
banks, 14 reported exposures to Lehman Brothers and its related entities either
in India or abroad. An analysis of the information reported by these banks revealed
that majority of the exposures reported by the banks pertained to subsidiaries
of Lehman Bros Holdings Inc. which are not covered by the bankruptcy proceedings.
Overall, these banks’ exposure especially to Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. which
has filed for bankruptcy is not significant and banks are reported to have made
adequate provisions. In the aftermath of the turmoil caused
by bankruptcy, the Reserve Bank has announced a series of measures to facilitate
orderly operation of financial markets and to ensure financial stability which
predominantly includes extension of additional liquidity support to banks. RBI
Response to the Crisis The
financial crisis in advanced economies on the back of sub-prime turmoil has been
accompanied by near drying up of trust amongst major financial market and sector
players, in view of mounting losses and elevated uncertainty about further possible
losses and erosion of capital. The lack of trust amongst the major players has
led to near freezing of the uncollateralized inter-bank money market, reflected
in large spreads over policy rates. In response to these developments, central
banks in major advanced economies have taken a number of coordinated steps to
increase short-term liquidity. Central banks in some cases have substantially
loosened the collateral requirements to provide the necessary short-term liquidity.
In contrast to the extreme volatility
leading to freezing of money markets in major advanced economies, money markets
in India have been, by and large, functioning in an orderly fashion, albeit with
some pressures. Large swings in capital flows – as has been experienced between
2007-08 and 2008-09 so far – in response to the global financial market turmoil
have made the conduct of monetary policy and liquidity management more complicated
in the recent months. However, the Reserve Bank has been effectively able
to manage domestic liquidity and monetary conditions consistent with its monetary
policy stance. This has been
enabled by the appropriate use of a range of instruments available for liquidity
management with the Reserve Bank such as the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Statutory
Liquidity Ratio (SLR) stipulations and open market operations (OMO) including
the Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) and the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF).
Furthermore, money market liquidity is also impacted by our operations in the
foreign exchange market, which, in turn, reflect the evolving capital flows. While
in 2007 and the previous years, large capital flows and their absorption by the
Reserve Bank led to excessive liquidity, which was absorbed through sterilisation
operations involving LAF, MSS and CRR. During 2008, in view of some reversal in
capital flows, market sale of foreign exchange by the Reserve Bank has led to
withdrawal of liquidity from the banking system. The daily LAF repo operations
have emerged as the primary tool for meeting the liquidity gap in the market.
In view of the reversal of capital flows, fresh MSS issuances have been scaled
down and there has also been some unwinding of the outstanding MSS balances. The
MSS operates symmetrically and has the flexibility to smoothen liquidity in the
banking system both during episodes of capital inflows and outflows. The existing
set of monetary instruments has, thus, provided adequate flexibility to manage
the evolving situation. In view of this flexibility, unlike central banks in major
advanced economies, the Reserve Bank did not have to invent new instruments or
to dilute the collateral requirements to inject liquidity. LAF repo operations
are, however, limited by the excess SLR securities held by banks.
While LAF and MSS have been able to bear a large part of
the burden, some modulations in CRR and SLR have also been resorted, purely as
temporary measures, to meet the liquidity mismatches. For instance, on September
16, 2008, in regard to SLR, the Reserve Bank permitted banks to use upto an additional
1 percent of their NDTL, for a temporary period, for drawing liquidity support
under LAF from RBI. This has imparted a sense of confidence in the market in terms
of availability of short-term liquidity. The CRR which had been gradually increased
from 4.5 per cent in 2004 to 9 per cent by August 2008 was cut by 50 basis points
on October 6 (to be effective October 11, 2008) – the first cut after a gap of
over five years - on a review of the liquidity situation in the context of global
and domestic developments. Thus, as the very recent experience shows, temporary
changes in the prudential ratios such as CRR and SLR combined with flexible use
of the MSS, could be considered as a vast pool of back-up liquidity that is available
for liquidity management as the situation may warrant for relieving market pressure
at any given time. The recent innovation with respect to SLR for combating temporary
systemic illiquidity is particularly noteworthy. The relative stability in domestic
financial markets, despite extreme turmoil in the global financial markets, is
reflective of prudent practices, strengthened reserves and the strong growth performance
in recent years in an environment of flexibility in the conduct of policies. Active
liquidity management is a key element of the current monetary policy stance. Liquidity
modulation through a flexible use of a combination of instruments has, to
a significant extent, cushioned the impact of the international financial turbulence
on domestic financial markets by absorbing excessive market pressures and ensuring
orderly conditions. In view of the evolving environment of heightened uncertainty,
volatility in global markets and the dangers of potential spillovers to domestic
equity and currency markets, liquidity management will continue to receive priority
in the hierarchy of policy objectives over the period ahead. The Reserve Bank
will continue with its policy of active demand management of liquidity through
appropriate use of the CRR stipulations and open market operations (OMO) including
the MSS and the LAF, using all the policy instruments at its disposal flexibly,
as and when the situation warrants. Impact
on Asian EMEs In contrast
to the previous episodes of global turmoil, EMEs have exhibited relative resilience,
though equity market and exchange rate pressures have intensified in recent days.
So far, the investment sentiment is positive for the Asian EMEs reflecting their
strong economic performance and, for some countries, favourable investment opportunities
associated with elevated commodity prices, though they have adjusted downwards
in recent times, while being somewhat volatile. Credit policy reforms, better
structuring of banking sector debt and improved fiscal positions have also played
their role making the EMEs resilient from the crisis. In addition, large foreign
exchange reserves, particularly in Asia, also provide a degree of protection against
possible sudden stops. Another factor that could be of relevance for this favourable
situation is the relatively smaller presence of foreign banks in the Asian banking
sector. This is evident from the fact that the share of banking assets held by
foreign banks in these economies generally lies between 0 and 10 percent (Global
Development Finance, 2008). The spillovers to the EMEs
from the current global financial market crisis have occurred mainly in and through
financial markets, reflecting the relatively high level of integration of such
markets in the global financial system. In this respect, there have been four
major spillovers, viz., (i) a rise in the price of risk; (ii) a reduction
in international bond issuance; (iii) a sell-off in equity markets; and (iv) some
unwinding of carry-trade positions. The major EMEs in Asia have been recording
surpluses on the current account in recent years, with the exception of Korea
and India. Thus, the vulnerability of Asia, other than Korea and India, is relatively
contained to that extent. It is in this context the foreign exchange markets in
India and Korea have experienced greater pressure in recent times. Despite
the fact that no significant macroeconomic disruption has taken place in EMEs,
some vulnerabilities exist. There are indications that the current crisis will
have some implications in terms of higher funding costs and raising external finance,
particularly, for lower rated firms. Further, countries with significant foreign
bank presence, mostly in East European economies, might be vulnerable to financial
stress faced by a parent bank. Similarly, slowdown in advanced countries might
impact the remittances to EMEs. As regards the impact of
financial turbulence on the real sector, Asian EMEs may not be entirely immune
to slowing growth in developed economies. For East Asian economies, since most
of these economies are small and their trade sector (export plus imports) as proportion
of GDP varies at a significantly higher level between over 200 per cent and 60
per cent as opposed to the weight of domestic demand as in India, it could be
an area of concern for these countries. Therefore, for these set of countries,
the crises could be transmitted through the trade channel. While strong regional
sources of growth within EMEs may be a mitigating factor, most EMEs still retain
substantial trade linkages with developed economies. In Asia, while intra-regional
trade has been growing rapidly over recent years, much of this activity is still
driven by developed economies as a major destination for final goods. According
to the analysis contained in the IMF’s latest Global Financial Stability Report
(October 2008) (IMF, 2008a), both domestic and global factors are important in
explaining the movement in equity prices in the EMEs. Correlation of equity markets
in EMEs with those in the advanced economies has risen, suggesting a growing transmission
channel for equity price movements. Amongst the three group of EMEs (Latin America,
Asia and Emerging Europe), the spillover from global factors is found to be strongest
in Latin American EMEs followed by Emerging Europe and Asia. The wealth effect
of stock market changes on consumption and investment, although statistically
significant, is found to be weaker in EMEs vis-à-vis the advanced economies.
Furthermore, such wealth effects tend to play out gradually. During
the financial turmoil, commodity prices may have been pushed higher to some extent
by increased demand for commodities as a hedge against a depreciating US dollar
and possibly also as a hedge against higher inflation. As global growth slows,
a fall in commodity prices represents a downside risk to commodity-exporting EMEs,
which is particularly relevant for some Latin American EMEs. In an extreme scenario,
where commodity prices fall dramatically, this could have significant implications
for economies that have had a heavy reliance on the performance of commodities
in recent years, and might furthermore pose some risks to the financial stability
in these countries. On the other hand, Asian EMEs which are commodity importers
may benefit from the correction in global commodity prices. This may alleviate
inflationary pressures in these economies and may provide the necessary flexibility
to monetary policy in these countries. However, the beneficial impact of softening
commodity prices is getting partly eroded by the depreciation pressures in some
of the EMEs, thus, limiting to some extent the manoeuvrability available to the
monetary policy. Overall, while the real sector in the
major Asian EMEs has held up relatively well, it needs to be recognised that the
financial crisis in the US has deepened significantly over the past couple of
months and there are signs of its spreading to the mature economies in Europe.
The deepening and widening of the financial crisis is already getting reflecting
in elevated volatility in the financial markets of key EMEs and widening of spreads
of the EME assets. Although a large amount of liquidity has been injected by the
central banks of the major advanced economies, short-term market rates remain
well above policy rates. Financing costs for the EMEs have increased over the
past few weeks and could thus deteriorate in the coming months. If the financial
crisis were to linger longer and the economic activity in these regions slows
down significantly, the adverse impact on the real economies in the major EMEs
could turn out to be stronger than that has been observed so far. According to
the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook (October 2008) (IMF, 2008b), major advanced
economies are already in or close to recession and the recovery is likely to be
unusually gradual. Global output growth (at purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange
rates) is now seen at 3.0 per cent in 2009, down from the likely 3.9 per cent
in 2008 and the robust growth of almost 5 per cent each during 2006 and 2007.
Growth in advanced economies is projected to decelerate from an average of 2.8
per cent during 2006-2007 to 1.5 per cent in 2008 and only 0.5 per cent in 2009.
Policy rates have been cut in a coordinated manner, an unprecedented move, by
central banks of major advanced economies on October 8, 2008 in view of the substantial
downside risks to growth. Thus, financial headwinds – both through reduced capital
flows, widening of spreads and elevated volatility in domestic financial markets
of the EMEs and through weakening of demand in major advanced economies – have
increased downside risks of the major EMEs, especially for the relatively more
open economies in the region. Concluding
Observations India has by-and-large
been spared of global financial contagion due to the sub-prime turmoil for a variety
of reasons. India’s growth process has been largely domestic demand driven and
its reliance on foreign savings has remained around 1.5 per cent in recent period.
It also has a very comfortable level of forex reserves. The credit derivatives
market is in an embryonic stage; the originate-to-distribute model in India is
not comparable to the ones prevailing in advanced markets; there are restrictions
on investments by residents in such products issued abroad; and regulatory guidelines
on securitisation do not permit immediate profit recognition. Financial stability
in India has been achieved through perseverance of prudential policies which prevent
institutions from excessive risk taking, and financial markets from becoming extremely
volatile and turbulent.
Annex
I Financial Stability Forum (FSF) Report: Status
In the wake of the turmoil in global financial
markets, the FSF brought out a report in April 2008 identifying the underlying
causes and weaknesses in the international financial markets. The Report contains,
inter alia, proposals of the FSF for implementation by end-2008 regarding
strengthening prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management,
enhancing transparency and valuation, changing the role and uses of credit ratings,
strengthening the authorities' responsiveness to risk and implementing robust
arrangements for dealing with stress in the financial system. The Reserve Bank
had put in place regulatory guidelines covering many of these aspects, while in
regard to others, actions are being initiated. In many cases, actions have to
be considered as work in progress. In any case, the guidelines are aligned with
global best practices while tailoring them to meet country-specific requirements
at the current stage of institutional developments. The proposals made by the
FSF and status in regard to each in India are narrated below:
1. Strengthened Prudential Oversight of Capital, Liquidity
and Risk Management
(i) Capital requirements: Specific
proposals will be issued in 2008 to: - Raise Basel
II capital requirements for certain complex structured credit products;
- Introduce
additional capital charges for default and event risk in the trading books of
banks and securities firms;
- Strengthen the capital
treatment of liquidity facilities to off-balance sheet conduits.
Changes
will be implemented over time to avoid exacerbating short-term stress.
(i) Liquidity:
Supervisory guidance will be issued by
July 2008 for the supervision and management of liquidity risks.
(ii)
Oversight of risk management:
Guidance
for supervisory reviews under Basel II will be developed that will:
-
Strengthen oversight of banks' identification and management of firm-wide risks;
- Strengthen oversight of banks' stress testing practices
for risk management and capital planning purposes;
Require
banks to soundly manage and report off-balance sheet exposures;
Supervisors will use Basel II to ensure
banks' risk management, capital buffers and estimates of potential credit losses
are appropriately forward looking. (iv)
Over-the-counter derivatives:
Authorities will encourage market participants to act promptly
to ensure that the settlement, legal and operational infrastructure for over-the-counter
derivatives is sound. The
road-map for the implementation of Basel II in India has been designed to suit
the country-specific conditions. The phased implementation process got underway
with the Basel II Accord being made applicable to foreign banks operating in India
and Indian banks having operational presence outside India with effect from March
31, 2008. All other commercial banks (except Local Area Banks and RRBs) are encouraged
to migrate to Basel II in alignment with them but in any case not later than March
31, 2009. The process of implementation is being monitored on an on-going basis
for calibration and fine-tuning. The
minimum capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR) in India is placed at 9 per
cent, one percentage point above the Basel II requirement. Further, regular monitoring
of banks' exposure to sensitive sectors and their liquidity position is also undertaken.
In India, off-balance sheet vehicles in the form of SPVs for the purpose of securitisation
are in existence for which extensive guidelines, in line with the international
best practices, have already been issued. Liquidity facilities to such SPVs are
subject to capital charge. Banks have been required to put in place appropriate
stress test policies and relevant stress test frameworks for various risk factors
by March 31, 2008. In order to further strengthen capital
requirements, the credit conversion factors, risk weights and provisioning requirements
for specific off-balance sheet items including derivatives have been reviewed.
Further, in India, complex structures like synthetic securitisation have not been
permitted so far. Introduction of such products, when found appropriate, would
be guided by the risk management capabilities of the system. The
Reserve Bank had issued broad guidelines for asset-liability management and banks
have flexibility in devising their own risk management strategies as per board-approved
policies. However, in regard to liquidity risks at the very short end, the Reserve
Bank has taken steps to mitigate risks at the systemic level and at the institution
level as well. The Reserve Bank has introduced greater granularity to measurement
of liquidity risk by splitting the first time bucket (1-14 days, at present) into
three time buckets, viz., next day, 2-7 days and 8-14 days. The net cumulative
negative mismatches in the three time buckets have been capped at 5 per cent,
10 per cent, and 15 per cent of the cumulative cash outflows.
The Reserve Bank had recognised the risks of allowing access to unsecured overnight
market funds to all entities and, therefore, restricted the overnight unsecured
market for funds only to banks and primary dealers (PD). Since August 2005, the
overnight call market is a pure inter-bank market. Accordingly, trading volumes
have shifted from the overnight unsecured market to the collateralised market.
Greater inter-linkages and excessive reliance on call money
borrowings by banks could cause systemic problems. The Reserve Bank has, therefore,
introduced prudential measures to address the extent to which banks can borrow
and lend in the call money market. On a fortnightly average basis, call market
borrowings outstanding should not exceed 100 per cent of capital funds (i.e.,
sum of Tier I and Tier II capital) in the latest audited balance sheet.
Recognising the potential of 'purchased inter-bank liabilities' (IBL) to create
systemic problems, the Reserve Bank had issued guidelines in March 2007 prescribing
that IBL of a bank should not exceed 200 per cent of its net worth (300 per cent
for banks with a CRAR more than 11.25 per cent). 2. Enhancing
Transparency and Valuation (i)
Robust risk disclosures: - The
FSF strongly encourages financial institutions to make robust risk disclosures
using leading disclosure practices at the time of their mid-year 2008 reports.
- Further
guidance to strengthen disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 of Basel II will
be issued by 2009.
(ii)
Standards for off-balance sheet vehicles and valuations:
Standard setters will take urgent action to:
- Improve
and converge financial reporting standards for off-balance sheet vehicles;
Develop guidance
on valuations when markets are no longer active, establishing an expert advisory
panel in 2008. (iii)
Transparency in structured products:
Market participants and securities regulators will expand the
information provided about securitised products and their underlying assets. The
Reserve Bank has, over the years, issued guidelines on valuation of various instruments/assets
in conformity with the international best practices while keeping India-specific
conditions in view. In order to encourage market discipline, the Reserve Bank
has developed a set of disclosure requirements which allow the market participants
to assess key pieces of information on capital adequacy, risk exposure, risk assessment
processes and key business parameters which provide a consistent and understandable
disclosure framework that enhances comparability. Banks are also required to comply
with the Accounting Standard (AS) on Disclosure of Accounting Policies issued
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).
In recognition of the fact that market discipline can contribute
to a safe and sound banking environment and as part of the ongoing efforts to
implement the Basel II Accord, the Reserve Bank issued guidelines on minimum capital
ratio (Pillar 1) and market discipline (Pillar 3) in April 2007 and guidelines
for Pillar 2 (supervisory review process) were issued in March 2008. Under these
guidelines, non-compliance with the prescribed disclosure requirements would attract
a penalty, including financial penalty. 3. Changes
in the Role and Uses of Credit Ratings Credit
rating agencies should: - Implement
the revised IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies to manage
conflicts of interest in rating structured products and improve the quality of
the rating process;
- Differentiate ratings on structured
credit products from those on bonds and expand the information they provide.
Regulators will review the
roles given to ratings in regulations and prudential frameworks. The
Reserve Bank has undertaken a detailed process of identifying the eligible credit
rating agencies whose ratings may be used by banks for assigning risk weights
for credit risk. Banks should use the chosen credit rating agencies and their
ratings consistently for each type of claim, for both risk weighting and risk
management purposes. Banks are not allowed to ‘cherry pick’ the assessments provided
by different credit rating agencies. If a bank has decided to use the ratings
of some of the chosen credit rating agencies for a given type of claim, it can
use only the ratings of those credit rating agencies, despite the fact that some
of these claims may be rated by other chosen credit rating agencies whose ratings
the bank has decided not to use. External assessments for one entity within a
corporate group cannot be used to risk weight other entities within the same group.
Banks must disclose the names of the credit rating agencies
that they use for the risk weighting of their assets, the risk weights associated
with the particular rating grades as determined by the Reserve Bank through the
mapping process for each eligible credit rating agency as well as the aggregated
risk weighted assets as required. In India, complex structures
like synthetic securitisations have not been permitted so far. As and when such
products are to be introduced, the Reserve Bank would put in place the necessary
enabling regulatory framework, including calibrating the role and capacity building
of the rating agencies. 4. Strengthening the Authorities'
Responsiveness to Risks
- A college of supervisors will be put
in place by end-2008 for each of the largest global financial institutions.
In the Indian context, there has been exchange of supervisory
information on specific issues between the Reserve Bank and few other overseas
banking supervisors/regulators. Supervisory cooperation has been working smoothly
and efficiently. The Mid-Term Review of October 2007 had
announced the constitution of a Working Group to lay down a road-map for adoption
of a suitable framework for cross-border supervision and supervisory cooperation
with overseas regulators, consistent with the framework envisaged in the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). A Working Group was constituted in March
2008 and is in the process of finalising its Report. A number of overseas regulators
of countries such as the USA, the UK, Canada, Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore
have been formally approached to share systems and practices, including legal
positions, in the matter of supervisory cooperation and sharing of information
with overseas regulators. The response from a few countries has been received
and is being examined. The 'Supervisory College' arrangement for this purpose
is also being examined by the Group. 5.
Robust Arrangements for Dealing with Stress in the Financial System
- Central
banks will enhance their operational frameworks and authorities will strengthen
their cooperation for dealing with stress.
In the Reserve Bank,
there is an institutional arrangement in place to oversee the functioning of the
financial markets on a daily basis. There is a Financial Market Committee monitoring
and assessing the functioning of different financial markets. Based on such an
oversight, appropriate and prompt action is taken, whenever necessary. The
Reserve Bank has the necessary framework for provision of liquidity to the banking
system, in terms of Sections 17 and 18 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
The regular liquidity management facilities of the Reserve Bank include the LAF,
OMO and MSS besides standing facilities such as export credit refinance (ECR)
and the liquidity facility for standalone PDs. The Reserve Bank can undertake
purchase/sale of securities of the Central or State Governments and can purchase,
sell and rediscount bills of exchange and promissory notes drawn on and payable
in India and arising out of bona fide commercial or trade transactions
for provision/absorption of liquidity for normal day-to-day liquidity management
operations as also for provision of emergency liquidity assistance to the banks
under the lender of last resort function. The Reserve Bank
is empowered under the existing legal framework to deal with the resolution of
weak and failing banks. The Banking Regulation Act provides the legal framework
for voluntary amalgamation and compulsory merger of banks under Sections 44 (A)
and 45, respectively. The Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC)
offers deposit insurance cover in India. The mergers of many weak private sector
banks with healthy banks have improved overall stability of the system. Not a
single scheduled commercial bank in the country has capital adequacy ratio which
is less than the minimum regulatory requirement of nine per cent. Source:
Annual Policy Statement for the Year 2008-09, Reserve Bank of India
Annex
II Measures Taken by the Reserve Bank during September-October
2008 in Response to the Global Financial Market Developments
- CRR cut by 250 basis
points to 6.5 per cent, effective fortnight beginning October 11, 2008
- Repo
rate cut by 100 basis points to 8.0 per cent
- As a
temporary measure, banks permitted to avail of additional liquidity support under
the LAF to the extent of up to 1 per cent of their NDTL.
- The
mechanism of Special Market Operations (SMO) for public sector oil marketing companies
instituted in June-July 2008 taking into account the extraordinary situation then
prevailing in the money and forex markets will be instituted when oil bonds become
available.
- Under the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt
Relief Scheme Government had agreed to provide to commercial banks, RRBs and co-operative
credit institutions a sum of Rs.25,000 crore as the first instalment. At the request
of the Government, RBI agreed to provide the sum to the lending institutions immediately.
- Interest rates on FCNR (B) Deposits and NRE(R)A deposits
were increased by 100 basis points each to Libor/Euribor/Swap rates plus 25 basis
points and to Libor/Euribor/Swap rates plus 100 basis points, respectively.
- Banks
allowed to borrow funds from their overseas branches and correspondent banks up
to a limit of 50 per cent of their unimpaired Tier I capital as at the close of
the previous quarter or USD 10 million, whichever is higher, as against the existing
limit of 25 per cent.
- Special 14 days repo to be conducted
every day upto a cumulative amount of Rs.20,000 crore with a view to enabling
banks to meet the liquidity requirements of Mutual Funds.
- Purely
as a temporary measure, banks allowed to avail of additional liquidity support
exclusively for the purpose of meeting the liquidity requirements of mutual funds
to the extent of up to 0.5 per cent of their NDTL.
- Under
the existing guidelines, banks and FIs are not permitted to grant loans against
certificates of deposits (CDs). Furthermore, they are also not permitted to buy-back
their own CDs before maturity. It was decided to relax these restrictions for
a period of 15 days effective October 14, 2008, only in respect of the CDs held
by mutual funds.
- For fine-tuning
the management of bank reserves on the last day of the maintenance period, a second
LAF (SLAF) on reporting Fridays, was introduced with effect from August 1, 2008.
It was decided to conduct the SLAF on a daily basis till further notice.
References: Henry,
Peter Blair (2007), "Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence, and
Speculation", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV, December. International
Monetary Fund (2008a), "Global Financial Stability Report", October ---
(2008b), "World Economic Outlook", October. Mohan,
Rakesh (2006), "Coping With Liquidity Management in India: A Practitioner's
View", Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, April. ----
(2007a), "Development of Financial Markets in India", Reserve Bank of
India Bulletin, June. ---- (2007b), "India's Financial
Sector Reforms: Fostering Growth While Containing Risk", Reserve Bank of
India Bulletin, December. Prasad, Eswar S., Raghuram G.
Rajan and Arvind Subramanian (2007), "Foreign Capital and Economic Growth",
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1. Reserve Bank of
India (2008), Annual Policy Statement for the Year 2008-09, April, World
Bank (2008), "Global Development Finance 2008", June.
Based
on remarks by Dr. Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor at IMF-FSF High-Level Meeting
on the Recent Financial Turmoil and Policy Responses at Washington D.C. on October
9, 2008. The assistance of Meena Hemachandra, Chandan Sinha, R.K. Pattnaik, Amitava
Sardar and Muneesh Kapur in preparation of the remarks is gratefully acknowledged. 1It
may be noted that India is more open as compared to the US: the ratio of current
receipts and current payments was 41 per cent of GDP in the US in 2007, while
capital inflows and capital outflows were around 15 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively. 2The status in India with regard to proposals
in the April 2008 Report of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is given in Annex
I. 3At present, banks are required to hold 25 per cent of
their net demand and time liabilities (NDTL) in Government (and some other approved)
securities. As against this requirement of 25 per cent, banks holdings of SLR
securities were 26.7 per cent of their NDTL as on September 12, 2008. Thus, banks
held nearly 1.7 per cent excess SLR securities - equivalent to Rs. 700 billion
as on September 12, 2008 - which could be used by banks to avail of liquidity
from the Reserve Bank under the daily LAF operations. 4In view
of sustained large capital flows on the one hand and the finite stock of government
securities with the Reserve Bank, and the absence of the option of issuing central
bank securities under the RBI Act on the other hand, a new scheme, Market Stabilisation
Scheme (MSS), was introduced in April 2004 to manage the large capital flows.
Under this scheme, the Reserve Bank has been empowered to issue government Treasury
Bills and medium duration dated securities exclusively for sterilization purposes,
so as to manage liquidity appropriately. The proceeds collected under MSS auctions
are kept in a separate identifiable cash account with the RBI, and can be used
only for redemption and/or buy back of securities issued under the MSS. The payments
for interest and discount on MSS securities are not made from the MSS Account,
but shown in the Union budget and other related documents transparently as distinct
components under separate subheads. The MSS securities are indistinguishable from
normal government Treasury Bills and dated securities. The introduction of MSS
has succeeded broadly in restoring LAF to its intended function of daily liquidity
management (see Mohan (2006)). 5On a review of the evolving liquidity
situation in the context of the abrupt changes in the international financial
environment subsequent to the October 6th announcement, it was decided to reduce
the CRR by 250 basis points to 6.50 per cent of NDTL with effect from the fortnight
beginning October 11, 2008 (instead of the 50 basis points reduction announced
on October 6, 2008). As a result, an amount of about Rs. 1000 billion would be
released into the system (instead of the injection of Rs 200 billion announced
earlier). A number of other measures were also announced on various occasions
during September-October 2008 (see Annex II) |