VI. REGULATION, SUPERVISION AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, pursuit of financial stability as an explicit policy objective, especially
by central banks, is gaining prominence. In India, the Reserve Bank’s regulatory and supervisory policies have
always been oriented towards maintenance of systemic stability. The Indian banking system remained largely sound
and resilient to shocks as indicated by various stress tests. The high level of leverage in developed countries, which was
one of the causal factors behind the global financial crisis, continues to remain low in India. The regulatory and
supervisory structure of the Reserve Bank was further strengthened during the year. The important policy decisions
for SCBs included, inter alia, strengthening countercyclical provisioning norms, measures to avoid excessive leverage
in housing loan segment, credit support to Micro Finance Institutions(MFIs) etc. After the consolidation in the
UCB sector there is substantial improvement in their financial health.
VI.1 The mandate of central banks in many
countries is getting widened to include systemic
regulation and macroprudential supervision in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis. In India, the
regulation and supervision have since long been the
most crucial functions of the Reserve Bank. The
Reserve Bank currently has the mandate to regulate
banks as well as non-banking financial companies
(NBFCs) and has conducted its regulatory and
supervisory functions with the objective of maintaining
systemic financial stability as well as preventing failure
of individual entities.
VI.2 The focus on regulation, supervision and
financial stability helped the Indian banking system
to sustain the downturn witnessed during the global
financial crisis. Strong prudential regulations were
adopted by the Reserve Bank much ahead of the
outbreak of the crisis. The Indian financial system still
remains largely bank oriented and therefore a resilient
banking system is crucial in maintaining systemic
stability. The stress test results suggest that Indian
banking system is largely resilient and can withstand
plausible shocks.
FINANCIAL STABILITY ASSESSMENT
VI.3 Post-crisis, financial stability has come to be
recognised as an integral element of macroeconomic
policy framework globally. In the international fora, a Financial Stability Board (FSB) is set up to detect
systemic vulnerabilities and strengthen the
supervisory and regulatory structure with a view to
promoting financial stability. India is also a member
of FSB and has committed to adopt international best
practices (Box VI.1).
VI.4 The multiple indicator approach to monetary
policy as well as prudent financial sector management
has enabled the Reserve Bank to maintain financial
stability in the country even in the face of strong
headwinds from the global economy. The post crisis
focus on establishing an institutional mechanism for
coordination among regulators and the Government
has culminated in the establishment of the Financial
Stability and Development Council (FSDC) in
December 2010. The FSDC is chaired by the Finance
Minister and assisted by a Sub-Committee to be
chaired by the Governor of the Reserve Bank. This
structure attempts to strike a balance between the
sovereign’s objective of ensuring financial stability and
the operative arrangements involving the central bank
and other regulators. While the Sub-Committee is
expected to evolve as a more active, hands-on body
for financial stability in normal times, the FSDC would
have a broad oversight and will assume a central role
during crises (Box VI.2).
VI.5 Further, the Financial Sector Legislative
Reforms Commission (FSLRC) has been constituted under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna
by the Central Government in March 2011, with a view
to rewriting and streamlining the financial sector laws,
rules and regulations to bring them in harmony with
the requirements of India’s fast growing financial
sector.
Box VI.1
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
The FSB, which was established in 2009 as a successor to
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), is an international body
established to address financial system vulnerabilities and
to drive the development and implementation of strong
regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of
financial stability. The FSB has identified a range of issues
with potential implications for systemic stability and various
initiatives, as under, are now underway, internationally, to
tackle these issues:
1. Developing macroprudential frameworks and policy
measures as an essential tool for ensuring financial
stability;
2. Implementing the Basel Committee proposals to
enhance the capital and liquidity standards of financial
institutions, now commonly known as Basel III. The
proposals envisage a minimum Common Equity Capital
ratio of 4.5 per cent, a Capital Conservation Buffer of up
to 2.5 per cent, calibration of a Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), etc.;
3. Reforming policies relating to Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (SIFI), with a view to reducing the
probability and impact of failure, improving resolution
capacity and strengthening core financial infrastructures
and markets;
4. Exploring possible regulatory measures to address the
systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage concerns posed
by the shadow banking system;
5. Improving the OTC and Commodity Derivatives Market
through measures requiring all standardised OTC
derivative contracts to be traded on exchanges or
electronic trading platforms and, where appropriate,
cleared through central counterparties; reporting of
OTC derivative contracts to trade repositories; and
higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared
contracts;
6. Other measures such as reforming compensation
practices of financial institutions, enhancing and
strengthening accounting standards and reducing
reliance on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs).
Reserve Bank’s views
India is a member of the FSB and the Reserve Bank is
actively involved in the process of policy formulation in the Board. It remains committed to adoption of international
standards and best practices, in a phased manner and
calibrated to local conditions, wherever necessary.
Banks in India are well capitalised and the Basel III norms
are unlikely to put undue pressure on the banking system in
the aggregate, though a few individual banks may need to
raise additional capital to comply to these standards, once
they are phased in. Many regulatory prescriptions being
contemplated internationally, especially with respect to core
capital, had been inducted into the Indian regulatory
framework well before the crisis.
A framework for monitoring the activities of the Financial
Conglomerates (FCs) is in place in the country. Though
none of the Indian institutions are likely to qualify as a
global SIFI, nonetheless, the progress made in SIFI
identification and resolution mechanism will have to be
incorporated into the domestic regulatory regime.
The shadow banking sector, as it is understood globally, does
not exist in India. The NBFC sector which is loosely identified
with shadow banking is also largely regulated. There remain
some regulatory gaps which leave scope for arbitrage. A
Working Group has been, inter alia, mandated to identify
such gaps and suggest measures to plug them.
Unlike in most jurisdictions, where centralised trade reporting
has come into focus only post-crisis, India has had
arrangements for reporting of various OTC derivative
transactions ranging from summary information to transaction
level data. The existing reporting arrangements require trades
in foreign exchange, interest rate, government securities,
corporate bonds and money market instruments to be
reported to the Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. (CCIL). A
Working Group constituted by the Reserve Bank has further
suggested a range of measures towards expanding the menu
of products which are reported and requiring such reporting
through regulatory mandates.
Macroprudential policy tools to address issues of systemic
concerns have been employed in India for quite some time
and the results have been largely positive. The tools used in
India included specifying/revising exposure norms,
provisioning for standard assets, differentiated risk weights
for sensitive sectors, specification of loan to value ratio, etc.
To sustain the efficacy of such instruments, going forward, a
wide range of qualitative and quantitative indicators will need
to be developed and the integrity of data will have to be
enhanced.
VI.6 By the Securities and Insurance Laws
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 2010, a new chapter
(chapter III-E) has been inserted in the Reserve Bank
of India Act, 1934. This chapter provides for a joint
mechanism, consisting of Union Finance Minister as
Chairperson, Governor, Reserve Bank of India as Vice-Chairperson, the Secretary, Department of
Economic Affairs, the Secretary, Department of
Financial Services and the Chairpersons of SEBI,
IRDA and PFRDA as members to resolve any
difference of opinion amongst the regulators. The Act
provides for a reference being made to the Joint
Committee only by the regulators and not by the
Central Government. The decision of the Joint
Committee shall be binding on the Reserve Bank of
India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI), the Insurance Regulatory and Development
Authority (IRDA) and the Pension Fund Regulatory
and Development Authority (PFRDA).
Box VI.2
Developments Related to FSDC and its Sub-Committee
Following the announcement in the Union Budget of 2010-
11, the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC)
was set up in December 2010 with a view to institutionalise
and strengthen the mechanism for maintaining financial
stability. The FSDC will, inter alia, deal with issues relating
to financial stability, financial sector development, interregulatory
coordination and macroprudential supervision of
the economy including the functioning of large financial
conglomerates.
The FSDC is chaired by the Union Finance Minister and its
members include the heads of the financial sector regulators
and representatives from key departments of the Ministry of
Finance. The FSDC is assisted by its Sub-Committee, which
meets frequently (at quarterly intervals) to assess the health
of the financial sector and monitor any incipient signs of
vulnerability. The Sub-Committee is chaired by the Governor
of the Reserve Bank and its members also include the heads
of the financial sector regulators and representatives from
the Ministry of Finance. The Sub-Committee has replaced the erstwhile High Level Co-ordination Committee on
Financial Markets (HLCCFM).
Since its inception, the FSDC has met thrice and has taken
stock of issues related to the macroeconomy, implications of
the developments in the advanced countries on India,
sovereign rating of India and the impact of competitive
devaluation by different jurisdictions. The Sub-Committee has
also met thrice since its constitution and has reviewed the
major macroeconomic and financial sector developments,
focusing on issues related to systemic risk. It is engaging
itself on an institutional mechanism for inter-regulatory
coordination for the supervision of financial conglomerates
and putting in place a robust reporting platform for over-thecounter
(OTC) derivatives market. Bridging the existing
regulatory gaps in the NBFC sector, regulation of government
sponsored NBFCs, regulation of investment advisory services,
conflict of interest in the distribution of financial products,
development of repos in corporate bonds, introduction of
infrastructure development funds (IDF), financial inclusion and
financial literacy are also critical issues on its agenda.
MONITORING OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
VI.7 Stress testing exercises are regularly carried
out by the Reserve Bank as part of its macroprudential
oversight. A series of stress testing in respect of credit,
liquidity and interest rate risks showed that Indian
banking system remained reasonably resilient though
their profitability could be affected significantly. The
stress tests show that credit risk would be well
contained even if 30 per cent of restructured standard
assets turned into NPAs. Though under the most
stringent credit quality shock of 150 per cent on the
baseline, the system level CRAR was adversely
affected, the banking system was able to withstand an adverse NPA shock reasonably with their capital
fund. Liquidity stress tests revealed some areas of
concern even though the scenario has improved as
compared to the last assessment. The credit risk
stress tests on systemically important non-deposit
taking NBFCs (NBFC-ND-SI) and scheduled UCBs
revealed that the impact on CRAR under different
scenarios would not be alarming.
Leverage of Corporate and Household Sector
VI.8 In the recent period, high leverage levels of
corporate and household sector are causes of
concern, especially in developed countries. Of these,
leverage in household and to a large extent even the
corporate sector has been an area which is not directly
regulated, even though macroprudential guidelines
exist for bank and non-bank lending to corporate
sector and retail sector. In India, however, the level of
leverage for corporate and household sector is much
lower as compared to the high levels prevailing in
developed countries (Box VI.3).
ASSESSMENT OF THE BANKING SECTOR
VI.9 The robust economic growth during 2010-11
was accompanied by a strong credit growth, even
though deposit growth did not keep pace and the gap
was funded through an increasing share of market borrowings. This increased reliance on borrowed
funds raised concerns about asset liability
mismatches. In the recent period however, the
divergent trend between credit and deposit growth
has significantly reversed.
Box VI.3
Corporate and Household Leverage, Credit Cycle and Economic Growth
The high level of debt and steady and sharp rise in leverage
in the developed economies, especially after 2000, has been
identified as one of the major causal factors that sparked off
the global financial crisis. The high level of leverage was
particularly significant in case of household sector and
corporate sector. In the years preceding the financial crisis,
household debt rose significantly, especially in countries
which experienced a boom in the housing sector, like USA,
UK, Ireland and Spain. Corporate debt ratios also increased
sharply in some countries like Ireland, Spain, Portugal and
UK but were stable in the US (Chart 1). In contrast, the
government debt ratios were stable in most of the countries.
Surprisingly, even though household sector and corporate
sector were highly leveraged, aggregate financial sector
leverage in most countries grew only modestly or declined
during the years preceding the crisis. This was mainly
because of rise in securitisation which allowed banks to shift
non-performing loans off their balance sheets.
It is well documented in economic literature that financial
crises often take place after a credit boom as reflected in a
sharp rise in the ratio of credit to GDP. The leverage is high
during credit boom periods, suggesting risk taking behaviour
of both lenders as well as borrowers, thereby leading to build-up of systemic risk. This subsequently results in a
bust when risk materialises. These types of credit cycles
are fairly regular and clearly identifiable across countries
and across time and may subsequently lead to banking
crises. Thus, even though high leverage in the initial period
may lead to a phase of high economic growth through credit
boom, as the bubble bursts, the spillover effects may have
adverse implications for growth. This is usually followed by
a long and often painful process of deleveraging, as
financial sector, households and corporates reduce their
debt exposures. Following the recent crisis as well, the
process of deleveraging has begun in developed
economies, though by no means yet complete. Thus, while
household and corporate sector debt is beginning to decline,
government borrowing is increasing sharply in many
economies to finance crisis related stimulus programmes
and financial sector bailouts. In contrast, the process of
deleveraging is faster in case of financial institutions as
these institutions reduced lending and resorted to shrinking
balance sheets.
In sharp contrast to the developing countries, the debt levels
in India have remained low. In fact, the leverage of corporate
sector has been falling in recent years implying that the corporates have preferred the equity route to raise money
as compared to the debt route. Microstructure issues like
improved ease of raising finances through capital markets
due to liberalisation of norms relating to issue and pricing of
shares coupled with encouraging market environment have
played a crucial role in a shift from debt to equity for corporate.
The household indebtedness, which remains a major cause
of concern in the developed countries, is comparatively very
low in India. Even though the debt ratio witnessed a sharp
rise during the period 2000-01 onwards, it has moderated in
the post-financial crisis period. Housing loans constitute
around half of the total personal loans in India and as a result
a boom and bust in the housing market can affect quality of
assets. The build-up of systemic risk in this area in India was avoided mainly due to implementation of
macroprudential policy by the Reserve Bank like changing
the risk weights for loans to real estate.
|
|
References:
Tang, G. and Upper, C. (2010): ‘Debt Reduction after Crises’,
BIS Quarterly Review, September, 25-38.
Roxburgh, C. et.al (2010): Debt and Deleveraging: The
Global Credit Bubble and its Economic Consequence’,
McKinsey Global Initiative, January.
Geanakoplos, J. (2010): ‘Solving the Present Crisis and
Managing the Leverage Cycle’, FRBNY Economic Policy
Review, August, 101-131.
VI.10 The strong credit growth during 2010-11
outpaced the growth in NPAs resulting in better asset
quality of the banking sector (chart VI.1a). The NPA
write-offs by banks to cleanse their balance sheets
also helped in achieving a lower gross NPA ratio. Even though the credit portfolio of banking system is fairly
diversified, the credit growth mainly emanated from
three sectors – infrastructure, retail and commercial
real estate. As each of these sectors has a peculiar
set of asset quality propositions, the brisk growth in
exposure seen during 2010-11 poses some concerns.
VI.11 The system level CRAR under Basel-II norms
stood at 14.2 per cent as at end-March 2011 which
was well above the regulatory requirement of 9 per
cent (Chart VI.1b). Subsequently however there was
a decline in CRAR at 13.8 per cent as at end June
2011 largely due to robust credit off-take. All the bank
groups had CRAR above 12 per cent as at end-March
2011 under Basel-II norms.
VI.12 Despite significant decline in securities trading
and hence in non-interest income and also higher risk
provisioning, SCBs could record a growth of 20 per
cent in their net profit during 2010-11, mainly due to
an impressive growth of 35 per cent in net interest
income. Accordingly, return on equity (RoE) and return
on assets (RoA) as well as net interest margin (NIM) of SCBs recorded an increase. The ratio of liquid
assets to total assets deteriorated during 2010-11 and
stood at around 30 per cent at end-March 2011 as
compared to more than 32 per cent for last several
years.
VI.13 The financial soundness indicators of
scheduled UCBs have improved in recent years.
Asset quality and profitability of NBFCs-ND-SI also
improved over the previous year. Asset quality of
deposit taking NBFCs (NBFCs-D) showed an
improvement in 2010-11compared with last year, even
though capital adequacy ratio declined marginally
(Table VI.1).
MAJOR DECISIONS TAKEN BY
BOARD FOR FINANCIAL SUPERVISION
VI.14 The Board for Financial Supervision (BFS),
constituted in November 1994, remains the chief
guiding force behind the Reserve Bank’s supervisory
and regulatory initiatives. The BFS held twelve
meetings during the period July 2010 to June 2011.
In these meetings, it considered, inter alia, the
performance and the financial position of banks and
financial institutions during 2009-10. It reviewed 94
inspection reports (25 reports of public sector banks,
28 of private sector banks, 31 of foreign banks, 4 of
local area banks, and 6 of financial institutions).
During the period, the BFS also reviewed 15
summaries of inspection reports pertaining to
scheduled urban co-operative banks and 43
summaries of financial highlights pertaining to
scheduled UCBs classified in Grade I/II. With a view
to fine tuning of supervisory rating, the BFS sought a
complete review of the rating methodology, which is
currently under process.
Table VI.1: Select Financial Indicators |
(Per cent) |
Item |
End- March
|
Scheduled
Commercial
Banks |
Scheduled
Urban
Co-operative
Banks |
All India
Financial
Institutions |
Primary
Dealers |
Non-Banking
Financial
Companies-D |
NBFCs-
ND-SI |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
CRAR |
2010 |
14.5 |
12.8 |
24.2 |
43.5 |
22.2 |
42.1 |
|
2011 |
14.2 |
12.7 |
22.1 |
46.2 |
21.0 |
N.A. |
Gross NPAs to Gross Advances |
2010 |
2.5 |
9.3 |
0.3 |
N.A. |
2.0 |
2.5 |
|
2011 |
2.3 |
7.4 |
0.3 |
N.A. |
0.9 |
1.9 |
Net NPAs to Net Advances |
2010 |
1.1 |
4.4 |
0.1 |
N.A. |
- |
1.2 |
|
2011 |
0.9 |
3.1 |
0.1 |
N.A. |
- |
0.8 |
Return on Total Assets |
2010 |
1.1 |
0.8 |
1.2 |
1.8 |
1.5 |
2.0 |
|
2011 |
1.1 |
0.9 |
1.0 |
1.1 |
N.A. |
2.2 |
Return on Equity |
2010 |
13.3 |
N.A. |
10.4 |
6.8 |
9.0 |
7.0 |
|
2011 |
13.7 |
N.A. |
9.2 |
5.1 |
N.A. |
8.7 |
Efficiency (Cost/Income Ratio) |
2010 |
45.8 |
58.8 |
14.6 |
31.2 |
81.8 |
73.5 |
|
2011 |
46.0 |
49.9 |
19.3 |
36.1 |
N.A. |
68.7 |
Interest Spread (per cent) |
2010 |
2.7 |
N.A. |
2.3 |
N.A. |
3.9 |
1.8 |
|
2011 |
3.1 |
N.A. |
2.0 |
N.A. |
N.A. |
1.9 |
N.A.: Not Available.
Note: 1. Data for 2011 are unaudited and provisional.
2. Data for SCBs are excluding LABs.
3. Data for SCBs covers domestic operations, except for CRAR.
4. Data on CRAR on Scheduled UCBs exclude Madhavpura Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd.
5. For NBFC-D, data for 2011 pertain to period ended September 2010.
Source: 1. SCBs: Off-site supervisory returns.
2. UCBs: Off-site surveillance returns. |
VI.15 Based on the recommendations of BFS, a
High Level Committee (Chairman: Dr. K. C.
Chakrabarty) has been constituted to assess the
adequacy of the RBI’s supervisory policies,
procedures and processes, and suggest
enhancements for benchmarking the supervisory
framework to global standards. Further, with a view
to address supervisory concerns arising out of
growing volumes as well as complexity of business
of banks, the supervisory processes and the
organisational structure of the Department of Banking
Supervision has been reorganised. The supervisory
process (both on-site and off-site) in respect of the
major banking groups is being brought together within
a division (Financial Conglomerates Monitoring
Division - FCMD) in the department so as to achieve
better synergy and optimum utilisation of available
supervisory resources. Further a need-based
reorganisation of the other operational areas of the
Department will also be undertaken.
VI.16 While deliberating on issues relating to the
Internal Vigilance Framework in private sector/foreign
banks, the BFS decided, inter alia, that the banks
may be advised to frame their own policy for
identification of sensitive positions at all levels and
for evolving a framework for periodic rotation and
mandated leave periods.
VI.17 While deliberating on the issues relating to
constitution and performance of co-operative courts
in different states, BFS had observed that recovery is treated as dispute under co-operative law, and it would
be desirable for UCBs to incorporate in their bye-laws
and loan agreements a provision for settling recovery
of loans internally through an arbitration council set
up by the general body. Based on the directions of
the BFS, the views of the respective Task Forces for
Co-operative Urban Banks (TAFCUBs) and those of
the Legal Department in the matter were obtained.
Subsequently, the Secretaries and Registrars of Cooperative
Societies of all the State Governments have
been advised on July 8, 2010 that the State Cooperative
Societies Act may be amended for setting
up an internal disputes resolution mechanism where
the Act does not provide for arbitration.
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Regulatory Initiatives
Entry of new banks in the private sector
VI.18 Following the announcement made in the
Annual Policy Statement for 2010-11, a discussion
paper on new bank license was published in August
2010 inviting suggestions and comments from all
concerned. Subsequently a gist of such comments
received on the discussion paper and the views
emerged in the discussions with stakeholders were
placed on the Reserve Bank’s website in
December 2010. Based on the experience gained
from the licensing of new banks under the guidelines
issued in 1993 and 2001 and the comments/
suggestions received from the stakeholders and
general public, draft guidelines on ‘entry of new banks
in the private sector’ are in the process of
being finalised in consultation with the Government
of India.
Entry of foreign banks
VI.19 A revision to the Reserve Bank’s “Roadmap
for Presence of Foreign Banks in India”, released in
February 2005 was due in April 2009. At that juncture,
however, the global financial markets were in turmoil
and there were uncertainties surrounding the financial
strength of banks around the world. In this backdrop,
it was decided to review the roadmap once there was greater clarity regarding stability and recovery of the
global financial system. Presently various
international fora are engaged in setting out policy
frameworks incorporating the lessons learnt from the
crisis. Drawing lessons from the crisis, a discussion
paper on ‘Presence of Foreign Banks in India’ was
released in January 2011 seeking feedback /
suggestions from stakeholders and general public.
The guidelines delineating the road-map for presence
of foreign banks in India would be finalised after taking
into account the feedback/suggestions received from
the stakeholders.
VI.20 Reserve Bank, however, continues to grant
licenses to foreign banks to open branches in India
on a case to case basis. During the year 2010-11,
the Reserve Bank issued 4 approvals to foreign banks
for maiden presence in India, taking the total numbers
of foreign banks operating in India to 37 as at end-
June 2011. Besides, 47 foreign banks have also
representative offices in India.
Basel II – Implementation of advanced approaches
VI.21 In line with the Basel II framework, Reserve
Bank issued detailed guidelines on Advanced
Measurement Approach (AMA) for computing capital
charge for operational risk in April 2011. Banks
intending to migrate to AMA were advised to assess
their preparedness with reference to these guidelines.
As and when they are ready for implementation, they
may approach RBI with a notice of intention.
VI.22 All the commercial banks in India were
advised to continue the parallel run under Basel I
framework till March 31, 2013 subject to review and
ensure that their Basel II minimum capital requirement
is higher than 80 per cent of the minimum requirement
under Basel I.
Basel III
VI.23 Pursuant to the release of the document titled
‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more
resilient banks and banking system’ by the BCBS in
December 2010, which becomes operational
beginning January 2013, banks have been advised
not to issue Tier I and Tier II capital instruments with ‘step up options’, so that such instruments can qualify
for inclusion in the new definition of regulatory capital
(Box VI.4).
Provisioning Coverage Ratio (PCR) for advances and
other provisioning requirements
VI.24 As a macroprudential measure, banks were
required to maintain PCR of 70 per cent of gross
NPAs with reference to the position as on end-
September 2010. The surplus of the provision over
and above the prescribed prudential norms should
be segregated into a separate account styled as
“countercyclical provisioning buffer” which will be
allowed to be used during periods of system-wide
downturn with the prior approval of Reserve Bank.
This was intended to be an interim measure till such
time the Reserve Bank introduces a more
comprehensive methodology of countercyclical
provisioning taking into account the evolving
international standards.
VI.25 Reserve Bank increased the provision
requirements in case of certain categories of nonperforming
and restructured accounts in May 2011.
The provision requirement for ‘sub-standard’ assets
was increased from 10 per cent to 15 per cent. The
provisioning requirement for unsecured exposure in
this category was increased from 20 per cent to 25
per cent. The provisioning in respect of secured
portion of advances which have remained in ‘doubtful’
category up to one year was increased from 20 per
cent to 25 per cent, whereas that for advances which
remained ‘doubtful’ between one to three years was
increased from 30 per cent to 40 per cent.
VI.26 Restructured accounts classified as standard
advances will now attract a provision of 2 per cent in
the first two years from the date of restructuring.
In case of moratorium on payment of interest/
principal after restructuring, such advances will now
attract a provision of 2 per cent for the period
covering moratorium and two years thereafter.
Restructured accounts classified as NPAs when
upgraded to standard category will now attract a
provision of 2 per cent in the first year from the date
of upgradation.
Box VI.4
Initiatives Taken by the Reserve Bank to Migrate Towards the Basel III Norms
In the wake of financial crisis, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS) has initiated several post-crisis
reform measures mainly building on the Basel II capital
adequacy framework. The framework was bolstered
significantly in July 2009 through a series of enhancements
to each of the three pillars; notably, to address the
undercapitalisation of trading book exposures of banks.
Subsequently, in December 2010, the BCBS has released
revised sets of rules for capital and liquidity regulations viz.
‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient
banks and banking systems’ and ‘Basel III: International
framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and
monitoring’ which inter alia aim at promoting a more resilient
banking sector and strengthening liquidity regulations.
Collectively, the revised Basel II capital framework and the
new global standards have been commonly referred to as
“Basel III”.
Though Basel III can be viewed as a modification to Basel II
framework, it differs significantly from Basel II in terms of its
comprehensiveness. More particularly, apart from revising
the definition of regulatory capital, it is much wider in risk
coverage and encompasses measures to address the
systemic risks. Implementation of Basel III has thrown up
significant challenges to both banks and the banking
supervisors alike.
So far as implementation of Basel III in India is concerned,
availability of adequate amount of capital, both in terms of
quality and quantity provides significant comfort to begin
implementation of the new framework as per the time
schedule fixed by the BCBS. Nevertheless, RBI has taken a
number of initiatives to ensure smooth transition of the banking sector to Basel III framework. RBI’s representation
at the Financial Stability Board (FSB), BCBS and their various
sub-groups provides the much needed opportunity to
understand and contribute to the formulation of policies
relating to regulation and supervision of the banking sector
at the international level, particularly, Basel III. In order to
raise awareness among banks about Basel III, RBI has been
regularly briefing the Chief Executives of banks since RBI
became member of BCBS in 2009. These meetings also
provide an opportunity to RBI to assess the level of
preparedness of banks to implement Basel III and
clarify any issues which they may have in this regard.
Other initiatives taken by RBI include organising various
training programmes through its training establishments,
seminars, meetings and participation in seminars organised
by the Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) and other self
regulatory bodies.
The BCBS is monitoring the impact of Basel III proposals
through the semi-annual Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) on
banks. Ten Indian banks are participating in this QIS exercise.
The outcome of the QIS will not only give an idea about the
impact of the Basel III rules on Indian banks, but will also
help in enhancing the understanding of banks about the
subtle nuances of various aspects of Basel III proposals.
Meanwhile, RBI is examining the Basel III regulations and
will issue guidelines to the extent applicable for banks
operating in India in due course of time. RBI is also working
on operationalisation of Countercyclical Capital Buffer under
Basel III. RBI would adhere to internationally agreed phasein
period starting in January 1, 2013 for implementation of
Basel III.
Housing loans by commercial banks – LTV ratio, risk
weight and provisioning
VI.27 In order to prevent excessive leveraging in
housing loans portfolio, banks were advised in
December 2010 that the Loan to Value (LTV) ratio in
respect of housing loans should not exceed 80 per
cent. However, for small value housing loans, i.e.
housing loans up to `20 lakh, the LTV ratio should
not exceed 90 per cent. The risk weight for residential
housing loans of `75 lakh and above, irrespective of
the LTV ratio, will be 125 per cent. The standard asset
provisioning on the outstanding amount of housing
loans at teaser rates was increased from 0.40 per
cent to 2 per cent. The provisioning on these assets
would revert to 0.40 per cent after one year from the
date on which the rates are reset at higher rates if the
accounts remain ‘standard’.
Credit support to Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs)
VI.28 Considering the fact that the problems
afflicting the Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) sector
were not necessarily on account of any credit
weakness per-se but were mainly due to exogenous
factors, it was decided in January 2011 that the special
regulatory asset classification benefit could be
extended to restructured MFI accounts, which were
standard at the time of restructuring, even if they are
not fully secured. This relaxation was granted purely
as a temporary measure and was applicable to
standard MFI accounts restructured up to March 31,
2011. This time line was extended up to June 6, 2011
in the case of MFI loans restructured under the
consortium approach adopted by banks and under
the CDR mechanism. The objective was to provide
some liquidity support to MFIs and facilitate a ‘holding on’ operation for some time till appropriate measures
were taken to bring about long term and structural
changes in the functioning of MFIs.
Prudential norms on investment in Zero Coupon
Bonds
VI.29 It was observed that banks were investing in
long term Zero Coupon Bonds (ZCBs) issued by
corporates including those issued by NBFCs. Since
the issuers of ZCBs are not required to pay any
interest or instalments till the maturity of bonds, the
credit risk in such investments would go unrecognised
till the maturity of bonds and this risk could especially
be significant in the case of long term ZCBs. Further,
since such issuances and investments if done on a
large scale could pose systemic problems, banks
were advised in September 2010 that they should not
invest in ZCBs unless the issuer builds up sinking
fund for all accrued interest and keeps it invested in
liquid investments/securities (Government bonds).
Banks were also advised to put in place conservative
limits for their investments in ZCBs. Similar guidelines
were also issued for UCBs.
Permanent diminution in the value of investments in
banks’ subsidiaries /joint ventures
VI.30 In the absence of any specific instructions on
the method of assessment/measurement of
permanent diminution in the value of banks’
investments in subsidiaries/ joint ventures which are
included under ‘Held to Maturity’ (HTM) category,
banks were not making any attempt to determine
whether there is any permanent diminution in their
strategic equity investments held under HTM or
‘Available for Sale’ (AFS) categories. In January 2011
banks were advised about the circumstances under
which the need to determine impairment arises and
in such an eventuality they would be required to obtain
valuation of such investments by a reputed/qualified
valuer and make provision for the impairment
required, if any.
Sale of Investments held under HTM category
VI.31 Securities under HTM category are intended
to be held till maturity by the banks and accordingly are not required to be marked to market. However, it
was observed that many banks were resorting to sale
of securities under HTM category, that too frequently
to take advantage of favourable market conditions
and to book profit. Therefore, banks were advised in
August 2010 that if the value of sales and transfers
of securities to/from HTM category exceeds 5 per cent
of the book value of investments held in HTM category
at the beginning of the year, they should disclose in
the notes to accounts to the balance sheet the market
value of the investments held in the HTM category
and indicate the excess of book value over market
value for which provision is not made. However, the
one-time transfer of securities to/from HTM category
with the approval of Board of Directors permitted to
be undertaken by banks at the beginning of
accounting year and sales to RBI under preannounced
OMO auctions, will be excluded from the
5 per cent cap mentioned above.
Accounting Procedure for Investment
VI.32 It was observed that banks were not following
a uniform methodology in accounting their investment
in government securities. They were following either
‘trade date’ accounting or ‘settlement date’
accounting. Therefore, to bring about uniformity, the
banks were advised to follow only the ‘Settlement
Date’ accounting. Similar guidelines were also issued
for UCBs.
Investment in Non-SLR Securities
VI.33 Reserve Bank issued a circular in December
2010 permitting banks to invest in non-convertible
debentures (NCDs) with original or initial maturity up
to one year issued by corporates (including NBFCs),
subject to extant prudential guidelines.
Guidelines on banks’ ALM-Interest Rate Risk
VI.34 Detailed guidelines on banks’ Asset Liability
Management (ALM) Framework on Interest Rate Risk
were issued by the Reserve Bank on November 4,
2010. In the guidelines, the banks were advised to
adopt the Duration Gap Analysis (DGA) for interest
rate risk management in addition to the Traditional
Gap Analysis (TGA) previously mandated.
Issue of Irrevocable Payment Commitments (IPCs)
VI.35 Certain risk mitigating measures were
prescribed by the Reserve Bank in September 2010
in the context of banks issuing IPCs to various stock
exchanges on behalf of mutual funds and FIIs, as a
transitory measure up to end-October 2011. Banks
were advised therein to incorporate a clause in the
agreement with their clients which gives them an
inalienable right over the securities to be received as
payout in any settlement, before November 1, 2010.
In view of operational difficulties expressed by some
banks, this deadline was subsequently extended up
to end-December 2010.
Revised Business Correspondents (BC) guidelines
VI.36 Guidelines were issued in September 2010,
permitting banks to engage companies registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 (excluding NBFCs)
with large and widespread retail outlets as BCs in
addition to the individuals/entities permitted earlier.
Credit card operations of banks
VI.37 Inspite of instructions issued to banks from
time to time on credit card operations, complaints are
received from card holders both at Reserve Bank and
at the offices of the Banking Ombudsmen. Banks were
therefore, once again advised that if they fail to adhere
to the prescribed guidelines, Reserve Bank would
initiate suitable penal action, including levy of
monetary penalties.
Branch authorisation policy
VI.38 In view of the need to step up opening of
branches in rural areas so as to meet the objectives
of financial inclusion and increased banking
penetration, banks have been mandated to open at
least 25 per cent of the total number of branches
proposed to be opened during a year in unbanked
rural (tier 5 and tier 6) centres.
Fair practices code-disclosure
VI.39 With a view to bringing in fairness and
transparency, banks were advised to disclose to the
borrowers all-in cost information inclusive of all charges involved in processing/sanction of loans in
the loan application in a transparent manner. Banks
were also advised to ensure that the charges/fees
are non-discriminatory.
Bank’s participation in trading of Currency Options
VI.40 Pursuant to the issue of guidelines on trading
of currency options on recognised stock/new
exchanges, AD category-1 commercial banks fulfilling
required criteria were permitted to become trading
and clearing members of the exchange traded
currency options market of the recognised stock
exchanges, on their own account and on behalf of
their clients. All other SCBs are permitted to participate
only as clients. NBFCs-ND-SI were also permitted to
participate in the designated currency options
exchanges recognised by SEBI as clients, only for
the purpose of hedging their underlying forex
exposures. UCBs licensed as AD category I were
allowed to participate in the exchange traded currency
option market of a designated exchange recongnised
by SEBI, only as clients, subject to RBI guidelines.
Such participation is allowed only for hedging
underlying forex exposure arising from customer
transactions.
Reopening of pension option- prudential treatment
VI.41 To mitigate the difficulties faced by public
sector banks in absorbing the enhanced expenditure
arising on account of enhancement of gratuity limits
and reopening of pension option to their employees,
special regulatory dispensation of amortisation was
granted to such banks and was subsequently
extended to ten old private sector banks, which came
under the 9th bipartite settlement under the aegis of
Indian Banks’ Association (IBA). These banks were
permitted to amortise the expenditure over a period
of 5 years beginning with the financial year 2010-11
subject to a minimum of 1/5th of the total amount being
amortised every year. Upon the introduction of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
from April 2013 as scheduled, the opening balance
of reserves of banks will be reduced to the extent of
the unamortised carry forward expenditure. Further
the unamortised expenditure shall not include any amount relating to retired employees. The
unamortised expenditure would not be reduced from
Tier I capital, as a special case in view of the
exceptional nature of the event.
The Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2011
VI.42 The Banking Laws (Amendment) Bill 2011 has
been introduced in Lok Sabha in March 2011. The
Bill seeks to amend certain provisions of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 and the Banking Companies
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act of 1970
and 1980. The proposed amendments to the BR Act
envisages, inter alia, removal of restriction on voting
rights, enabling banking companies to raise capital
in accordance with the international best practices,
formation of Depositors’ Education and Awareness
Fund, conferring powers on Reserve Bank to
supersede the Board of Directors of a banking
company in certain cases, to call for information from/
to inspect the associate enterprises of a banking
company and to exempt mergers of banking
companies from the applicability of the provisions of
the Competition Act, 2002, thus making the regulatory
powers of RBI more effective.
VI.43 The proposed amendments to the
Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) Act, 1970 and 1980 envisages raising
the authorised capital of the nationalised banks,
enable them to raise capital through right issue/issue
of bonus shares and raising the restriction on voting
rights.
Supervisory Initiatives
Cross Border Supervision and Co-operation
VI.44 The process of entering into bilateral MoUs
with 16 identified jurisdictions/countries for cross
border supervision has been initiated. Out of the 16
pre-identified overseas supervisors, MoUs with China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and Dubai
Financial Services Authority (DFSA), the independent
integrated financial services and market regulators
of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), have been signed. Proposals in respect of 7 other
overseas supervisors are at various stages of
finalisation.
Regulatory and Audit Compliance
VI.45 In view of the concerns about the adequacy
of regulatory compliance by foreign banks in India, it
was advised that for all foreign banks operating in
India, the Chief Executive Officer would be
responsible for effective oversight of regulatory and
statutory compliance as also the audit process and
the compliance thereof in respect of all operations in
India.
Developments in Fraud Monitoring
VI.46 RBI as a part of its supervisory process alerts
the banks about common fraud prone areas, modus
operandi of frauds and the measures to be taken by
them to prevent/reduce incidence of frauds in banks
on an ongoing basis. During 2010-11, the Reserve
Bank took several measures for strengthening the
frauds monitoring mechanism in banks.
Enhancement of governance of IT security measures
VI.47 A Working Group on Information Security,
Electronic Banking Technology, Risk Management
and Cyber Frauds (Chairman: Shri G. Gopalakrishna),
was formed by the Reserve Bank following the
announcement in the Annual Monetary Policy
Statement of 2010. Based on the recommendations
of the group and the feedback received from
stakeholders, detailed guidelines were issued to the
banks on April 29, 2011. These guidelines are aimed
at enhancing the governance of IT information security
measures, cyber frauds, independent assurance
about the effectiveness of the IT controls and related
areas.
Internal vigilance in banks
VI.48 In an endeavour to align the vigilance function
in private sector and foreign banks to that of the public
sector banks, detailed guidelines for the former have
been issued so that all issues arising out of lapses in the functioning of the private sector and foreign banks
especially relating to corruption, malpractices, frauds
etc. can be addressed uniformly by the banks for
timely and appropriate action.
Guidelines for prevention of frauds
VI.49 A study was also made across banks to
ascertain the policy and operating framework in place
for detection, reporting and monitoring of frauds. The
study revealed that while the banks do have control
policies and processes, these are not well structured
and systematic to ensure proper focus on typical fraud
events. Besides, there was lack of consistency in
treatment of transactions having characteristics of
fraud as also in their reporting to the competent
authority. The banks have been advised to suitably
modify their policies and streamline the operating
framework. In order to ensure close monitoring and
tighter controls so as to thwart frauds especially in
housing loan, export finance, loans against fixed
deposit receipts etc., the banks have been asked to
structure their operating framework on three tracks
viz. (i) Detection and reporting of frauds (ii) Corrective
action and(iii) Preventive and punitive action.
URBAN CO-OPERATIVE BANKS
Consolidation through mergers
VI.50 The consolidation of the urban co-operative
banking sector through the process of merger of weak
banks with stronger ones while providing an avenue
for non-disruptive exit to the weak entities has been
set in motion since 2005-06. During last six years,
the Reserve Bank has received 158 proposals for
merger. The Reserve Bank issued no objection
certificate (NOC) for 120 cases. Out of the 120 NOCs
issued, 95 mergers had actually been effected upon
the issue of statutory orders by the Central Registrar
of Co-operative Societies (CRCS)/Registrar of Cooperative
Societies (RCS) of the State concerned. Out
of the 95 mergers, 59 UCBs had negative net worth.
Profit making UCBs were also permitted to merge
with other financially strong UCBs with the aim of
consolidation and strengthening the sector.
Transfer of assets and liabilities of UCBs to
Commercial Banks
VI.51 Certain financially weak UCBs with relatively
bigger size balance-sheets (i.e. Tier II UCBs) could
not opt for mergers as there were no willing UCBs to
take over such UCBs with higher accumulated losses.
To overcome this problem, specific guidelines about
transfer of certain assets and liabilities with mutual
consent of both the UCB and the interested SCBs
were issued for the first time in February 2010. So far
there have been two such cases of transfer of assets
and liabilities of UCBs to SCBs. Specific assets and
liabilities of Shree Suvarna Sahakari Bank Ltd., Pune
were taken over by the Indian Overseas Bank and
similarly the assets and liabilities of the Memon Cooperative
Bank Ltd., Mumbai were taken over by the
Bank of Baroda.
Unlicensed UCBs and licensing of new UCBs
VI.52 Based on the guidelines issued by the BFS in
August 2009, a review of unlicensed UCBs was made
and 51 UCBs have been granted banking licenses.
As on March 31, 2011, there are four unlicensed
banks and review in respect of these UCBs is in
progress. Further, the Reserve Bank has constituted
an expert committee for studying the advisability of
granting new urban cooperative banking licenses
(Box VI.5).
Maximum limits on unsecured loans and advances
VI.53 The maximum limits for grant of unsecured
loans by the UCBs (with or without surety or for
cheque purchase) for individual and group borrowers
were enhanced suitably keeping in view the twin
criteria of capital adequacy (CRAR) and size of
demand and time liabilities (DTL) of the UCBs. The
enhanced limits ranged between `0.25 lakh (for UCB
with DTL up to `10 crore and CRAR below nine per
cent) and `5.00 lakh (for UCB with DTL above `100
crore and CRAR above nine per cent). The total
unsecured loans and advances granted by an UCB
are limited to 10 per cent of its total assets as per
audited balance sheet as on 31 March of the
preceding financial year.
Box VI.5
Expert Committee on Licensing of New Urban Cooperative Banks
In the light of the past experience regarding newly licensed
UCBs becoming financially unsound in short span of time
and the prevailing precarious financial health of the UCB
sector, the Reserve Bank issued a comprehensive policy in
2005 on UCBs with a view to improving the financial health
of this sector. It was also decided not to issue any fresh
licences thereafter for new UCBs. The Reserve Bank entered
into memoranda of understanding (MoU) with all State
Governments and the Central Government for coordination
of regulatory policies and encouraged voluntary consolidation
in the sector by merger of non-viable UCBs with financially
sound and well managed UCBs. Pursuant to these policies,
the share of financially sound banks has increased from 61.3
per cent in 2005 to 80.3 per cent in 2010. As the financial
position of the sector improved considerably, UCBs were
permitted to enter into new areas of business.
Against this backdrop a Committee (Chairman: Shri Y. H.
Malegam), has been set up for studying the advisability of
granting new urban co-operative banking licences. Further,
as announced in the Second Quarter Review of Monetary
Policy 2010-11, the Committee was advised to look into the
feasibility of an umbrella organisation for the UCB sector.
The terms of references of the Committee are as under:
i) To review the role and performance of UCBs over the
last decade and especially since the adoption of Vision
document in 2005,
ii) To review the need for organisation of new UCBs in the
context of the existing legal framework for UCBs, the
thrust on financial inclusion in the economic policy and
proposed entry of new commercial banks into the
banking space,
iii) To review the extant regulatory policy on setting up of
new UCBs and lay down entry point norms for new UCBs,
iv) To examine whether licensing could be restricted only
to financially sound and well managed cooperative credit
societies through conversion route,
v) To make recommendations relating to the legal and
regulatory structure to facilitate the growth of sound
UCBs especially in the matter of raising capital consistent
with co-operative principles.
vi) To examine the feasibility of an umbrella organisation
for the UCB Sector.
vii) To examine other issues incidental to licensing of UCBs
and make appropriate recommendations.
Share linking to borrowing norm in UCBs
VI.54 UCBs which maintain a minimum capital to
risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) of 12 per cent on
a continuous basis were exempted from the
mandatory share linking norms.
Credit exposure to housing and commercial real
estate sectors
VI.55 The permitted credit exposure of UCBs to
housing, real estate and commercial real estate
sectors was revised from the earlier limit of 15 per
cent of deposits to 10 per cent of their total assets.
This limit of 10 per cent could be exceeded by an
additional limit of five per cent of total assets in
housing loans to individual up to `15 lakh.
Extension of area of operation of UCBs
VI.56 All financially sound and well managed UCBs
having minimum assessed net worth of `50 crore,
subject to meeting other norms, were permitted to
extend their area of operation beyond the State of
original registration as also to any other States of their choice. Further if such UCBs have acquired weak
banks in other States, they would be allowed to extend
their area of operation to the entire State of registration
of the target bank.
Liberalised norms for opening of branches by UCBs
VI.57 All financially sound and well managed UCBs
having required headroom capital in terms of assessed
net worth per branch including existing branches and
satisfying other criteria were allowed to open
branches/extension counters beyond the annual
ceiling of 10 per cent of existing branch network.
Use of business correspondents/ business facilitators
by UCBs
VI.58 With the objective of ensuring greater financial
inclusion and increasing the outreach of the UCBs in
providing basic and affordable banking services in
their area of operation, it was decided to consider
requests from well managed and financially sound
UCBs to engage business facilitator/business
correspondent using ICT solutions.
Collection of account payee cheques
VI.59 With a view to mitigating the difficulties faced
by the members of co-operative credit societies in
collection of account payee cheques, UCBs were
permitted to collect account payee cheques drawn
for an amount not exceeding `50,000 to the account
of their customers who are co-operative credit
societies, if the payees of such cheques are the
constituents of such co-operative credit societies.
RURAL CO-OPERATIVES
Package for revival of Rural Co-operatives
VI.60 Based on the recommendations of the Task
Force on Revival of Rural Co-operative Credit
Institutions (Chairman: Prof. A. Vaidyanathan) and in
consultation with state governments, the central
government had approved a package for revival of
rural co-operatives at the apex level. An aggregate
amount of `8,993 crore has been released by
NABARD up to June 30, 2011 towards Government
of India’s share for recapitalisation of PACS in sixteen
States while the State Governments have also
released `854 crore as their share.
Licensing of Rural Co-operative Banks
VI.61 The Annual Policy Statement of April 2009 had
announced a roadmap for licensing of unlicensed
state and central co-operative banks in a nondisruptive
manner and revised guidelines were issued
for the same in October 2009. Subsequent to the
issuance of revised guidelines, 10 StCBs and 160
DCCBs have been licensed taking the total number
of licensed StCBs and DCCBs to 24 and 235
respectively as at end-June, 2011. Efforts are being
made to ensure that the remaining unlicensed
banks meet the criteria for licensing by the stipulated
date.
Raising RRB branches to CBS platform
VI.62 The Working Group of Technology
Upgradation in Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) (Chairman: Shri G. Srinivasan) had recommended
that CBS should be fully implemented in all RRBs by
September 2011. As on date, out of total 82 RRBs,
CBS has been fully implemented in 45 RRBs while in
remaining 37 it is in progress.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CREDIT
GUARANTEE CORPORATION
VI.63 Deposit insurance constitutes an important
element in preventing any runs on the banks due to
unforeseen events. Deposit Insurance and Credit
Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Reserve Bank of India. Deposit
insurance extended by DICGC covers all commercial
banks, including Local Area Banks (LABs) and
Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) in all the States and
Union Territories (UTs). All Co-operative Banks across
the country except three UTs of Lakshadweep,
Chandigarh, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli are also
covered by deposit insurance. The number of
registered insured banks as on March 31, 2011 stood
at 2,217 comprising 82 Commercial Banks, 82 RRBs,
4 LABs and 2,049 Co-operative Banks. With the
present limit of deposit insurance in India at `1 lakh,
the number of fully protected accounts (977 million)
as on March 31, 2011 constituted 93 per cent of the
total number of accounts (1,052 million) as against
the international benchmark1 of 80 per cent. Amountwise,
insured deposits at `17,35,800 crore constituted
35 per cent of assessable deposits at `49,52,427
crore against the international benchmark1 of 20 to
40 per cent. At the current level, the insurance cover
works out to 1.63 times per capita GDP as on March
31, 2011 as against the international benchmark of
around 1 to 2 times per capita GDP prior to the
financial crisis.
VI.64 The Corporation builds up its Deposit
Insurance Fund (DIF) through transfer of its surplus,
i.e., excess of income (mainly comprising premia
received from insured banks, interest income from
investments and cash recovery out of assets of failed
banks) over expenditure each year, net of taxes. This fund is used for settlement of claims of depositors of
banks taken into liquidation/reconstruction/
amalgamation, etc. During the year 2010-11, the
Corporation settled aggregate claims for `379 crore
in respect of a commercial bank (supplementary
claim) and 73 Co-operative Banks (28 original claims
and 45 supplementary claims) as compared with
claims for around `655 crore during the previous year.
The size of the DIF stood at `24,704 crore as on March
31, 2011, yielding a Reserve Ratio (DIF/insured
deposits) of 1.4 per cent.
VI.65 An assessment team comprising
representatives of IADI and IMF visited DICGC in end-
September 2010 to undertake a field test of the Draft
Assessment Methodology for Core Principles for
Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. According to
the assessment of the team, DICGC is compliant or
largely compliant with about half of the 18 core
principles for ‘effective deposit insurance systems’.
In its “paybox” function, the DICGC is fully or largely
compliant on all core principles. However,
weaknesses in the overall insolvency framework
which are outside the control of the DICGC makes
overall compliance with many core principles limited.
The report made several recommendations such as
removing insolvent co-operative banks from the
system, obtaining deposit-specific information from
banks in a standard format, executing MoUs by
DICGC with other deposit insurers whose banks have
a presence in India, granting DICGC an access to a
“fast-track” source of funding from either RBI or
Ministry of Finance (MoF) to provide funds needed
for prompt depositor reimbursement, developing a
formal public awareness programme and establishing
a reasonable target reserve fund by DICGC. The
Working Group on Reforms in Deposit Insurance,
including Amendments to DICGC Act, would be
looking into the recommendations of the field test
team.
BANKING CODES AND STANDARDS
BOARD OF INDIA
VI.66 The membership of BCSBI has grown from
67 banks in 2006 to 112 banks in 2011 and the membership of 14 more banks is under process.
During the year, BCSBI undertook a Survey of 1,000
branches and 135 hubs of 49 member banks
(excluding RRBs and Urban Co-operative Banks),
spread over 22 cities in India, to independently verify
compliance with the provisions of the Code of Bank's
Commitment to Customers and Code of Bank's
Commitment to Micro and Small Enterprises. More
than 2,000 customers were also interviewed at the
branches to obtain their responses. In general, the
Survey findings reveal perceptible improvement in
customer service.
NON-BANKING FINANCIAL COMPANIES
VI.67 As announced in the Annual Policy 2010-11,
the regulatory framework for Core Investment
Companies (CICs) was announced (Box VI.6).
Provision of 0.25 per cent for standard assets of
NBFCs
VI.68 In the interest of counter cyclicality and also
to ensure that NBFCs create a financial buffer as a
protection from the effect of economic downturns,
provisioning for standard assets was introduced to
NBFCs at 0.25 per cent of the outstanding standard
assets.
Participation in currency futures
VI.69 NBFCs (excluding residuary non-banking
companies (RNBCs)) were allowed to participate in
the designated currency futures exchanges
recognised by SEBI as clients only for the purpose of
hedging their underlying forex exposures. NBFCs
were advised to make appropriate disclosures
regarding transactions undertaken in the balance
sheet.
Exemption for Long Term Infrastructure Finance
Bonds
VI.70 Amount raised by issue of infrastructure bonds
by Infrastructure Finance Companies, shall not be
treated as ‘public deposit’ under the ‘Non-Banking
Financial Companies Acceptance of Public Deposits
(Reserve Bank) Directions, 1998.
Box VI.6
Regulatory Framework for Core Investment Companies (CICs)
Core Investment Company (CIC) is a non-banking financial
company carrying on the business of acquisition of shares
and securities and which (a) holds not less than 90 per cent
of its net assets in the form of investment in equity shares,
preference shares, bonds, debentures, debt or loans in group
companies and (b) its investments in the equity shares in
group companies constitutes not less than 60 per cent of its
net assets as on the date of the last audited balance sheet.
CICs were not required to obtain Certificate of Registration
(CoR) from Reserve Bank under Section 45 IA of the RBI
Act 1934. In practice however, it proved very difficult to
determine whether a company has invested in the shares of
another company for the purpose of holding stake or for the
purpose of trade. It was therefore decided that investing in
shares of other companies, even for the purpose of holding
stake should also be regarded as carrying on the business
of acquisition of shares. Furthermore, in view of the peculiar
business model of CICs, viz., holding stake in group
companies and funding group concerns, CICs find it difficult
to comply with the extant net owned fund (NOF) requirements
and exposure norms for NBFCs prescribed by the Reserve
Bank. Considering these issues, a revised regulatory
framework for CICs was announced in August 2010. The
salient features of the framework are as follows:
i) Core Investment Companies (CIC) with an asset size of
less than `100 crore will be exempted from the
requirements of registration with RBI. For this purpose
all CICs belonging to a Group will be aggregated.
ii) CICs with asset size above Rs. 100 crore but not
accessing public funds are also exempted from the
requirement of registration with RBI.
iii) Due to systemic implications on account of access to
public funds (such as funds raised through Commercial
Paper, debentures, inter-corporate deposits and
borrowings from banks/FIs), CICs having asset size of 100 crore or above are categorised as Systemically
Important Core Investment Companies (CICs-ND-SI)
and are required to obtain CoR from the Reserve Bank.
iv) Every CIC-ND-SI shall ensure that at all times it
maintains a ‘minimum capital ratio’ whereby its adjusted
net worth shall not be less than 30 per cent of its
aggregate risk weighted assets and risk adjusted value
of off-balance sheet items.
v) Every CIC-ND-SI shall ensure that its outside liabilities
at all times shall not exceed 2.5 times its adjusted net
worth.
vi) A CIC-ND-SI which adheres to the requirements
regarding capital and leverage ratio as specified at (iii)
and (iv) above, may to the extent necessary, be
exempted from compliance with maintenance of statutory
minimum NOF and requirements of “Non-Banking
Financial (Non-Deposit accepting or holding) Companies
Prudential Norms (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2007”
including requirements of capital adequacy and exposure
norms.
In view of the changed regulatory framework, all CICs-NDSI,
irrespective of whether they were specifically exempted
in the past from registration with the Reserve Bank or not,
were directed to apply for obtaining the CoR. In order to
operationalise the changed policy environment in a nondisruptive
manner, companies which apply for CoR within
the stipulated time were directed to carry on the existing
business till the disposal of their application by the Reserve
Bank. However, companies which fail to apply for the CoR
within the stipulated period will be regarded as contravening
the provisions of Section 45IA of the Reserve Bank of India
Act, 1934. Companies which presently have an asset size
of less than `100 crore would be required to apply to RBI for
CoR within three months of the date of achieving a balance
sheet size of `100 crore.
Amendment to Definition of Infrastructure Loan
VI.71 NBFCs were advised to include telecom
towers also as an infrastructure facility for availing
credit facility. Further NBFCs were advised that only
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) approved by the
Reserve Bank can give the rating to Infrastructure
Finance Companies (IFCs).
NBFCs not to be Partners in Partnership firms
VI.72 In view of the risks involved in NBFCs
associating themselves with partnership firms, it was decided to prohibit NBFCs from contributing capital
to any partnership firm or to be partners in partnership
firms. In cases of existing partnerships, NBFCs were
advised that they may seek early retirement from the
partnership firms.
Loan facilities to the physically / visually challenged
VI.73 NBFCs were advised that there should be no
discrimination in extending financial products and
facilities including loan facilities to the physically/
visually challenged applicants on grounds of disability and all possible assistance may be provided to such
customers.
Applicability of exemption from concentration norms
VI.74 Under the extant instructions, any NBFC-NDSI
not accessing public funds, either directly or
indirectly, may make an application to the Reserve
Bank for modifications in the prescribed ceilings with
regard to concentration of credit/investment norms.
NBFCs-ND-SI may also be issuing guarantees
and devolvement of these guarantees might
require access to public funds. Accordingly, any
NBFC-ND-SI not accessing public funds, either
directly or indirectly, or not issuing guarantees may
approach Reserve Bank of India for appropriate
dispensation.
Enhancing CRAR to fifteen per cent
VI.75 It was decided to align the minimum capital
ratio of all deposit taking NBFCs as well as NBFCs-
ND-SI to 15 per cent. Accordingly, all deposit taking
NBFCs were advised to raise the minimum capital
ratio consisting of Tier I and Tier II capital, which shall
not be less than 15 per cent of its aggregate risk
weighted assets on balance sheet and risk adjusted
value of off-balance sheet item with effect from March
31, 2012.
Review of guidelines on entry of NBFCs into
insurance business
VI.76 As per extant instructions, NBFCs registered
with the Reserve Bank and satisfying the eligibility
criteria will be permitted to set up a joint venture (JV)
company for undertaking insurance business with risk
participation. The maximum equity contribution an
NBFC can hold in a JV company is 50 per cent of its
paid-up capital. In case more than one company
(irrespective of doing financial activity or not) in the
same group of NBFC wishes to take a stake in the
insurance company, the contribution by all companies
in the same group shall be counted for the limit of 50
per cent prescribed for the NBFCs in an insurance JV.
Opening of branch/subsidiary/ joint venture/
representative office or undertaking investment
abroad by NBFCs.
VI.77 Presently, an Indian party requires prior
approval of the concerned regulatory authorities both
in India and abroad, to make an investment in an entity
outside India engaged in financial services activities.
No-objection certificate will be issued by Reserve
Bank to the NBFC before opening of subsidiary/joint
venture/representative office or undertaking investment
abroad subject to the NBFC fulfilling the conditions
specified by Reserve Bank on June 14, 2011.
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