Even as state governments stay on course for fiscal consolidation they face several challenges during 2013-14.
A positive development is the central government’s decision to restructure centrally sponsored schemes (CSS),
which is expected to provide flexibility to the states in designing and implementing these schemes. At the same
time, a revision in the mechanism of transfer of funds to the states, i.e., routing all transfers through state
government budgets will increase the accountability of states. The public distribution system under the recently
enacted National Food Security Act 2013 may have favourable implications for the states in terms of state-level
subsidies, even as it requires preparedness by way of creating storage facilities and identifying beneficiaries within
the specified time frame and putting in place an institutional set up for implementation and monitoring of PDS
under the Act. While the overall debt position of the states is sustainable, narrowing of the growth-interest rate
differential could exert pressure on the debt of certain states in the medium-term. Further, states’ contingent,
off-budget and unfunded liabilities could pose a risk to their fiscal and debt sustainability. In this context, the
implementation of the financial restructuring plan (FRP) for state-owned power distribution companies (discoms)
will have implications on the finances of participating states in terms of higher expenditure and additional debt
and contingent liabilities in the short to medium-term. However, in case the restructuring plan, as envisaged,
brings about a turnaround in the viability of the discoms its overall impact on state finances in the long-term
will be positive. Cooperation between the central and state governments through mutual confidence building
measures is crucial for facilitating the process of introducing the goods and services tax (GST), a long pending
tax reform which could increase revenue mobilization in the medium-term by increasing the tax base, reducing
tax evasions and bringing in transparency and efficiency in the tax collection mechanism.
1. Introduction
2.1 State budgets for 2013-14 indicate a further
move towards fiscal consolidation, which is in line
with the fiscal roadmap laid down by the Thirteenth
Finance Commission (FC-XIII). The central
government’s recently announced policy initiatives,
like restructuring of the centrally sponsored
schemes (CSS), financial restructuring plan of the
state-owned power distribution companies and the
National Food Security Act 2013 are important
from the point of view of their impact on state
finances. In addition, the introduction of the goods
and services tax (GST), which is still being
debated, will have a significant bearing on the
resource raising potential of the state governments,
besides being an important tax reform measure
for improving tax efficiency and reducing the costcascading
prevalent in the present indirect tax regime, thereby contributing to higher growth. The
financing of gross fiscal deficit (GFD) at the state
level has exhibited a compositional shift, with the
contribution from the National Small Savings Fund
(NSSF) losing its significance as a source of
finance in the recent period. On the issue of debt
sustainability, although the states have fared
reasonably well, this process was aided by a
favourable macroeconomic environment,
enactment of fiscal responsibility legislations by
the states and implementation of debt and interest
relief measures by the centre. However, going
forward, narrowing of the growth-interest rate
differential and increases in contingent, off-budget
and unfunded liabilities could pose risks to debt
sustainability of some states. This chapter
examines and provides an assessment of the
above issues.
2. Central Assistance to State Plans:
Compositional shift towards plan programme
linked assistance in alignment with central
government objectives
2.2 States are primarily responsible for major
sectors such as health, education and employment
which often involve large public expenditures.
Recognising the higher resource requirements of
the states relative to their resource-raising
capacity, the Constitution mandates statutory
transfers of tax and grants from the central
government to the state governments in accordance
with the Finance Commission awards. In addition,
states also have access to central assistance to
state plans and central plan funds through CSS.
Central assistance to state plans has three
components, viz., normal central assistance
(NCA), additional central assistance for externally
aided projects (ACA for EAP) and assistance for
programmes based on specific criteria and
guidelines. Assistance to the states under state
plans is released as per the scheme of financing approved by the Planning Commission. Normal
central assistance is the only ‘untied’ part of plan
assistance, while ACA for EAP and programme
linked assistance are both tied.
2.3 The NCA’s share in total central assistance
for all states increased during 2002-03 to 2006-07
before declining gradually thereafter to 20.6 per
cent in 2012-13 (41.4 per cent in 2006-07). So,
nearly four-fifths (80 per cent) of all the central
assistance to states was in the form of ‘tied’
assistance in 2012-13 as against around 65 per
cent during 2002-03. Among all three components
of plan assistance to the states, the share of special
plan assistance was the highest at around 75 per
cent in 2012-13 while that of ACA for EAPs was
only around 5 per cent (Table II.1). From 2007-08
onwards, the centre has not been extending loans
to the states under the state plans but the grants
portion of the assistance has been significantly
enhanced in pursuance of the recommendations
of the Twelfth Finance Commission (FC-XII). Each
state raises market borrowings for the loan portion of the state plan schemes subject to its
borrowing caps for the year. Based on FC-XII’s
recommendation, transfer of external assistance
to non-special category states (as state
governments cannot access external sources of
finance directly) is being made on a ‘back-to-back’
basis from April 1, 20051. Special category states
continue to get external assistance from the centre
at the earlier loan-grant ratio of 10:90.
Table II.1: Central Plan Assistance to Non-special and Special Category States |
(Share in Per cent) |
Year |
Normal Central Assistance |
ACA for EAPs |
Special and Other Programmes |
NSC States |
SC States |
Total |
NSC States |
SC States |
Total |
NSC States |
SC States |
Total |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
2002-03 |
29.1 |
60.0 |
35.0 |
43.3 |
5.9 |
36.1 |
27.6 |
34.1 |
28.8 |
2003-04 |
30.5 |
54.9 |
35.6 |
40.5 |
4.9 |
33.0 |
29.1 |
40.3 |
31.4 |
2004-05 |
31.9 |
53.5 |
36.5 |
32.4 |
6.2 |
26.8 |
35.7 |
40.4 |
36.7 |
2005-06 |
35.5 |
56.1 |
40.1 |
29.9 |
7.4 |
24.9 |
34.6 |
36.5 |
35.0 |
2006-07 |
37.2 |
56.5 |
41.4 |
23.0 |
8.5 |
19.8 |
39.8 |
35.1 |
38.8 |
2007-08 |
20.5 |
51.3 |
31.1 |
11.1 |
13.0 |
11.7 |
68.5 |
35.7 |
57.2 |
2008-09 |
16.6 |
46.7 |
26.1 |
7.0 |
11.6 |
8.5 |
76.4 |
41.7 |
65.4 |
2009-10 |
16.0 |
38.6 |
23.9 |
5.6 |
9.2 |
6.8 |
78.5 |
52.3 |
69.2 |
2010-11 |
15.8 |
39.2 |
23.8 |
3.8 |
9.5 |
5.7 |
80.5 |
51.3 |
70.4 |
2011-12 |
15.3 |
36.1 |
22.6 |
2.1 |
9.2 |
4.6 |
82.7 |
54.7 |
72.8 |
2012-13 |
14.4 |
31.1 |
20.6 |
1.8 |
9.1 |
4.5 |
83.8 |
59.8 |
74.8 |
2013-14 |
16.1 |
32.0 |
22.4 |
2.1 |
10.2 |
5.3 |
81.8 |
57.8 |
72.4 |
NSC: Non-special category. SC: Special category. ACA: Additional Central Assistance. EAP: Externally Aided Project.
Note: 1. Data compiled from statement ‘detailed break-up of central assistance under State Plans to the states for years 2002-03 to 2013-14’
appearing under financial resources section of State Plans.
2. Data from 2007-08 onwards includes assistance in form of grants only to States.
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India. |
3. Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Restructuring
would provide greater flexibility to the states
but would also entail greater responsibility
2.4 Over the years, the central government has
introduced several CSS in areas of national priority
such as health, education, agriculture, skill
development, employment, urban development
and rural infrastructure. While the primary
responsibility for developing several of these
sectors vests with the state governments, the
central government extends support to state
governments through CSS which cover education
and health, among others. The CSS are
operationalised by the central ministries based on
scheme-specific guidelines and are largely funded
by the central government2, with state governments
having to make a defined contribution. These
schemes are implemented by state governments
or their designated agencies. Notwithstanding a
decline in the number of such schemes in recent
years, the share of CSS in the gross budgetary
support (GBS) has gone up progressively in the
last few plans, particularly in the Eleventh Plan
(Table II.2) while the significance of normal central
plan assistance in GBS has declined in relative
terms.
Table II.2: Plan Assistance to States/
UTs through CSS |
Plan |
Gross
Budgetary
Support
(GBS)
(` billion) |
No. of
Schemes |
CSS
(` billion) |
Share of
CSS in
GBS
(Per cent) |
Ninth Plan* (1997-2002) |
3,163 |
360 |
990 |
31.3 |
Tenth Plan* (2002-07) |
5,946 |
155 |
2,298 |
38.6 |
Eleventh Plan* (2007-12) |
11,313 |
147 |
4,274 |
37.8 |
* At Constant Prices.
Source: Report of the Committee on Restructuring of Centrally
Sponsored Schemes and Planning Commission,
Government of India |
2.5 Some of the issues raised by the states in
the past relating to the operation of CSS include:
(i) inability of some states to provide counterpart
funds to access the funds under CSS; (ii) lack of
flexibility in implementing CSS, and the resultant
need to provide for flexibility in norms (both in
physical and financial terms) taking into account
state specific requirements and to ensure effective
convergence between schemes run by the states
and CSS in the same sector; (iii) thin spread of
resources due to proliferation in the number of
schemes; (iv) lack of transparency in guidelines
relating to transfer/release of funds under the
schemes; and (v) difficulty in effective monitoring
of final use of funds under CSS, particularly in the
case of funds released directly to various societies.
2.6 The Committee on Restructuring of
Centrally Sponsored Schemes (Chairman:
Shri B.K. Chaturvedi), which was set up by the
Planning Commission in April 2011, looked into
the working of CSS with a view to enhancing their flexibility, scale and efficiency. In its Report
submitted in September 2011, the Committee
recommended that the total number of CSS be
reduced to 59 so as to increase the efficiency of
these schemes towards serving the desired
objectives. It categorised the proposed restructured
schemes into nine flagship programmes, 38 subsectoral
schemes and 13 umbrella schemes.3 The
National Development Council (NDC), while
approving the Twelfth plan in its meeting in
December 2012, had also recommended building
flexibility in the schemes to suit the requirements
of the state governments.
2.7 In line with the recommendations of the
Chaturvedi Committee and the NDC, the Union
Cabinet decided in June 2013 to restructure the
existing CSS/Additional Central Assistance (ACA)
schemes in the Twelfth Five Year Plan into 66
schemes (Table II.3). This includes 17 flagship
programmes with significant outlays for major
interventions required in health, education,
irrigation, urban development, infrastructure
(including rural infrastructure) and skill development.
To meet the states’ requirements, the Cabinet also
approved that a scheme may have state specific
guidelines which may be recommended by an
Inter-Ministerial Committee constituted for this
purpose.
2.8 Under the existing arrangements, transfer
of funds under the CSS to state governments takes
place through (i) the state budgets and (ii) direct
transfer to district rural development agencies
(DRDA) and independent societies under the
control of state governments. A substantial
proportion of the assistance (over 70 per cent) is disbursed to the DRDA and implementing agencies,
bypassing the state budgets. While the agency
route reduces the time delay in the agencies
receiving the funds, it also dilutes the responsibility
of the states in ensuring proper utilisation of the
funds as these are not transferred through the state
budgets. Under the restructured scheme, the entire
financial assistance to the states for CSS will be
routed through their consolidated funds from the
fiscal year 2014-15 and not directly to DRDAs or
through other independent agencies, as is done at
present.
Table II.3: Number of Centrally
Sponsored Schemes |
S.
No. |
Ministry / Department |
Existing
CSSs in
2013-14 |
Proposed
by the
Chaturvedi
Committee |
Union
Cabinet's
Decision |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
1 |
Agriculture & Cooperation |
13 |
6 |
6 |
2 |
Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries |
17 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Commerce |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
Aids Control |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
Drinking and Water Supply |
2 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
Environment and Forests |
5 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
Food Processing Industries |
1 |
- |
1 |
8 |
Health and Family Welfare |
13 |
5 |
2 |
9 |
Industrial Policy and Promotion |
2 |
1 |
- |
10 |
AYUSH |
3 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
Home Affairs |
6 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
School Education and Literacy |
16 |
6 |
6 |
13 |
Higher Education |
2 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
Information Technology/ Finance |
- |
- |
1 |
15 |
Labour and Employment |
2 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
Law and Justice |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
Minority Affairs |
4 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
Panchayati Raj |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
Planning Commission / Finance |
- |
- |
1 |
20 |
Land Resources |
2 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
Road Transport and Highways |
1 |
1 |
- |
22 |
Rural Development |
6 |
4 |
5 |
23 |
Sports |
1 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
Statistics and Programme Implementation |
2 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
Disability Affairs |
3 |
- |
1 |
26 |
Social Justice and Empowerment |
10 |
5 |
4 |
27 |
Textiles |
3 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
Tourism |
1 |
- |
1 |
29 |
Tribal Affairs |
5 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
Urban Development |
- |
- |
- |
31 |
Urban Development / Finance |
2 |
- |
1 |
32 |
Women and Child Development |
7 |
3 |
4 |
33 |
Water Resources / Finance |
- |
- |
1 |
34 |
Youth Affairs |
1 |
- |
1 |
35 |
Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation |
2 |
2 |
2 |
36 |
Culture |
1 |
- |
- |
|
Total |
137 |
59 |
66 |
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India. |
2.9 The states will, therefore, be in a better
position to monitor the funds flow under the CSS.
It will also enable the states to effect convergence
of schemes run by the state governments and the
central government. At the same time, this will
require the state governments to put in place an
effective fund transfer mechanism to ensure that
funds to the lowest utilising organisational level,
i.e., the panchayats, reach with minimum delay.
2.10 Further, to bring in the desired flexibility,
the Cabinet has approved that 10 per cent of the
total outlay of the schemes be kept as flexifunds4.
The guidelines for flexi-funds were issued
by the central government on January 6, 2014. For
each new CSS/ACA/flagship scheme, at least 25
per cent of funds would have to be contributed by
the non-special category states and 10 per cent of
funds, by the special category states. As the
budgetary provision for 2013-14 has already been
made, these arrangements will come into force
from 2014-15 for the remaining years of the Twelfth
Five-Year Plan and will help in optimum utilisation
of resources for desired results. The restructured
CSS would help to address the need for state
specific flexibility in designing the schemes/ programmes. The states would have to take
advantage of the same and ensure that the
schemes meet the objectives they set out to
achieve.
4. Surplus Cash Balances of the state
governments: Need for better cash management
2.11 State governments have been accumulating
large cash balances since 2004-05. The
accumulation is on account of: (i) surpluses in the
revenue account of some states; (ii) borrowing in
excess of their requirements; (iii) funds earmarked
for meeting certain expenditures, which will be
utilised as and when the identified expenditures
get crystallised; (iv) funds transferred to lower
parastatals/agencies/schemes but not yet utilised
by them and (v) unanticipated funds transfer from
the centre.
2.12 Build-up of large surplus cash balances
increases the interest cost for the state governments,
particularly if it is built from borrowed resources.
While the investment of surplus balances of the
states in centre’s treasury bills meets its fiscal
requirements, it also complicates its cash
management due to the uncertainty about the
durability of such flows. As maintenance of large
cash balances amounts to draining of liquidity from
the system, it could, at times, come in conflict with
the liquidity management objective of the Reserve
Bank.
2.13 The average investment by the states in
treasury bills has been on an uptrend except in
2009-10, in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis and the pay commission awards. In
general, states have been accumulating large
surplus cash balances towards the final quarter
of the year to meet year-end expenditure
requirements (Chart II.1).
2.14 As the GFD-GSDP ratio is capped at 3.0
per cent from 2014-15 under the states’ FRBM
Acts, it is essential that states adopt a need-based
approach to their market borrowings. The FC-XIII
had highlighted that while states required some
cushion for smoothening expenditure at the
implementation level, the accumulation of cash
beyond a level reflected inefficiency, leading to
avoidable interest burden. Since the return on the
central government treasury bills in which states
invest their surplus cash balances is lower than
the coupon rate on their market borrowings through
dated securities, states may consider using their
surplus cash balances to finance their GFD rather
than resorting to fresh borrowings, in line with the
suggestion made by FC-XIII. Cash surplus may
also be used for pre-paying old high cost debt as
some states have done in the past.
2.15 The recent increase in ways and means
advances (WMA) limits by 50 per cent of the
existing limits by the Reserve Bank would enable
states to maintain lower cash balances as it
provides a cushion for meeting unforeseen
expenditure, without the states having to maintain
large cash balances for precautionary purposes.
States can reduce the negative carry on interest
rates by increasing their investment in auction
treasury bills (ATBs) rather than in intermediate
treasury bills (ITBs) that carry a lower interest rate.
It is noteworthy that the investment in ATBs more
than doubled in recent years, although only a few
states have exercised this option. However, states
should adopt prudent cash management and
refrain from short-term borrowings from the
Reserve Bank while maintaining their investment
in ATBs.
5. National Small Savings Fund: Negative
contribution to financing of states’ GFD in
recent years
2.16 Investments made by the NSSF in special
state government securities (SSGS) out of the net
proceeds collected under various small savings
schemes5, was the predominant source of GFD
financing for the state governments during 1999-
2000 to 2006-07. However, its contribution to GFD
financing has been declining over the years and
has turned negative since 2011-12, with the
redemption of SSGS issued to NSSF far exceeding
fresh investments. The share of NSSF investments
in GFD financing declined from a high of 81.9 per
cent in 2005-06 to -4.8 per cent and -3.5 per cent,
respectively in 2011-12 and 2012-13 (RE). In
contrast, the share of market borrowings in GFD
financing increased sharply from 17.0 per cent in 2005-06 to 80.4 per cent in 2011-12 before falling
to 72.1 per cent in 2012-13 (RE).
2.17 The declining role of NSSF’s contribution
to GFD financing can be attributed to three factors:
(i) volatility in net collections under small savings
schemes; (ii) revisions in norms relating to sharing
of net collections between the centre and the
states; and (iii) redemption of SSGS during the
year.
2.18 Collections under small savings, which
were substantial till 2005-06, have been declining
in recent years due to higher returns on alternate
instruments of savings. In fact, during 2007-08 and
2008-09, when market interest rates ruled higher
than small savings rates, which had remained
unchanged since March 2003, subscriptions to
small savings instruments declined and flows from
NSSF dried up, necessitating additional market
borrowings by state governments. Although
NSSF’s investment in SSGS increased in 2009-10
and 2010-11 due to buoyant small savings
collections, it slumped again in 2011-12. Seven
states did not receive any fresh investment from
NSSF in 2011-12 as their net collections had
turned negative. Since December 2011, interest
rates on small savings instruments have been
made more market-aligned, based on the
recommendation of the Committee on
Comprehensive Review of the National Small
Savings Fund (Chairman: Smt. Shyamala
Gopinath), but as they are revised at annual
intervals, they cannot respond to market signals
as quickly as other instruments of savings.
2.19 The volatility in NSSF’s contribution to GFD
financing is also linked to the revisions in norms
relating to sharing of net collections between centre
and states during 1999-2000 to 2012-13.6 From
2012-13 onwards, state governments have been
given the option of availing either the entire net
small savings collections within the state or only
50 per cent of the net collections. In 2012-13 and
2013-14(BE), 16 out of the 28 states opted for a
50 per cent share of net small savings collections.
States which opted for a 100 per cent share include
those with large small savings collections, such as
Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh; those
which are fiscally constrained like West Bengal7
and Kerala and all the special category states in
the north-east, barring Mizoram. Uncertainty
surrounding NSSF collections in recent years may
have played a role in their decision to avail 100 per
cent of the net small savings collections.
2.20 NSSF’s contribution to GFD financing of
states also depends on the magnitude and
investment pattern of redemption proceeds of
SSGS. Up to 2011-12, the redemption proceeds
were re-invested primarily in special central
government securities8. The decline in fresh
investment by NSSF in SSGS due to the two factors
mentioned earlier coupled with increasing
redemption of SSGS over the years led to negative
contribution of NSSF to the GFD financing of
several states in 2011-12. Apart from Bihar,
Chhattisgarh and Uttar Pradesh all the other nonspecial
category states had an outflow under
SSGS issued to NSSF in 2011-12. Although the policy decision to reinvest 50 per cent of the
redemption proceeds in SSGS in 2012-13 enabled
all the states to receive some funds from NSSF
during the year, NSSF’s contribution in financing
the consolidated GFD of the states continued to
be negative, as investments in SSGS were lower
than redemption requirements.
2.21 With the envisaged reduction in the tenor
of SSGS to 10 years from 25 years, the advantage
of elongated maturity in comparison to market
borrowings would no longer be available. With
regard to the interest rates, although interest rate
on SSGS was significantly above the weighted
average interest rate on market borrowings, the
gap between the two has been narrowing in recent
years (Chart II.2). The states will, therefore, have
to weigh the relative merits of NSSF financing and
market borrowings and exercise the option on the
proportion of net small savings collections that they
would like to avail, taking into account the amounts they would be receiving through reinvestment of
redemption proceeds. As intermittent flows from
the NSSF could distort the states’ cash
management, greater clarity in the procedure and
periodicity of the transfer/release of funds from the
NSSF could remove the uncertainty in the flows
and enable the states to undertake active cash
management.
6. Public Distribution System: Reduction in
central issue prices under the National Food
Security Act 2013 could help in reducing state
level food subsidies
2.22 Under the recently enacted National Food
Security (NFS) Act 2013,9 state governments have
the responsibility of implementing and monitoring
central as well as state schemes for ensuring food
security for the targeted beneficiaries. The impact
of the Act on the public distribution system is
examined from the perspective of (i) state level
food subsidy expenditure (ii) expansion of storage
capacity and (iii) identification of beneficiaries.
Table II.4: Central Issue Price |
(` per kilogram) |
Foodgrains |
Under Existing TPDS |
Under NFS |
AAY |
BPL |
APL |
AAY and
priority
beneficiaries |
Rice |
3.00 |
5.65 |
7.9
5 and 8.30 |
3.00 |
|
(25.9) |
(43.3) |
(30.8) |
|
Wheat |
2.00 |
4.15 |
6.10 |
2.00 |
|
(20.5) |
(22.9) |
(56.6) |
|
Note: Figures in parentheses are the percentage shares of the
respective categories in the total allocations of rice and
wheat for 2013-14.
Source: Foodgrains Bulletin, Ministry of Food and Consumer
Affairs. |
Impact of NFS Act on State Level Food Subsidies
2.23 Under the existing targeted public
distribution system (TPDS), the central government
allocates foodgrains to states at the central issue
price (CIP) fixed by it for the three categories of
TPDS beneficiaries: below poverty line (BPL),
Antyodaya Anna Yojna10 (AAY) and above poverty
line (APL) (Table II.4). While the centre provides
35 kg of foodgrains each for BPL and AAY families,
APL families are provided foodgrains depending
on the availability. The states have the flexibility of
fixing the retail issue prices for distributing
foodgrains under TPDS, except with respect to
AAY, where the end retail price is to be retained at
the CIP for that category. In effect, the states have
to bear the margins for wholesalers/retailers,
transportation charges, levies and local taxes in
respect of AAY families but have the flexibility to
pass these on to BPL and APL families.
2.24 However, some states have gone beyond
the provisions made under the existing TPDS by
including other items like edible and cooking oils,
sugar, pulses and milk and extending the coverage
to other segments of the population. For instance,
Tamil Nadu and the union territory of Puducherry
have a universal system since June 2011 under
which 20 kg of rice is distributed free of cost to all
families covered under PDS. The governments of
these state/UTs also distribute pulses and
pamolein oil at subsidised rates. In Andhra Pradesh
and Chhattisgarh, the existing public distribution
systems are near universal. Chhattisgarh enacted
its own Food Security Act in January 2013 which
entails antyodaya and priority households to highly
subsidised foodgrains, iodised salt, black gram and pulses. BPL category consumers in 13 states/UTs
get rice at prices lower than the CIP11 (including
two states/UTs where rice is provided free of cost)
and seven states offer wheat at prices lower than
CIP for this category. Furthermore, AAY category
consumers get rice in 17 states and wheat in one
state at prices lower than the respective CIPs fixed
for this category12.
2.25 Under the provisions of the NFS Act 2013,
the distinction between BPL, AAY and APL families
is no longer relevant from the point of view of fixing
the CIP. Instead, 813 million people (about two-thirds
of the country’s population as per the 2011
census) will be entitled to 5 kg of foodgrains per
month at the prices currently applicable to AAY
families, i.e., at `3, `2, `1 per kg for rice, wheat
and coarse grains for a period of three years from
the date of commencement of the Act. Thereafter,
the issue price would be fixed by the central
government, from time to time, not exceeding
(i) the minimum support price for wheat and coarse
grains; and (ii) the derived minimum support price
for rice, as the case may be. AAY families would
continue to get 35 kg of foodgrains. In case the
allocation for any state under the NFS Act is lower
than their current allocation, it will be protected up
to the level of average off-take during last three
years, with the CIP for the additional allocation
being fixed at levels currently applicable for APL
households (viz., `6.10 per kg for wheat and `8.30
per kg for rice).
2.26 For those states which are offering
foodgrains at prices lower than the CIP to
beneficiaries under the existing TPDS, the
reduction in the CIP under NFS Act would result
in narrowing down the difference between the retail price fixed by the states and the CIP, thereby
reducing the subsidy that these states would have
to incur. This is, however, subject to no further
expansion in the coverage of beneficiaries and/or
commodities covered under the existing PDS of
the states. As the NFS Act requires the central
government to share the costs associated with
transportation/handling/dealer margin, the states
which were hitherto bearing these costs will stand
to benefit. However, for the states which have been
passing on these costs to BPL consumers in terms
of higher retail prices under the existing TPDS, the
financial implication will depend on the extent of
cost-sharing by the centre.
Expansion of Storage Capacity
2.27 In order to meet storage requirements
under the NFS Act, governments, both at the centre
as well as in the states, have been allocating funds
for constructing high-capacity godowns across the
country in the last one year through government
schemes as well as through public-private
partnerships (PPPs), besides modernising the
storage facilities by building state-of-the-art silos
for maintaining global standards in storage and
distribution. Although the total available storage at
74.6 million tonnes is well above the current
requirement of around 61.5 million tonnes under
NFS Act, there are wide inter-state differences.
States which have made large budgetary allocations
for capital expenditure on food and warehousing
in 2013-14 include Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Tripura, Maharashtra
and West Bengal.
Identification of beneficiaries
2.28 Corresponding to the coverage of 75 per
cent rural and 50 per cent urban population at all-
India level, state/UT-wise coverage has been
determined by the central government. The work
of identifying eligible households has been left to the states/UTs, which may frame their own criteria
or use social, economic and caste census data, if
they so desire. The states/UTs have been given a
period of 365 days, after the commencement of
the Act, to complete the beneficiary identification
process. So far, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan and NCT
Delhi have been allocated foodgrains under the
NFS Act based on the number of beneficiaries
reported to have been identified by the respective
state governments.
2.29 Implementation of institutional reform
measures, such as end-to-end computerisation of
public distribution system and leveraging of
aadhaar for unique identification of entitled
beneficiaries, would help to prevent diversion of
foodgrains and improve targeting of benefits under
the NFS Act in the medium-term.
7. Debt Sustainability: Overall debt position of
the states is sustainable although the narrowing
of growth-interest rate differential could exert
pressure in the medium term
2.30 The debt position of state governments in
India, which deteriorated sharply during the first
half of 2000s, has witnessed significant improvement
since 2005-06 (Table II.5). This has been attributed,
among others, to the implementation of fiscal rules
through the enactment of fiscal responsibility
legislations at the state level. The fiscal consolidation
initiatives of state governments were complemented
by debt and interest relief measures by the centre,
and were supported by a favourable macroeconomic
environment following the high growth
phase and a reversal of the interest rate cycle in
the mid-2000s. At the end of March 2013, while all
the non-special category states were able to
adhere to the debt target recommended by FC-XIII,
the debt-GSDP ratio for Kerala, Punjab, Uttar
Pradesh and West Bengal exceeded 30 per cent.
Table II.5: Debt/ GSDP Ratio of Indian States (Average) |
(Per cent) |
States |
1995-96 to 1999-2000 |
2000-01 to 2004-05 |
2005-06 to 2009-10 |
2010-11 to 2013-14* |
End-March 2013 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
Andhra Pradesh |
22.3 |
30.8 |
28.3 |
23.1 |
22.7 |
Bihar |
57.0 |
54.8 |
45.8 |
26.7 |
24.8 |
Chhattisgarh |
- |
25.6 |
19.2 |
13.6 |
12.5 |
Goa |
33.7 |
39.4 |
32.4 |
27.8 |
27.6 |
Gujarat |
21.8 |
35.5 |
31.0 |
24.6 |
23.5 |
Haryana |
21.0 |
26.1 |
20.8 |
18.3 |
18.6 |
Jharkhand |
- |
22.2 |
27.2 |
21.4 |
21.1 |
Karnataka |
18.4 |
26.2 |
23.9 |
21.8 |
20.6 |
Kerala |
21.1 |
33.3 |
33.6 |
29.8 |
29.4 |
Madhya Pradesh |
33.8 |
36.0 |
34.2 |
25.7 |
23.9 |
Maharashtra |
17.9 |
27.7 |
25.9 |
20.4 |
19.7 |
Odisha |
37.3 |
52.6 |
36.2 |
20.8 |
18.5 |
Punjab |
34.7 |
46.1 |
38.7 |
32.6 |
31.7 |
Rajasthan |
28.3 |
44.2 |
39.8 |
25.9 |
24.3 |
Tamil Nadu |
17.5 |
25.0 |
22.1 |
19.9 |
20.2 |
Uttar Pradesh |
35.7 |
48.9 |
46.4 |
35.3 |
33.7 |
West Bengal |
26.0 |
44.3 |
46.1 |
38.6 |
37.5 |
NSC States |
24.5 |
35.6 |
32.2 |
25.3 |
24.4 |
SC States |
29.2 |
43.0 |
43.3 |
34.4 |
33.2 |
All States |
21.8 |
30.1 |
27.6 |
22.2 |
21.7 |
NSC = Non-special category states; SC = Special category states
*: 2012-13 relates to revised estimates & 2013-14 relates to budget estimates.
–: Nil/ Not Available
Note: 1. Data for ‘All states’ are expressed as per cent to GDP
2. Data for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh for the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000 pertain to the former undivided states |
2.31 Traditionally, indicator analysis has been
used to assess debt sustainability. The assessment
is generally done in terms of credit worthiness
indicators (nominal debt stock/own current revenue
ratio; present value of debt service/own current
revenue ratio) and liquidity indicators (debt service/
current revenue ratio and interest payment/current
revenue ratio). These indicators broadly enable an
assessment of the ability of a state government to
service its interest payments and repay its debts
as and when they become due through current and
regular sources of revenues. In pioneering work
done on debt sustainability, based on post-Second
World War US data, Domar (1944) pointed out that
the primary deficit path can be sustained as long
as real growth of the economy remains higher than
the real interest rates.
2.32 An analysis of debt sustainability at the
state level, based on various indicators, has been
undertaken for the period 1995-96 to 2013-14
(Table II.6). While the rate of growth of debt of state
governments at the aggregate and disaggregated
levels during 1995-96 to 2004-05 exceeded the
nominal GSDP growth rate, there was a significant
improvement thereafter, with the difference
between the rate of growth of debt and the growth
rate of nominal GSDP turning negative during
2005-06 to 2013-14. Similarly, moderation in the
effective interest rate coupled with higher growth
of nominal GSDP during 2005-06 to 2009-10 and
in the subsequent period contributed to an
improvement in debt sustainability indicators (Kaur
et. al., 2013).
Table II.6: Debt Sustainability Indicators |
States |
Rate of growth of public debt (k) should be lower
than growth rate of nominal GSDP (g) : k-g<0 |
Rate of growth of GSDP (g) should be higher than
effective interest rate (i) : g-i>0 |
1995-96 to
1999-00 |
2000-01 to
2004-05 |
2005-06 to
2009-10 |
2010-11 to
2013-14* |
1995-96 to
1999-00 |
2000-01 to
2004-05 |
2005-06 to
2009-10 |
2010-11 to
2013-14* |
1 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
Non-Special Category |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Andhra Pradesh |
5.3 |
6.2 |
-5.9 |
-3.8 |
2.1 |
-1.0 |
7.8 |
8.0 |
Bihar |
3.6 |
-2.2 |
-9.7 |
-13.4 |
2.3 |
-0.5 |
9.0 |
14.2 |
Chhattisgarh |
- |
3.2 |
-10.0 |
-6.3 |
- |
2.1 |
8.3 |
10.0 |
Goa |
-2.5 |
-0.2 |
-4.3 |
-0.6 |
10.6 |
4.3 |
10.0 |
4.1 |
Gujarat |
10.1 |
4.3 |
-4.6 |
-4.8 |
0.7 |
1.7 |
8.1 |
9.7 |
Haryana |
9.3 |
-0.1 |
-7.8 |
-1.7 |
1.3 |
2.1 |
10.3 |
7.7 |
Jharkhand |
- |
1.2 |
4.5 |
-1.0 |
- |
1.0 |
3.3 |
6.0 |
Karnataka |
1.5 |
6.4 |
-1.1 |
-4.8 |
3.5 |
-0.6 |
7.1 |
9.4 |
Kerala |
4.7 |
8.4 |
-2.7 |
0.9 |
2.6 |
-3.6 |
5.9 |
3.5 |
Madhya Pradesh |
3.4 |
2.3 |
-6.3 |
-6.6 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
7.4 |
9.4 |
Maharashtra |
8.4 |
6.8 |
-5.5 |
-6.5 |
3.6 |
0.3 |
8.3 |
10.5 |
Odisha |
6.2 |
1.4 |
-11.8 |
-13.1 |
2.1 |
0.6 |
8.4 |
9.5 |
Punjab |
4.2 |
4.6 |
-7.7 |
-3.4 |
0.2 |
-1.9 |
7.0 |
6.1 |
Rajasthan |
8.1 |
5.9 |
-6.9 |
-13.5 |
2.5 |
-2.6 |
7.5 |
13.8 |
Tamil Nadu |
4.0 |
5.0 |
-4.2 |
-0.9 |
2.6 |
-1.5 |
8.7 |
6.9 |
Uttar Pradesh |
5.9 |
4.6 |
-6.3 |
-4.5 |
1.8 |
-1.9 |
8.5 |
7.3 |
West Bengal |
8.6 |
8.2 |
-1.3 |
-7.0 |
3.9 |
-2.4 |
4.6 |
8.3 |
NSC states |
6.0 |
5.3 |
-5.4 |
-5.6 |
2.4 |
-0.9 |
7.7 |
8.8 |
SC States |
3.4 |
9.3 |
-4.6 |
-6.6 |
1.8 |
-0.7 |
6.8 |
7.8 |
All states |
4.8 |
4.7 |
-4.6 |
-5.2 |
3.5 |
0.0 |
6.9 |
8.2 |
NSC = Non-special category states; SC = Special category states
*: 2012-13 relates to revised estimates & 2013-14 relates to budget estimates.
-: Nil/ Not Available
Note: 1. Indicators for ‘All states’ are in terms of GDP
2. Data for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh for the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000 pertain to the former undivided states |
2.33 A steady decline in the debt service burden
of Indian states is also evident, as different debt
service indicators, viz., interest payments to
revenue receipts, interest payments to GSDP and
interest payments to revenue expenditure, declined
during 2005-06 to 2013-14 (Table II.7). Interest
payments, which had crossed one-fifth of revenue
receipts (considered as a tolerable ratio of interest
burden; Dholakia et. al. 2004) during the first half of 2000s, declined to around 12 per cent in the
recent period. The improvement in debt servicing
conditions in India since the second half of 2000s
is, however, to a large extent policy driven, with
debt swap scheme (DSS), debt consolidation and
relief facility (DCRF) and interest reset on high cost
borrowings from the NSSF contributing to the
reduction in the interest rates on liabilities of the
states owed to the centre.13
Table II.7 : Debt Servicing Indicators |
States |
Interest Payments to
Revenue Receipts |
Interest Payments to
GSDP |
Interest Payments to
Revenue Expenditure |
1995-96
to
1999-00 |
2000-01
to
2004-05 |
2005-06
to
2009-10 |
2010-11
to
2013-14* |
1995-96
to
1999-00 |
2000-01
to
2004-05 |
2005-06
to
2009-10 |
2010-11
to
2013-14* |
1995-96
to
1999-00 |
2000-01
to
2004-05 |
2005-06
to
2009-10 |
2010-11
to
2013-14* |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
Non-Special Category |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Andhra Pradesh |
16.9 |
23.5 |
15.4 |
11.4 |
2.0 |
3.0 |
2.2 |
1.7 |
15.0 |
20.8 |
15.8 |
11.6 |
Bihar |
20.2 |
24.5 |
14.0 |
8.3 |
4.4 |
4.5 |
3.2 |
1.8 |
17.9 |
21.6 |
15.5 |
9.1 |
Chhattisgarh |
- |
16.0 |
8.2 |
4.3 |
- |
2.1 |
1.4 |
0.9 |
- |
15.8 |
9.8 |
4.8 |
Goa |
12.2 |
16.3 |
15.7 |
11.7 |
2.4 |
3.0 |
2.3 |
1.9 |
11.7 |
14.8 |
16.1 |
12.1 |
Gujarat |
17.4 |
27.1 |
21.8 |
17.0 |
1.9 |
3.0 |
2.3 |
1.8 |
15.4 |
21.5 |
21.6 |
17.2 |
Haryana |
15.7 |
21.6 |
13.1 |
13.5 |
2.1 |
2.5 |
1.5 |
1.4 |
13.4 |
20.2 |
13.2 |
12.6 |
Jharkhand |
- |
12.4 |
11.6 |
8.9 |
- |
1.8 |
1.9 |
1.7 |
- |
12.0 |
11.2 |
9.6 |
Karnataka |
13.6 |
17.2 |
11.1 |
8.9 |
1.7 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
1.3 |
12.6 |
15.8 |
12.0 |
9.2 |
Kerala |
19.5 |
27.2 |
21.5 |
15.7 |
1.8 |
2.8 |
2.5 |
2.2 |
16.1 |
20.6 |
18.3 |
14.1 |
Madhya Pradesh |
14.8 |
19.5 |
13.8 |
8.7 |
2.9 |
3.2 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
13.0 |
17.3 |
15.5 |
9.8 |
Maharashtra |
15.1 |
21.6 |
16.9 |
14.0 |
1.4 |
2.2 |
1.8 |
1.4 |
13.4 |
17.1 |
17.4 |
13.9 |
Odisha |
26.1 |
33.2 |
16.3 |
8.8 |
3.1 |
4.9 |
2.7 |
1.6 |
20.1 |
27.3 |
18.2 |
9.6 |
Punjab |
32.6 |
30.2 |
23.3 |
19.9 |
3.6 |
3.9 |
3.0 |
2.4 |
25.4 |
23.0 |
20.1 |
17.2 |
Rajasthan |
22.9 |
30.4 |
20.9 |
13.6 |
2.6 |
4.0 |
3.1 |
1.9 |
19.0 |
24.6 |
20.5 |
14.0 |
Tamil Nadu |
13.8 |
18.4 |
12.5 |
10.7 |
1.6 |
2.2 |
1.6 |
1.4 |
12.0 |
16.3 |
13.0 |
10.6 |
Uttar Pradesh |
27.2 |
30.2 |
16.0 |
11.2 |
3.1 |
4.0 |
2.8 |
2.2 |
21.0 |
23.6 |
16.7 |
11.7 |
West Bengal |
28.9 |
47.3 |
37.9 |
25.8 |
2.4 |
4.4 |
3.8 |
2.8 |
20.2 |
30.8 |
27.8 |
21.3 |
NSC states |
19.4 |
25.3 |
17.1 |
12.6 |
2.2 |
3.1 |
2.3 |
1.8 |
16.4 |
20.8 |
17.2 |
12.7 |
SC States |
12.5 |
16.6 |
11.7 |
8.6 |
2.7 |
3.9 |
3.2 |
2.2 |
12.8 |
15.8 |
13.4 |
9.2 |
All States |
18.7 |
24.3 |
16.5 |
12.2 |
1.9 |
2.6 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
16.1 |
20.3 |
16.8 |
12.4 |
NSC = Non-special category states; SC = Special category states
*: 2012-13 relates to revised estimates & 2013-14 relates to budget estimates.
–: Nil/ Not Available
Note: 1. Data for ‘All states’ in Columns 6 to 9 are expressed as per cent to GDP
2: Data for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh for the period 1995-96 to 1999-2000 pertain to the former undivided states |
2.34 Overall, the debt position of state
governments has shown an improvement as is
evident from various debt sustainability indicators.
However, the recent growth slowdown and volatility
in the financial markets may affect the financial
health of the state governments, particularly those
which have relatively high debt-GSDP ratios. The slowdown in the growth momentum may affect the
revenue raising capacity of state governments, which
may not only contribute to incremental debt but also
have an adverse impact on their debt servicing
capacity. Moreover, withdrawal of interest relief14 for
those states which have not adhered to their FRBM
targets may increase their debt service burden.
8. Going Beyond the Conventional Debt
Sustainability Analysis: Contingent liabilities
and unfunded liabilities of the states can
increase the risk to their fiscal and debt
sustainability
2.35 The conventional debt sustainability
analysis, though useful, may not provide a
comprehensive assessment of debt sustainability,
as it is based on a narrow coverage of debt and
excludes contingent, implicit and off-budget
liabilities. Apart from issues of debt coverage, this
analysis is generally done in a static framework
and, therefore, it does not account for fiscal and
economic behaviour in response to shocks
(sensitivity analysis) and fiscal vulnerabilities
(stress-testing exercise).
2.36 In India, while the enactment and
implementation of rule based fiscal policies have
resulted in a gradual move towards sustainability
of the state governments’ fiscal and debt positions,
the issuance of guarantees by them has remained
an area of concern. Notwithstanding strict monitoring
of overall borrowing limits and adherence to various
restrictions15, states have been able to raise
additional ‘off-budget’ borrowings with guarantees
through state controlled special purpose vehicles
(SPVs) and/or state-owned public sector enterprises
(SPSEs). In recognition of the fiscal risk associated
with guarantees, both fresh issuances and
outstanding, a Group of State Finance Secretaries
on the Fiscal Risk on State Government Guarantees
(2002) had underlined the importance of according
appropriate risk weights with respect to devolvement
of guarantees, and making adequate budgetary provisions for honouring these guarantees in case
they devolve on the states.
2.37 State-wise data on explicit guarantees from
1990-91 onwards (refer to Statement 30) indicates
that there was a declining trend in outstanding
guarantees at the aggregate level in the 2000s. This
reflected the impact of fixing limits on annual
incremental guarantees as ratio of GSDP or total
revenue receipts under the FRBM Acts/FRLs
enacted by state governments. Notwithstanding
this, these explicit contingent liabilities as at end-
March 2012 had increased substantially in some
states.
2.38 The guarantee commitments of state
governments with respect to SPSEs are, in fact, a
major source of potential risk to fiscal and debt
sustainability at the state level in general16 and in
those states in particular where SPSEs have
accumulated huge losses and debt liabilities
(Table II.8). In this context, it may be pertinent to
draw attention to the financial burden on state
governments arising from their participation in
financial restructuring plan (FRP) of their power
distribution companies17.
2.39 The fiscal implications of the FRP for
participating states are linked to four major aspects:
(i) issuance of bonds by the state-owned power
distribution companies (discoms) with respect to
50 per cent of short-term liabilities (STL) as on
March 31, 2012 and its subsequent replacement
through issuance of special securities by the state
governments; (ii) issuance of guarantees towards
interest and principal repayment of the balance 50
per cent of STL to be restructured by banks/FIs and other creditors; (iii) implementation of
mandatory conditions under the FRP having
financial implications18; and (iv) sharing of burden
in respect of operational losses and working capital
loans (as indicated in the FRP guidelines of the
Ministry of Power) by state governments with
banks/financial institutions (FIs).
Table II.8: Debt and Accumulated Profit/Loss Position of State PSUs |
(` billion) |
States |
2009-10 |
2010-11 |
2011-12 |
Debt |
Accumulated
Profits/Losses(-) |
Debt |
Accumulated
Profits/Losses(-) |
Debt |
Accumulated
Profits/Losses(-) |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
Andhra Pradesh |
.. |
.. |
297.7 |
-2.8 |
356.1 |
-0.2 |
Arunachal Pradesh |
0.1 |
– |
0.1 |
– |
0.1 |
-0.2 |
Assam |
14.3 |
-12.8 |
12.2 |
-10.9 |
15.1 |
-22.5 |
Bihar |
90.4 |
-46.2 |
102.4 |
-72.1 |
117.4 |
-98.2 |
Chhattisgarh |
42.5 |
18.1 |
52.6 |
20.5 |
85.8 |
20.0 |
Goa |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
Gujarat |
237.3 |
-6.0 |
268.6 |
1.7 |
302.5 |
16.9 |
Haryana |
174.4 |
-50.9 |
199.4 |
-56.8 |
218.4 |
-86.2 |
Himachal Pradesh |
26.7 |
-8.5 |
30.8 |
-12.9 |
36.0 |
-13.6 |
Jammu and Kashmir |
45.0 |
-13.4 |
47.3 |
-15.3 |
44.6 |
-16.5 |
Jharkhand |
47.6 |
-5.9 |
50.5 |
-16.5 |
60.2 |
-63.9 |
Karnataka |
247.0 |
-2.0 |
253.6 |
10.1 |
292.0 |
13.7 |
Kerala |
.. |
.. |
.. |
.. |
24.0 |
30.5 |
Madhya Pradesh |
101.6 |
-114.9 |
136.0 |
-139.2 |
.. |
.. |
Maharashtra |
277.0 |
-85.4 |
343.5 |
-96.1 |
474.2 |
-115.5 |
Manipur |
0.3 |
-0.1 |
0.3 |
-0.1 |
0.1 |
-0.1 |
Meghalaya |
8.7 |
-5.2 |
11.3 |
-6.2 |
10.8 |
6.7 |
Mizoram |
0.3 |
-0.4 |
0.3 |
-0.5 |
0.3 |
-0.5 |
Nagaland |
0.4 |
-0.3 |
0.5 |
-0.3 |
0.5 |
-0.5 |
Odisha |
55.5 |
21.4 |
75.9 |
23.4 |
74.7 |
22.5 |
Punjab |
128.1 |
-106.4 |
104.6 |
-121.9 |
119.9 |
-124.9 |
Rajasthan |
264.4 |
-13.4 |
362.6 |
-20.7 |
459.8 |
-15.9 |
Sikkim |
4.6 |
-0.7 |
4.0 |
-0.7 |
2.6 |
-0.8 |
Tamil Nadu |
309.0 |
-213.0 |
467.9 |
-336.2 |
431.6 |
-596.4 |
Tripura |
1.1 |
-3.0 |
1.3 |
-3.2 |
2.0 |
-3.5 |
Uttar Pradesh |
143.8 |
-190.2 |
250.8 |
-226.0 |
359.5 |
-293.8 |
Uttarakhand |
25.9 |
-4.2 |
24.7 |
-8.1 |
28.8 |
-19.1 |
West Bengal |
291.1 |
-50.2 |
271.2 |
-50.5 |
.. |
.. |
–: Nil/Negligible. .. : Not available.
Source: State Audit Reports on Public Sector Undertakings, CAG. |
2.40 As the state governments take over the
bonds to be issued by the discoms, it will add to
their outstanding debt liabilities. The issuance of
bonds by discoms is required to be guaranteed by
the state governments. In addition, the repayment
of principal and interest, with respect to the balance
50 per cent of the STL to be rescheduled by lenders and serviced by the discoms, is also to be fully
secured by state government guarantees. These
guarantees will have a bearing on the states’
contingent liabilities.
2.41 In view of the foregoing and considering
the strong presence of contingent liabilities in some
states, there is a need for a holistic assessment of
state government debt. The debt position of state
governments should be seen together with their
off-budget liabilities and borrowings through SPVs
while also taking into account the potential risks to
state finances arising from the dismal health of
SPSEs, particularly state power utilities.
9. Goods and Services Tax: Need for building
consensus between centre and states for
introduction of GST
2.42 A major indirect tax reform which has been
engaging the attention of policy makers, both at
the central and state government levels, as well as
industry associations in the last few years is the
introduction of the goods and services tax (GST).
The proposed GST is a comprehensive destination
based tax on manufacture, sale and consumption
of goods and services, with individual central and
state components in the tax structure, viz., CGST
and SGST, respectively. GST will replace a number
of indirect taxes presently being levied by the
central and the state governments and is intended
to remove cascading of taxes (Table II.9). The
switch to a GST regime will, on the one hand,
streamline the entire indirect tax system by
reducing inter-state differentials in tax rates,
subsuming a large number of taxes into an
aggregate levy, which, once paid, can be claimed
as credit against subsequent tax payments
anywhere in the country. On the other hand, it will
incentivise countless producers to enroll themselves
into the tax system, because in not doing so their
competitive edge will get reduced.
Table II.9: Taxes to be Subsumed
in the Proposed GST |
Taxes levied by the Central
Government which would be
subsumed in CGST |
Taxes levied by the State
Government which would be
subsumed in SGST |
(i) Central Excise Duty |
(i) VAT / Sales tax |
(ii) Additional Excise Duty |
(ii) Entertainment tax (unless it is levied by the local bodies) |
(iii) Excise Duty levied under the Medicinal and Toiletries Preparation Act |
(iii) Luxury tax |
(iv) Service Tax |
(iv) Taxes on lottery, betting and gambling |
(v) Additional Customs Duty, commonly known as Countervailing Duty (CVD) |
(v) State cesses and
surcharges in so far as they
relate to supply of goods
and services |
(vi) Special Additional Duty of Customs |
(vi) Entry tax not in lieu of octroi |
(vii) Surcharges |
|
(viii) Cesses |
|
Note: 1. Taxes on alcohol and petroleum products are kept out of
GST.
2. Tax on tobacco products will be subject to GST but the
central government can levy extra excise duty over and
above GST. |
2.43 The states’ own tax revenue-GDP ratio has
grown from an average of 5.8 per cent during the
high growth phase, i.e.,2004-08 to 6.6 per cent in
2012-13 (RE). While there could be some revenue
loss to the states in the short-term due to reduced
manoeuvrability in fixing tax rates, improvement in
tax compliance, facilitated by the IT infrastructure
to be used for GST implementation, is expected to
increase tax buoyancy in the medium term.
2.44 The Empowered Committee of State
Finance Ministers has been working with the
central government for preparing the road map for
the introduction of GST. As a preparatory step to
implementing GST, the central government had
introduced the 115th Constitution Amendment Bill
in the Parliament on March 22, 2011. The bill
sought to confer simultaneous powers to the
Parliament as well as the state legislatures to make
laws for levying GST. The bill provided for the setting up of two constitutional bodies - GST
Council and GST Dispute Settlement Authority
(DSA). The GST Council will make recommendations
on all key matters pertaining to GST such as
taxation rates under both CGST and SGST and
exemptions from GST. The DSA will be responsible
for any disputes amidst the Union/states/members
with respect to GST. The Constitution Amendment
Bill will have to be passed by two-thirds majority in
the Parliament, which is then to be ratified by
legislatures of at least half the states. The bill was
referred to the Standing Committee on Finance on
March 29, 2011; the committee tabled its report in
the Parliament on August 5, 2013, the main
recommendations of which are summarised in
Annex 1.
2.45 Two committees were set up by the central
government to deliberate on (a) the compensation
package for the states in lieu of revenue loss on
account of reduction of central sales tax from 4 per
cent to 2 per cent and (b) the GST design. These
two committees submitted their reports in January
2013. As a follow up, three other committees
comprising officials from central and state
governments were constituted in February 2013:
(i) the Committee on Revenue Neutral Rates for
State GST and Central GST and Place of Supply
Rules in GST regime; (ii) the Committee on Inter-
State GST and GST on Import ; and
(iii) the Committee on the Problem of Dual Control,
Threshold and Exemptions in GST. Interim reports
have been given by these committees which are
being examined and deliberated upon by various
stake holders.
2.46 Some of the important issues which need
to be resolved include (i) revenue neutral rate for
GST; (ii) compensation from the central government
for short-term losses, if any, arising from the shift to the proposed GST tax regime; (iii) rules relating
to ‘place of supply’ in order to bring about clarity
as to which state will have jurisdiction over
transactions in case of services that are complex;
(iv) raising the exemption threshold for the benefit
of small businesses and; (v) issues relating to the
introduction of an integrated GST (I-GST).
2.47 Inter-state trade is currently being subjected
to central sales tax (CST) which is levied by the
centre but collected and appropriated by the states.
As this tax is origin based, it is inconsistent with
the proposed GST which is a destination based
tax. Keeping in view the proposed introduction of
GST from April 1, 2010, it was decided in 2006-07
to phase out CST and accordingly CST rates were
reduced in 2007-08 and 2008-09. The states were
to be compensated for the reduction in CST rates.
The central government has released to the states
a sum of `308.6 billion as compensation for CST
reduction for the years 2008-09 and 2009-10. The
centre has made a budgetary provision of `93
billion in 2013-14 as the first instalment of the
balance amount of CST compensation to states
for the year 2010-11.
2.48 Keeping in view the requirement of a strong
IT infrastructure for the implementation of GST
regime, Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN),
a Section 25 company has been set up. It will
primarily be responsible for the implementation
and sustenance of the IT infrastructure. The budget
for 2013-14 has made a provision of `1 billion for
providing recurring grant to GSTN.
2.49 Most of the states and UTs have already
enabled mission mode projects for computerisation
of commercial taxes to align with the roll out of
GST. Most of the states/UTs have completed the
legal changes required to enable the e-services
and have started accepting electronic tax returns. As at end-December 2013, out of the 33 states/
UTs19, 32 have started e-registration. Thirty two
states/UTs have commenced e-payment facility to
their dealers. Most of the states/UTs have made
PAN compulsory for filing return. Twenty seven
states/UTs have collected more than 80 per cent
of PAN details from their dealers and remaining
states/UTs are collecting it on priority. Seventeen
states have started e-issuance of forms required
for inter-state trade.
2.50 Based on the recommendations of the
Standing Committee on Finance and inputs from
various committees set up by the centre, a revised
draft Constitution Amendment Bill was prepared
by the centre for consideration by the Empowered
Committee of State Finance Ministers. The states
did not agree on provisions regarding inclusion of
petroleum, alcoholic liquor and entry tax in the
proposed GST, as this might dent their revenue
collections. It may be mentioned that the VAT rate
levied by states at present ranges from 0.1 per cent
to 33.2 per cent for petrol and from 9.2 per cent to
25 per cent for diesel. Tax revenue from alcoholic
liquor is significant for some states as the
manufacture of liquor is subject to state excise duty
and its sale is subject to VAT; state excise duty on
alcohol and intoxicants alone contributed over 15
per cent of states’ own tax revenue in 13 out of the
30 states/UTs in 2012-13(RE).
2.51 The Empowered Group on IT Infrastructure
on GST (Chairman: Nandan Nilekani) has stated,
“a fully electronic GST can dramatically increase
tax collections by reducing leakages. Tools such
as matching the input tax credit, data mining and
pattern detection will deter tax evasion and thus
increase collections.” While the timing of the
introduction of GST is still uncertain, a consensus
needs to be built through confidence building
measures/steps both by the central and state
governments, for the successful rollout of GST
without any further delay. This would improve
compliance and increase overall tax buoyancy.
10. Conclusion
2.52 States, while managing their finances
prudently, are also saddled with the additional
responsibility of reinvigorating the slowing economy
by utilising the fiscal space available with some of
them to invest in productive sectors of the economy.
The initiative taken by the centre in restructuring
CSS will provide states with some fiscal space to
manoeuvre the schemes to their advantage by
enhancing their impact on the development of
states. An early resolution of differences between
the centre and the states and among the states
themselves will facilitate removing the legislative
hurdles for the introduction of GST, with attendant
benefits to tax revenue and growth in the medium-term.
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